Consolidation within the prison payphone communications industry, also known as inmate communications services (ICS), continues with Global Tel*Link (GTL) asking the FCC for approval to buy (some? all?) of the assets of Legacy/Edovo.

GTL is the largest provider of ICS in the US. Legacy Inmate Communications is a wholly owned subsidiary of Jail Education Solutions, Inc. d/b/a Edovo (“Edovo”).

From the FCC filling, “On July 2, 2020, GTL, Legacy, and Edovo entered into a Master Transaction Agreement (“Agreement”) pursuant to which GTL will purchase certain assets and customers of Legacy, including certain customer accounts and receivables, certain customer agreements and contracts, certain vendor agreements and contracts, and certain equipment (the “Transaction”).”

Pursuant to the Transaction, Legacy will assign the following correctional facility contracts to GTL:

(1) Cook County, Illinois;

(2) Fresno County, California;

(3) Maine Department of Corrections;

(4) Bay County, Florida;

(5) Sonoma County, California;

(6) Kane County, Illinois;

(7) City of Santa Ana, California;

(8) Jackson County, Oregon;

(9) Mendocino County, California;

(10) Carroll County, Maryland;

(11) Yolo County, California;

(12) Dunn County, Wisconsin;

(13) Santa Clara County, California.

As a result of the Transaction, GTL will provide ICS to the Correctional Facility Customers pursuant to the terms of the above-referenced contracts, which are primarily county jail contracts.

Interestingly, the filing states, “Further, the proposed Transaction will not adversely affect competition because, after consummation of the Transaction, the total share of the interstate interexchange market of GTL will be less than ten percent (10%), and there are many other interexchange and international carriers operating on a nationwide basis, including other ICS providers. The Transaction will not provide Applicants with any competitive advantage as the result of concentration of fiber assets and will not harm consumers or negatively impact the market for facilities-based service. The proposed Transaction will not have a negative impact on the public interest, services to customers, or competition.”

With GTL and Securus Technologies controlling 80% if the total ICS market, we are not sure how this does not, in fact, continue the trend of adversely affecting competition in the ICS industry though the elimination of smaller competing vendors.

What this latest proposed acquisition shows is that the ICS industry is a duopoly and the current competition has neither the scale nor scope to compete. This market structure hinders true competition and thereby the economic and innovation benefits a robust marketplace would bring to inmates and their families.

The following image from a recent Prison Policy Initiative article highlights how these two firms have been allowed to capture this industry through acquisition.

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T-Mobile recently submitted to the FCC a study comparing Managed Access Systems (“MAS”) and precision jamming systems (micro-jamming) as potential solutions to prevent contraband phone use in correctional facilities. This study was submitted to Docket 13-111, Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities.

The study provides an overview of MAS and micro-jamming solutions examining both technical and cost considerations. The paper finds that the cost to deploy and operate the two solutions is roughly equivalent, with the cost for a MAS being less than a jammer solution in larger prisons and the jammer solution being slightly less than an MAS solution for smaller prisons.

However, the study also details a number of detrimental impacts of a jammer solution compared to an MAS solution, such as blocking legitimate use of wireless devices, including use for E911 and FirstNet, jamming other important uses, including GPS, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, and creating a significant potential for interference with use of wireless devices by the general public in surrounding areas.

Based on the findings of the study, any cost/benefit analysis would necessarily have to conclude that a jamming solution is not an appropriate approach to combating contraband devices in prisons given the availability of comparably priced, effective solutions that do not include the negative societal impacts associated with jammers.

It also highlights that, although both solutions prevent the use of contraband devices within correctional facilities, MAS allows officials to permit the operation of authorized devices within correctional facilities, whereas jamming solutions prevent the operation of all devices for all purposes, regardless of legitimacy. Furthermore, the report identifies additional operational benefits available for MAS, e.g, data collection, that are not available with a jamming deployment.

