On March 7, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) stayed two provisions of the FCC’s ICS rules: 47 CFR § 64.6010 (setting caps on ICS calling rates that vary based on the size and type of facility being served) and 47 CFR § 64.6020(b)(2) (setting caps for single-call services). The D.C. Circuit’s March 7 Order denied motions for stay of the FCC’s ICS rules “in all other respects.” On March 23, 2016, the D.C. Circuit modified the stay imposed in the March 7 Order to provide that “47 CFR § 64.6030 (imposing interim rate caps)” be stayed as applied to “intrastate calling services.”

In accordance with the 2015 ICS Order, the rules limiting charges for ancillary services—other than the rule related to single-call services, which the D.C. Circuit stayed—took effect on March 17, 2016 for all ICS calls from prisons, and will take effect on June 20, 2016 for all ICS calls from jails (see chart below). Those same effective dates also apply to the rates for ICS calls involving TTY devices, the rule governing the treatment of taxes and fees, the rule prohibiting per-call or per-connection charges, the rule prohibiting flat-rate calling, and the rules governing minimum and maximum calling account balances.

In addition, the interim rate caps – $0.21 per-minute for debit and prepaid ICS calls and $0.25 per-minute for collect ICS calls – set forth in the FCC’s rules are in effect for all interstate ICS calls.

Despite the legal fight over these rates between the FCC and ICS providers such as Securus Technologies and Global Tel*Link, the elephant in the room, commissions paid to correctional facilities by the ICS vendors, has not been fundamentally addressed in this rule-making process.

In a submission to the FCC responding to objections to his petition to reconsider the latest FCC rule-making on ICS rates, lawyer Michael S. Hamden distills the issues and risks succinctly. He states, “But, as set forth in the Petition, the Second ICS Order fell short of the comprehensive reform necessary because the Commission failed to address the primary cause of ICS marketplace dysfunction—site commission payments.”

“In granting a stay of the implementation of permanent ICS rates, the appellate court necessarily concluded that appellants are likely to succeed as to one or more of their challenges to the Second ICS Order. Should appellants ultimately prevail, the foundation upon which the Second ICS Order rests may well collapse. From a practical perspective, such an outcome would be destructive of the investment of time and resources of all parties over two decades, as well as the considerable time, energy, and political capital expended by the Commission in its effort to ensure just and reasonable charges and practices by ICS providers, while taking care to set rates that provide fair compensation for “each and every completed intrastate and interstate call . . ..”

His analysis of the situation continues, “The Commission declined to regulate site commissions or mandate any sort of facility cost recovery, at least in part because the record before it “contain[ed] a wide range of conflicting views regarding whether correctional facilities incur any costs that are directly reasonably related to making ICS available and that must be recovered through ICS rates.” The Commission did not require ICS providers or correctional facilities to report data regarding facility costs, and, consequently, it did not receive “sufficiently detail[ed]” data demonstrating facility costs from which to determine an appropriate level of facility compensation. The Wright Petitioners argue the Commission was correct to decline to establish rules that would have created a facility cost recovery fee additive because it did not have “concrete evidence in the record of the actual costs incurred by correctional facilities.” That lack of data, however, is exactly why the Commission cannot have fully analyzed and ruled on a facility cost recovery mechanism.”

He concludes with, “Comprehensive ICS reform has been a long time coming. This proceeding and its predecessor have been pending for twenty years. The threat is real that the persistent efforts of so many may end in a cataclysmic unraveling of reform measures painstakingly fashioned to provide certainty with regard to just and reasonable ICS charges and practices, as well as fair compensation for all ICS calls.

There is still time for the various parties to come together and work toward an ICS regulatory scheme in which rates and fees are capped at just levels, site commissions are prohibited, and facilities are modestly compensated for their ICS expenses through a fair cost recovery mechanism.”

Whether this happens or not, remains to be seen.