Regarding cost, the study finds that in a large facility, precision jamming is expected to be costlier than  a  MAS  due  to  higher  system  management  and  monitoring  costs,  as  well  as  higher  R.F. jamming head-end costs.  In a medium facility, the precision jamming system’s higher management and head-end costs are expected to be partially offset by the MAS core network costs.  In a small facility, the additional cost of the MAS core network may make it slightly more costly. The following from the report summarizes these findings:

Of particular public interest is the potential impact of micro-jamming on the ongoing deployment of FirstNet nationwide. First Responder communications may be carried on commercial cellular bands. Since a jammer does not discriminate between cellular users, first responders attempting to communicate on the affected cellular frequency bands will be blocked. This would be a problem for first responder communications within the correctional facility, as well as outside of the facility if the jammer degrades local commercial wireless networks that also carry First Responder communications.

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Recently meshIP, LLC submitted  comments to the FCC’s Docket No. 13-111, Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities. We are re-posting  those comments here:

Introduction

meshIP, LLC (“meshIP” or “Company”) respectfully submits these comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC” or “Commission”) Report & Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM”) in the above- captioned proceeding.

meshIP is the provider of meshDETECT©  Secure Prison Cell Phone Solutions™. meshDETECT© is a unique solution to the problem of contraband cell phones in prison that also provides enhanced cellular wireless telephone access to detainees and their families. We offer a patented technology platform that can be offered in any prison interested in the smart deployment and management of secure prison cell phones – which reduces contraband wireless phone demand, promotes improved detainee behavior, reduces recidivism and increases officer safety.

We urge the FCC to consider the potential negative impact of blanket cellular jamming on the deployment and provision of alternate solutions to the demand for contraband cell phones as well as on those technologies that would introduce true choice and competition into the prison payphone industry, a stated goal of the FCC.

Demand and Supply are Two Sides of the Same Coin

We have long advocated for a balanced strategy that addresses both supply AND demand for contraband cell phones within prisons and jails. An effective contraband cell phone elimination strategy should focus on reducing demand, in addition to restricting supply.

Corrections officials have shared with us the fact that at least 40% of the calls intercepted by currently implemented managed access systems are to phone numbers already on inmates’ approved calling lists. We suspect that an even higher percentage are to other family and loved ones not on the limited list of allowed contacts and are also non-criminal wireless usage, i.e. conversations not related to criminal activity.

We believe that the problem of demand for smuggled mobile phones in jail goes beyond the very real problems of long-term offenders looking to continue their drug or crime operations, witness intimidation and the avoidance of high calling rates.

The demand is also driven by an inmate desire for more communication and more privacy (not secrecy). As such, any comprehensive solution should address both sides of the equation – supply and demand. However, like the problem of drug smuggling, without addressing the demand for contraband, the problem will never be solved.

A recent CDCR inmate, now released, shared with us the following insight, “California’s gangs have evolved over the past 5 decades to operate efficiently within the system of scarce resources. They can get gang orders out of a locked down county jail and into a locked down prison 70 miles away between midnight and 2 AM without reliance on any contraband inside either facility, telephones, nor help from staff using only technology from the 1970’s plus a large number of people inside and out working towards a common goal (FGA in custody terms – in furtherance of a gang activity). Sanctioned gang action does not travel over any phone for a reason. The reality is contraband phones are used for calls to friends and family, mostly female, because the current prison payphone system is inadequate to serve the number of people housed within CA’s system of incarceration. Managed Access has become an asset for the gang that controls and sells and profits from the technology to defeat it, since it now drives demand for the product they offer to sell inside while reducing supply of competing alternatives.”