The post FCC Inmate Phone Rate Ruling At Risk appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), in a recent FCC filing for Docket No. 12-375 (Inmate Calling Services), made the case that jails should be compensated for the costs they incur to allow inmate calling service (ICS). The FCC, in its Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SFNPRM), proposed the elimination of the payment of site commissions as a category to correctional facilities, including jails.

On January 12, 2015, NSA’s submitted a cost survey to the FCC which provided information on the cost to Sheriffs to provide security and administrative functions necessary to allow ICS in jails. Sheriffs operating jails in 23 states and the District of Columbia reported the number of hours per week officers, supervisors and other employees spent on monitoring/security duties and administrative duties in connection with ICS and the annual compensation for the officers and employees engaged in these duties.

With respect to monitoring/security duties, the Sheriffs reported time spent on call monitoring, responding to ICS system alerts, responding to law enforcement requests for records/recordings, call recording analysis, enrolling inmates for voice biometrics, and other duties.

With respect to administrative duties, the Sheriffs reported time spent on system administration, answering questions from the public, answering questions from inmates, blocking/unblocking numbers, providing escorts for phone repairs, educating inmates on the use of ICS and other duties.

Sheriffs also were asked to provide the most recent three months of data from ICS providers concerning the total minutes of use for the facility for each month. From this data, the per minute cost for each facility was calculated.

The NSA cost survey provides the inputs for a sampling of jails of all sizes for the hours spent on ICS related duties, the salaries and benefits for the officers and employees performing the ICS-related duties and the number of ICS minutes for the jails.

This input data was then used to calculate a per minute cost to perform the duties associated with ICS for each jail. Excluding the highest cost jails (any result over $1.00), which might reasonably be considered outliers, the average per minute cost for jails by average daily population (ADP):

• $0.409 for jails with 1-99 ADP
• $0.209 for jails with 100-349 ADP
• $0.088 for jails with 350-999 ADP
• $0.059 for jails with 1000-2499 ADP

(NSA’s survey includes only one facility with ADP of 2500 or more, with a per minute compensation amount of approximately $0.007.)

However, after taking into account similar analysis conducted by Pay-Tel, CenturyLink, Praeses, Global Tel*Link, it proposes the following commission rates:

ADP                                     Per Minute Compensation

1-349                                         $0.09-$0.11

350-2,499                                  $0.05-$0.08

?2,500                                       $0.01-$0.02

The NSA concludes its analysis by stating that facility costs should be recovered via a per minute amount added to the per minute ICS rate and that if Sheriffs do not receive compensation, they would have the incentive to reduce the amount of unrecoverable cost by reducing access to ICS.

The NSA further states, “Unlike food, shelter and healthcare, there is no obligation on the public at large to pay for inmate calling services. Some argue, and the Commission has found, that the public benefits from ICS because it keeps children in touch with incarcerated parents and reduces recidivism, which reduces the costs to our justice and prison systems. Even if this is true, it does not change the fact that the Communications Act and Commission precedent establish that costs incurred in connection with a service should be recovered from the cost causer. Nor does it change the fact that the Commission has no authority under the Communications Act to mandate the recovery of cost from general taxpayers. It also does not change the fact that in most cases ICS is a discretionary service and that Sheriffs have wide latitude in determining the extent of ICS calling that will be allowed.”

The post Sheriffs’ Association Makes Case For Jail Call Commissions appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The inmate communication services industry is being fundamentally reshaped by the FCC. Potentially more significant than its predecessor initiative, which significantly reduced prison payphone long-distance rates, the recently issued Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks comment on key drivers of revenue and profit for these prison payphone providers and the prisons themselves.