An article[1] written by a current CDCR inmate also provides some interesting insights into this demand and how it is met, “The black market within the fences of the California prison in which I am incarcerated is as bad as any corrections department in this country. In my case, this prison is five hours from home, and the distance makes visitation a financial burden. Some prisoners have it even worse. The vast majority of the prison population lives on the support of loved ones alone. While the cost of a contraband cellphone is high, the corporation-run prepaid call system is downright robbery. Desperate to stay in touch with loved ones and faced with only unaffordable options, incarcerated people turn to the black market, where they are charged as much as $1,000 for a contraband smartphone. Incarcerated persons prefer to take the risk and spend the money on contraband phones than rely on the prison phone system because of the freedom they provide and their functionality beyond making simple calls. There are no time limits and fees to place calls…”

“The drug market is self-sustaining because drugs are consumed almost immediately. There will always be a demand for them, and the supply can flow as freely as they can be smuggled into the housing units. But a phone can possibly last years once you have one. So, there is a need for constant manipulation of the supply in order to ensure a steady stream of demand. The models of phone that I’ve come across are difficult to conceal and this could be deliberate. In the outside world, there are keychain-sized smartphones with 3G capabilities, but rarely have I seen one in here. I bought a basic talk and text-only phone the size of two fingers, and costed me the same amount as a 4G touchscreen model the size of my hand.”

An additional driver of contraband cell phones is the risk/reward ratio associated with the significant financial rewards for those smuggling these devices into prisons. Recent research[2] has linked contraband smuggling to low pay and high turnover for guards — and salaries for corrections officers in the states with the highest smuggling rates are indeed among the lowest in the nation.

However, by siphoning off and co-opting this non-criminal wireless usage, we can significantly reduce the overall demand for contraband cell phones and therefore the profitability for those smuggling these devices. Less financial reward for cell phone smugglers changes the risk/reward equation and makes it much less appealing given the high personal and professional risk for those caught smuggling.

In addition to reducing the demand for, and therefore the supply of, contraband cell phones, enhanced access to telecommunications services have the proven, significant, additional benefits of reducing recidivism, improving detainee behavior and increasing officer safety.

However blanket cellular jamming in prisons and jails will significantly reduce the technology options available to address the demand for contraband cell phones.

Introducing Choice and Competition into the Prison Payphone Industry

Not only will jamming significantly reduce the technology options available to address the demand for contraband cell phones, it will hamstring a viable, cost effective solution to introducing choice and competition into the prison payphone industry.  In fact, the FCC has frequently advocated for competition in the provision and availability of inmate communications services (ICS) in prisons and jails.

In its Second Report And Order And Third Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking[3] (NPRM) adopted on 10/22/15, the Commission wrote, “While we adopt regulations in this Order to correct failures in the ICS market, the Commission generally prefers to rely on competition over regulation. We seek additional comment on whether there are ways to promote competition within the ICS market to enable the Commission to sunset or eliminate our regulations adopted herein in the future. In the 2012 NPRM, the Commission noted that the First Wright Petition asked the Commission to “mandate the opening of the ICS market to competition.”

“In the First Wright Petition, the Petitioners further requested that the Commission address high ICS rates by prohibiting exclusive ICS contracts and collect-call-only restrictions at privately administered prisons, and requiring such facilities to permit multiple long-distance carriers to interconnect with prison telephone systems…The Commission sought comment on whether security issues were still a legitimate reason for limiting competition within correctional facilities, and whether any technological advances had changed the justification for such exclusive use.”

The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) commented, “The ICS commission issue also illustrates the fundamental problem with the existing status quo; specifically, the lack of competition in the ICS industry, in which, in exchange for commission payments, local jails and 42 state prison systems provide ICS providers with monopoly phone service contracts.[4]”

The American Bar Association commented, “The ABA recommends that the FCC use its statutory authority under section 253(d) of the Act to preempt states from entering into exclusive provider agreements, and open up the ICS market to fair and widespread competition.[5]”

And the Wright Petitioners wrote, “The FCC correctly notes that the Petitioners have been calling for the introduction of competition in the ICS market for more than 15 years, and in fact, this goal served as the basis for Martha Wright and the Petitioners to file the original lawsuit.[6]”

Some of the solutions put forth to achieve this goal include an equal access[7] approach similar to that which was put in place to open up local and long distance services to competition wherein consumers picked their local and long distance providers. Others have suggested a “wholesale/retail” bifurcation of the industry providers.

We believe, like the FCC, ABA, HRDC and the Wright Petitioners, that competition is an essential ingredient in breaking the ICS providers’ monopolies in prisons and jails in order to drive market-based pricing.

However, like the consumer market, unfettered and robust choice is what drives real competition. Completely bypassing the monopolists is the best way to ensure this choice. The consumer telecommunications market, while initially cracked open by regulatory schemes such as equal access, was fully emancipated by the introduction and widespread adoption of cellular phones.

An individual “wireless prison payphone” in the form of a secure cellular service offered to any detainee who wants it, without requiring interconnection to the monopolist’s infrastructure or the forced bifurcation of the industry into wholesale/retail providers, will offer true choice and therefore real competition in an industry that has for so long thrown up barriers to any meaningful competition.

By using commercial cellular networks to bypass the monopolists, no potentially insecure and costly infrastructure, such as WiFi[8], is required in a prison facility and therefore no capital costs to the prison facility as well as no risk of interconnection hurdles and artificial costs imposed by the incumbent ICS provider.

The current prison payphones already installed will remain in place, thereby giving inmates and their families a choice. If desired, the inmate can stand in line, waiting for his 15 minute call in a public area on the traditional prison payphone. Or he can make a controlled and sanctioned cellular call of unlimited length in the relative privacy of his cell.

In this way, real market forces will be introduced into the ICS arena thereby fulfilling the stated goals of the FCC, the ABA, the HDRC and the Wright Petitioners as well as providing choice and cost savings to the families of prisoners throughout the United States.

Conclusion

Accordingly, meshIP requests that the FCC considers the potential negative impact of cellular jamming on the competitive landscape and to alternative technology solutions available to address the problem of contraband cell phones in prisons. The approval of blanket cellular signal jamming runs the risk of hamstringing viable alternative solutions not only to this problem but also to the FCC’s long standing commitment to introducing choice and competition into the prison payphone industry.

————————————————————————————————————————————-

[1] https://shadowproof.com/2017/01/05/corrections-officers-control-supply-demand-contraband-phones-prisons/

[2] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/corrections/southern-prisons-have-smuggled-cellphone-problem-n790251

[3]https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-136A1_Rcd.pdf

[4] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001013059.pdf

[5] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001016566.pdf

[6] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001408397.pdf

[7] https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/local-local-toll-and-long-distance-calling

[8] https://prisoncellphones.com/blog/2013/06/06/the-risks-of-wifi-and-internet-deployment-in-prisons/

The post Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The FCC has frequently advocated for competition in the provision and availability of inmate communications services (ICS) in prisons and jails.

In its Second Report And Order And Third Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) adopted on 10/22/15, it wrote, “While we adopt regulations in this Order to correct failures in the ICS market, the Commission generally prefers to rely on competition over regulation. We seek additional comment on whether there are ways to promote competition within the ICS market to enable the Commission to sunset or eliminate our regulations adopted herein in the future. In the 2012 NPRM, the Commission noted that the First Wright Petition asked the Commission to “mandate the opening of the ICS market to competition.”

“In the First Wright Petition, the Petitioners further requested that the Commission address high ICS rates by prohibiting exclusive ICS contracts and collect-call-only restrictions at privately administered prisons, and requiring such facilities to permit multiple long-distance carriers to interconnect with prison telephone systems…The Commission sought comment on whether security issues were still a legitimate reason for limiting competition within correctional facilities, and whether any technological advances had changed the justification for such exclusive use.”