With the two largest providers of payphone services owned by private equity firms, not usually known for embracing a shrinking profit model, it will be interesting to see how they push their investments to respond – both at the FCC and in the market. One potential bright spot is the increase in call volume achieved post LD rate reduction mentioned below by Commissioner Clyburn. However, with a limited number of payphones per prison facility and call length typically limited to 15 minutes per day, there is a natural cap on the call volume increase that can be hoped for to offset reduced rates and fees. (We do know of one way to provide enhanced access to communications and unlimited calling…)

The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks comment on the following:

• Permanent rate caps on local, intrastate and interstate calling
• What level of cap would ensure coverage of the enhanced security requirements of inmate calling
• The elimination of per-call connection fees
• Prohibiting site commissions as a category for all interstate and intrastate services but permitting facilities to recover any legitimate costs of provisioning inmate calling services
• Capping and restricting ancillary fees, such as fees to open and maintain calling card accounts
• Phasing in these changes, with rate caps being effective in 90 days and a 2-year transition away from site commissions.
• Ensuring that inmate calling services are accessible for all Americans, including inmates and families with disabilities.
• Effective methods of enforcing inmate calling rate rules and reviewing their effect.

According to FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler this second rulemaking on prison payphone calls is being undertaken because, “Despite positive steps forward on interstate rates, it is clear that a more comprehensive approach to reform is necessary to address problems that continue to drive up rates. Namely, charges for “ancillary services” for an increasing array of services are on the rise; intrastate rates, which encompass the vast majority of calls from correctional facilities, remain very high in many states; and, most importantly, site commissions – payments required by correctional institutions from ICS providers for the privilege of serving those facilities – continue to be demanded and appear to be the driving force behind increased rates and ancillary fees. There are some positive signs that reform of interstate rates has resulted in reduced rates and increased calling, but absent a comprehensive solution to the problem we will continue to find ourselves in a never ending game of ICS rate whack-a-mole.”

Commissioner Mignon Clyburn stated, “The impact of the first phase of reform of our nation’s inmate calling regime has been tremendous. Our decision shows that doing the right thing can have reverberating benefits. Since February, when the interstate rate caps of $0.21 for debit/prepaid calls and $0.25 for collect calls went into effect, call volumes across state lines have increased nearly 70% in some facilities, and over 300% at one state department of corrections.

These are not just empty statistics. More affordable rates can help bring about increased and regular contact between inmates and their families. Studies show that having meaningful communication beyond prison walls can make a real difference when it comes to maintaining community ties, promoting rehabilitation, and reducing recidivism.”

The post FCC Seeks To Kill Prison Payphone Site Commissions appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The FCC has released its order (FCC 13-113) detailing the rules associated with the regulating of prison payphone interstate calling rates. This is the culmination of FCC Proposed Rule Making 12-375 (The Wright Petition – follow the link for to see the new proposed rates) in which the Federal Communications Commission proposed to lower rates charged to prison inmates for long distance telephone calls by considering changes to its regulations governing rates for interstate inter-exchange inmate calling services (ICS), after studying the issue for nine years.

The ruling effectively guts the per minute LD rates and one-time per call fees companies such as Global Tel*Link and Securus Technologies can charge imates and their families as well as the commissions paid to Federal, State and County prisons.

The FCC claims that commissions are “not recoverable through interstate ICS rates because the record makes clear that they are not a direct cost of providing interstate ICS.”

It also sets the ground work for a similar action on intrastate rates. Relevant excerpts from the ruling relating to one time fees and to the payment of commissions to jails and prisons by the prison payphone providers are below. Securus has previously stated that it will go to court to stop the implementation of these rules.

As the prison payphone companies and prisons grapple with the challenge of recovering the revenues associated with this order, we suggest they consider meshDETECT Secure Prison Cell Phone Solutions™ as a potential new service offering that also reduces the demand for contraband cell phones while reducing recidivism.

Commissions

The Commission has previously held that site commissions are-for purposes of considering ICS rates under section 276—an apportionment of profit, not a cost of providing ICS.In the 2012 ICS NPRM, the Commission sought comment on its prior conclusion that site commission payments, or “location rents are not a cost of payphones, but should be treated as profit.” Site commission payments are not costs that are reasonably and directly related to the provision of ICS because they are payments made to correctional facilities or departments of corrections for a wide range of purposes, most or all of which have no reasonable and direct relation to the provision of ICS. After carefully considering the record, we reaffirm the Commission’s previous holding and conclude that site commission payments are not part of the cost of providing ICS and therefore not compensable in interstate ICS rates.

In this Order we find that site commissions are not recoverable through interstate ICS rates because the record makes clear that they are not a direct cost of providing interstate ICS. If commissions or other payments from ICS providers to correctional facilities reflect costs of providing ICS, providers have several avenues available to them.

Although it is clear that site commissions are a revenue stream to the correctional facility, we cannot foreclose the possibility that some portion of payments from ICS providers to some correctional facilities may, in certain circumstances, reimburse correctional facilities for their costs of providing ICS. As a result, we provide several avenues for exploring this issue further. First, we set the interim safe harbors and interim rate caps at conservative levels above costs in our record. Second, any ICS provider seeking a waiver of the rate cap or seeking to justify costs between the safe harbor and the interim rate cap may provide specific details about payments to correctional facilities that it contends are compensable for costs meeting our cost standards through interstate ICS rates as articulated in this Order. Third, as part of the mandatory data collection we initiate below, we will seek further information on payments to correctional facilities and whether they cover any costs of service. Finally, in our accompanying Further Notice, we seek comment on whether we should categorically find that payments to correctional facilities are not compensable costs, or whether there are certain compensable costs that those payments can legitimately address. In his Dissent, Commissioner Pai notes that this Order recognizes that excluding sitecommissions from cost data used to develop our safe harbor benchmark and rate cap may be an “underinclusive approach given that correctional institutions themselves often incur costs to provide ICS and those costs may need to be included in any costs-of-service estimates.” While it is correct that the rates and cost studies that the Commission used as a basis for the safe harbor benchmarks and the interim rate caps do not includesite commission payments, the Commission did not exclude them. Rather, the rates used to establish the safe-harbor benchmarks are rates for service in states that have prohibited site commission payments. Also, the ICS provider cost studies that we use as a basis for the interim rate caps adopted in the Order were prepared by the ICS providers to show costs of service excluding site commission payments. Furthermore, we do not remove costs or adjust inputs from the data used to establish the interim rate caps. For example, both cost studies used to establish the interim rate caps use an 11.25% rate of return to determine the cost of capital. We do not opine on whether this input is appropriate in this context. Instead, we accepted the figures in the cost study, as asserted, without considering whether they represent accurate levels of costs that are reasonably and directly related to provision of interstate ICS and, therefore, are appropriately recoverable thought interstate ICS rates. Consequently, it is likely that these cost figures are overstated, but we accept that possibility as part of our decision to set conservative interim rate cap levels.

We also disagree with ICS providers’ assertion that the Commission must defer to states on any decisions about site commission payments, their amount, and how such revenues are spent. We do not conclude that ICS providers and correctional facilities cannot have arrangements that include site commissions. We conclude only that, under the Act, such commission payments are not costs that can be recovered through interstate ICS rates. Our statutory obligations relate to the rates charged to end users— the inmates and the parties whom they call. We say nothing in this Order about how correctional facilities spend their funds or from where they derive. We state only that site commission payments as a category are not a compensable component of interstate ICS rates. We note that we would similarly treat “in-kind” payment requirements that replace site commission payments in ICS contracts.

Per Call Fees

We are concerned about the evidence regarding current per-call rates and associated practices. In particular, we are concerned that a rate structure with a per-call charge can impact the cost of calls of short duration, potentially rendering such charges unjust, unreasonable and unfair. We have particular concerns when calls are dropped without regard to whether there is a potential security or technical issue, and a per-call charge is imposed on the initial call and each successive call. As a result, we conclude that unreasonably high per-call charges and/or unnecessarily dropped calls that incur multiple per-call charges are not just and reasonable

Our interim rate structure will help address concerns raised about unreasonable per-call charges while we consider further reforms in the Further Notice. As described above, we adopt interim safe harbor rate levels and interim rate caps to ensure the overall cost of a 15-minute call is just, reasonable, and fair. ICS providers have the flexibility to satisfy the safe harbor either through a certification that the per-minute rate is at or below the safe harbor, or by demonstrating that the cost of a 15-minute call (including any per-connection charges) is at or below the safe harbor per-minute rate times 15.Thus, where an ICS provider elects to take advantage of the interim safe harbor rate levels described above, we allow the provider flexibility to determine whether its rate structure should include per-call charges. Specifically, we allow ICS providers to calculate whether their rates are at or below the interim safe harbor levels or the interim rate caps by calculating their compliance on the basis of a 15-minute call. Because our interim safe harbors constrain the cost of a 15-minute conversation to a level we find to be just, reasonable, and fair, we find it is appropriate to afford ICS providers such flexibility

Although we are unable to find ancillary charges per se unreasonable based on the record,
we have sufficient information and authority to reach several conclusions regarding ancillary charges. First, as stated earlier, interstate ICS rates must be cost-based, and to be compensable costs must be reasonably and directly related to provision of ICS. Ancillary service charges are no exception; they also fall within this standard and the Commission has the jurisdiction and authority to regulate them. Section 201(b) of the Act requires that “all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with” communications services be just and reasonable. Section 276 of the Act defines “payphone service” to encompass “the provision of inmate telephone service in correctional institutions, and any ancillary services,” and requires that providers be “fairly compensated.” The services associated with these ancillary charges are “in connection with” the inmate payphone services for purposes of section 201(b) and “ancillary” for purposes of section 276. As such, they fall within the standards we articulate above for determining which costs are compensable through interstate ICS rates. Therefore, even if a provider’s interstate ICS rates are otherwise in compliance with the requirements of this Order, the provider may still be found in violation of the Act and our rules if its ancillary service charges are not cost-based.

The post FCC Releases Order (FCC 13-113) Regulating Prison Payphone Costs and Commissions appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The first round of comments are in for the FCC Proposed Rule Making 12-375 (The Wright Petition), and advocates from both sides of the issue have submitted letters and comments on the price of interstate calls from prison.

Some cash-strapped states and facilities collect commissions from prison phone contracts. Texas, for instance, uses some of the money collected for a crime victims’ fund.

Nationwide, states collect more than $150 million a year from prison phone commissions, according to a Prison Legal News survey. These commissions effectively raise call rates, but they also provide funding that states or prisons crave.

“Correctional agencies need those revenues either to lessen the financial burden that prison operations put on state and county budgets, or to implement programs that benefit inmates,” Stephanie A. Joyce, an attorney representing Dallas-based Securus Technologies, advised the FCC in October.

Of particular interest amongst the many briefs, letters and comments was a study of Securus Technologies’ prison payphone costs, commissions and prices across small, medium and large jails as well as state department of corrections (DOC) facilities. The following are some of the highlights from that report:

The costs incurred by Securus for the provision of ICS services to a typical institution in each facility group are summarized in Table 2. The ICS cost figures reflect the average costs incurred by Securus to provide ICS service. The costs include site commissions, bad debt, billing and collection, telecom facilities and services, validation, field technicians, and customer services:

The costs faced by Securus in providing ICS services can also be assessed on a per-call basis. As shown in Table 3, Securus incurred total ICS costs of $2.53 per call in serving the average High 10 facility. For Medium 10 facilities, the company incurred costs of $5.48 per call. For Low 10 institutions, on average, Securus faced ICS costs per call of $11.54 per call. Finally, for DOC facilities, the company’s average ICS cost per call came to $1.51:

In Table 5, the average site commissions reported in Table 4 are divided by the total average costs required to provide ICS services for the facilities in each facility group. The ICS cost figures were previously reported in Table 2:

In Table 6, the average site commissions from Table 4 are divided by the average ICS revenue generated by inmate facilities in each of the four facility groups. The resulting percentages demonstrate the magnitude of site commissions as a function of the average calling revenue earned by Securus in each facility group:

The total number of interstate calls from all Securus facilities nationwide in 2012 was 9,122,432 calls. For the same year, the company processed 106,082,679 interstate minutes. Based on these two figures, the average length of an interstate call from a Securus facility in 2012 was 11.63 minutes.

Table 10 reports the calculated price per call that would apply for an interstate call of average duration that was generated by an average facility in one of the four facility groups. Note that the average call lengths assumed in Table 10 closely track the calculated average call lengths for the four facility groups:

Although it is never explicitly summarized in the report, here is the bottom line: (Using Table 10 to calculate the price per minute and subtracting costs per minute from Table 2)

• High 10 = $1.09 price per minute vs. $0.17 cost per minute = $0.92 profit/minute

• Medium 10 = $1.08 price per minute vs. $0.50 cost per minute = $0.58 profit/minute

• Low 10 = $1.09 price per minute vs. $1.71 cost per minute = ($0.62) profit/minute

• State DOC = $0.46 price per minute vs. $0.10 cost per minute = $0.36 profit/minute

Note: This profit analysis does not take into account intrastate and local calls, which are the majority of prison phone calls.

————————————————————————————————————————-

Methodology for the Securus data: Divide the non-DOC facilities into three groups. Each group contains ten facilities for which Securus provided ICS services in 2012. The three groups included the ten highest volume non-DOC customers (“High 10”), the ten medium volume non-DOC customers (“Medium 10”) and the 10 lowest non-DOC volume customers (“Low 10”) (collectively, the “10-10-10”methodology). For each customer, the volume used to determine membership in each group was based on total minutes.

In addition to these three groups, a fourth group was created consisting of all DOC facilities that Securus served in 2012, of which there are eight (8).

After review of the data provided for the 10-10-10 groups, it was decided to adjust the data as follows: First, a minimum contract revenue of $1,000 was adopted for the Low 10 group. This adjustment removed facilities with extremely low revenue totals that likely reflected measurement periods of less than one year. Second, outlier facilities in the original High 10 group were replaced by alternative facilities. The three outlier facilities reported volume and/or ICS revenue data that for known reasons are not representative of the High 10 Group.

Source

The post Economics Of The Prison Payphone Call appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

A bipartisan group of prison reformers is calling on the Federal Communications Commission to stop phone companies from charging inmates what they call unreasonable and predatory rates to make phone calls.

Here is the full text of the letter:

May 18, 2012

CAP INTERSTATE PRISON PHONE RATES

Chairman Julius Genachowski

Federal Communications Commission

445 12th Street, SW

Washington, DC 20554

RE: Docket No. 96-128, Petitioner Martha Wright et al., Alternative Rulemaking Proposal

Dear Chairman Genachowski:

We write to you as organizations and individuals that represent a wide variety of views on many issues, but that stand united on the need to reduce the exorbitant rates for telephone calls from prisons. Unreasonably high prison phone rates unjustly punish the families of people who are incarcerated, and contribute to rising recidivism rates by deterring regular telephone contact with family members and loved ones. Our diverse groups strongly believe that action on a petition that has been pending before the Federal Communications Commission since 2003 represents a critical opportunity for the Commission to exert its leadership in this area. Accordingly, we urge you to act quickly to address this problem by capping the charges that can be imposed for interstate prison phone calls.

As you are aware from the record that has been compiled at the FCC, the costs of telephone calls from incarcerated people are often extraordinarily high—well beyond what most people in our country pay for telephone service. It is cheaper to call Singapore at 12 cents a minute from a cell phone than it would be to speak to someone in prison in this country. A typical interstate collect call from a prison has a $3.95 connection fee (regardless of the length of the call), while rates per minute can be as high as almost 90 cents per minute. This can result in charges of $10-17 for a 15-minute collect call or $250 per month for a weekly one-hour call. Prisoners do not bear these costs; rather it is the family members and loved ones outside of prison who pay these extremely high rates.

The high rates are caused by the system used to procure telephone service at correctional institutions. Prisons request bids from competing telephone companies, requiring each bid to include the payment of a fee or commission to the prison in addition to the provision of telephone service. The costs of the calls are passed on to prisoners’ families in the form of higher telephone rates, while the prison reaps the benefit of the extra fees and commissions. Thus, prisons have every incentive to choose bids that maximize fees and maximize telephone rates—a clear “moral hazard.” While competition would be everyone’s first choice for constraining telephone prices, in this case consumers—prisoners and their families—have no voice in the selection of the carrier. The prison system that does select the carrier actually benefits from the higher rates, leaving the actual consumers as a literally captive market, unable to shop around for lower prices.

Healthy relationships with their families and other members of the community are the most important factor in prisoners’ successful return to their neighborhood. Maintaining the bonds of a family and support network is a very effective way to reduce recidivism among inmates, which is an important national goal. The rate of recidivism is at crisis levels in the U.S.; within three years of being released, 67 percent of ex-prisoners re-offend and 52 percent are re-incarcerated. Americans are paying dearly for this trend. According to the Pew Center on the States, state and federal spending on corrections has grown 400 percent over the past 20 years, from about $12 billion to about $60 billion. Yet, predatory phone rates discourage regular telephone contact with stable family members and others in the community.

Prisoners’ friends and families often provide the only opportunity incarcerated individuals will have to re-connect with a job and a support network that can prevent them from returning to prison. We need more people connecting to those in prison, not fewer. Sound public policy dictates that we should not disincentivize the very behavior that will help us keep families together and in turn reduce future crime.

It does not have to be this way. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons and several states that have rejected these commission payments charge reasonable rates and maintain superior levels of security. A recent study by the Government Accountability Office found that the Bureau of Prisons typically charged less than most state prison systems, yet continued to produce some profit for use by the prison, and also met its security objectives. To illustrate, the Bureau of Prisons charged 6 cents per minute for local calls and 23 cents per minute for long-distance calls, and generated $34 million in profits in 2010.[1]

In sum, the exorbitant rates paid by prisoners’ families increase recidivism, and place an undue and unfair burden upon the innocent. These spiraling costs are not attributable to security needs and cannot be corrected by a marketplace solution. As the only agency with jurisdiction over long distance rates, the Federal Communications Commission is the correct venue to resolve this problem. A firm stance by the Commission, along with recommendations that will help guide the state regulatory bodies with authority over local telephone rates, will provide a strong impetus to improve the situation at every level. Prisoners will be able to be in more frequent contact with their loved ones, and the public will be safer as a result.

For all the above reasons, we urge you to cap interstate prison phone call rates and take up the long-overdue task of protecting a vulnerable population from abusive practices. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights

ACLU

Rabbi Menachem Katz, The Aleph Institute*

David Keene, American Conservative Union*

Gary Bauer, American Values*

Asian American Justice Center

Chris Cannon, Cannon Industries, Inc.*

Center for Constitutional Rights

Center for Media Justice

Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice

The Constitution Project

Consumers Union

Tom McClusky, FRC Action*

Free Press

Human Rights Defense Center

International CURE

NAACP

Galen Carey, National Association of Evangelicals*

National Council of La Raza

National Hispanic Media Coalition

National Urban League

New America Foundation, Open Technology Initiative

NOW

PolicyLink

Prison Fellowship

Public Knowledge

Rev. Lou Sheldon and Andrea Lafferty, Traditional Values Coalition*

United Church of Christ, OC, Inc.

United Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society

Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs

*Institutional affiliation listed for identification purposes only.

The post Predatory Prison Phone Rates appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

This article discusses the impact prison telephone service commissions have on the overall cost of prisoner’s calling loved ones. The article quotes the recent GAO study on contraband cell phones at the BOP, “lowering rates could increase communication between inmates and their families, helping the inmates reintegrate when they got out of prison. But there would be less money available for things like paying wages for inmate labor and offering education and recreational activities.” Bureau of Prison officials told the GAO that the programs were important because “inmate idleness increases the risk of violence, escapes and other disruptions”

Another approach to enhanced prisoner communication and reduced idleness is to offer a secure cell phone service. Prisoners will have many more opportunities to communicate with family, commissions can be lowered because overall call usage (and therefore total revenue) will increase and contraband cell phone usage will be reduced.

Kimberly Scardina-Gomez has pawned jewelry and even skipped paying the electric bill so she can afford for her 16-year-old son to talk on the phone with his father, who is serving a robbery sentence at a state prison in Illinois.

What really irks her is that phone companies are giving a chunk of the revenue they make from handling calls for families like hers — 42 percent is typical, according to an analysis finished this year— back to jail and prison operators in exchange for the business.

Prison Legal News, a West Brattleboro, Vt.-based publication that advocates for the rights of inmates, found that among state prison systems, commissions cost prisoners’ families, friends and attorneys more than $152 million in 2008, the year studied. A report released this month by the Government Accountability Office found that of the $74 million in revenue generated in 2010 by the Bureau of Prisons’ inmate telephone system, about $34 million was profit.

Under pressure, states such as Kansas and Florida have reduced commissions while others such as Nebraska and New York have stopped accepting commissions. In California, which ended commissions earlier this year, phone rates declined by 61 percent, Prison Legal News found. Advocacy groups want more prison and jail operators to follow suit or persuade the Federal Communications Commission to establish caps on inmate phone rates.

“It’s not fair,” said Scardina-Gomez, a 35-year-old laid off paralegal and second-year law student from Chicago. “You see all kinds of studies talking about how to reduce recidivism, how to stop repeat offenders. Things of that nature all start with family structure. They all start with positive reinforcement, yet they don’t try to reinforce that at all.”

Because of the commissions, receiving calls from inmates cost as much as $15 to $25 for a 15-minute conversation — often five times as high as ordinary collect call rates.

“Whenever you’ve got money in the mix, it’s hard to get away from it,” said Paul Wright, editor of Prison Legal News. “It’s like telling a crack addict to lay off the dope. Even if they know they should, it’s hard to get them to do it.”

The GAO, which studied phone rates as part of a larger report on contraband cell phones being snuck into federal prisons, said lowering rates could increase communication between inmates and their families, helping the inmates reintegrate when they got out of prison. But it said there would be less money available for things like paying wages for inmate labor and offering education and recreational activities.

Bureau of Prison officials told the GAO that the programs were important because “inmate idleness increases the risk of violence, escapes and other disruptions” but noted that Congress would be unlikely to chip in the money. Even critics of the commissions acknowledge it’s tough to generate sympathy for inmates, and Wright said their families are “right up there with single welfare moms and illegal immigrants as far as bashable, disenfranchised constituencies that no one gets too concerned about.”

And the expense isn’t just borne by the families of the 2.3 million people incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons but often by the attorneys who represent them — a practice that some groups allege discourages attorneys from talking to their clients.

The phone companies defend the rates in briefs filed with the FCC, saying their phone systems require costly security devices to keep inmates from harassing potential witnesses or orchestrating crimes from behind bars.

Plus, states and counties — many of them facing deficits because of the recession — have become dependent on the money they earn from the commissions.

“It offsets other costs and allows certain programs for inmates to continue — some training programs, some rehab programs,” said Fred Wilson, director of operations for the National Sheriff’s Association. “However, we have taken a stand and said the rates need to be reasonable.”

Stephanie Joyce, an attorney for Dallas-based inmate communication provider Securus Technologies Inc., which offers phone service for about 2,300 correctional facilities in 44 states, said the issue of who pays for jails and prisons is one for policymakers to decide and that Securus merely collects the commissions when contracts require it to do so.

“If my client doesn’t want to go bankrupt and pay out more than it takes in, then the site commissions must be recovered,” Joyce said. “It wasn’t Securus’ decision to invent site commissions.”

Fifty-five-year-old Samella Green has benefited from a 40-percent reduction in phone rates in Kansas. But the Wichita woman and her husband, who live on federal disability payments, still spend about $200 a month to talk to four incarcerated relatives.

“It’s an enormous weight for people to carry because so many people have family in there,” she said.

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