The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) commented, “The ICS commission issue also illustrates the fundamental problem with the existing status quo; specifically, the lack of competition in the ICS industry, in which, in exchange for commission payments, local jails and 42 state prison systems provide ICS providers with monopoly phone service contracts.”

The American Bar Association commented, “The ABA recommends that the FCC use its statutory authority under section 253(d) of the Act to preempt states from entering into exclusive provider agreements, and open up the ICS market to fair and widespread competition.”

And the Wright Petitioners wrote, “The FCC correctly notes that the Petitioners have been calling for the introduction of competition in the ICS market for more than 15 years, and in fact, this goal served as the basis for Martha Wright and the Petitioners to file the original lawsuit.”

Some of the solutions put forth to achieve this goal include an “equal access” approach similar to that which was put in place to open up local and long distance services to competition wherein consumers picked their local and long distance providers. Others have suggested a “wholesale/retail” bifurcation of the industry providers.

We believe, like the FCC, ABA, HRDC and the Wright Petitioners, that competition is an essential ingredient in breaking the ICS providers’ monopolies in prisons and jails in order to drive market-based pricing.

However, like the consumer market, unfettered and robust choice is what drives real competition. Completely bypassing the monopolists is the best way to ensure this choice. The consumer telecommunications market, while initially cracked open by regulatory schemes such as equal access, was fully emancipated by the introduction and widespread adoption of cellular phones.

An individual “wireless prison payphone” in the form of a secure cellular service offered to any detainee who wants it, without requiring interconnection to the monopolist’s infrastructure or the forced bifurcation of the industry into wholesale/retail providers, will offer true choice and therefore real competition in an industry that has for so long thrown up barriers to any meaningful competition.

By using commercial cellular networks to bypass the monopolists, no infrastructure, such as WiFi, is required in a facility and therefore there is no capital cost to the prison facility as well as no risk of interconnection hurdles and artificial costs imposed by the incumbent ICS provider.

The current prison payphones already installed will remain in place, thereby giving inmates and their families a choice.

If desired, the inmate can stand in line, waiting for his 15 minute call in a public area on the traditional payphone. Or he can make a wireless call of unlimited length in the relative privacy of his cell.

In this way, real market forces will be introduced into the ICS arena thereby fulfilling the stated goals of the FCC, the ABA, the HDRC and the Wright Petitioners as well as the families of prisoners throughout the United States.

The post Introducing Choice And Competition Into The Prison Payphone Industry appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

An interesting article in light of the recent letter submitted to the FCC by ten Republican governors  who want the Federal Communications Commission to give states more autonomy to apply technology that can stop prison inmates from using smuggled cellphones.

Gov. Nikki Haley and her counterparts encouraged FCC Chairman Thomas Wheeler in a letter Monday to give them “flexibility and authority” to render such communication impossible.

While the letter doesn’t explicitly say so, what the governors want is permission to jam cellphone signals behind bars, primarily because the current efforts to deploy managed access systems, which selectively block calls from unapproved mobile phones, have proven ineffective and expensive.

A 1934 law says the FCC can grant permission to jam public airwaves only to federal agencies, not state or local ones. The cellphone industry has strongly opposed the use of localized jamming technology out of concern that it could set a precedent leading to much wider gaps in their networks.

The governors say the technology would be strictly limited to prisons, and that society outside would not suffer.

Back in 2013, the FCC first took up the issue of technology solutions to contraband cell phones in prisons in a “notice of proposed rule making” to “remove barriers to the deployment and viability of existing and future technologies used to combat contraband wireless devices.”  That rulemaking is still pending.

The FCC has been reluctant to approve jamming devices (and wireless companies have been opposed to them) because jamming devices could conceivably work beyond prison walls, jamming cell phones of civilians trying to call 911, for instance. There’s also a fear that once prisons get the ability to jam cell phone signals, there won’t be anything stopping other agencies from getting it, too.

£1.2m pilot project that tried to stop prisoners using mobile phones in jail is unlikely to be extended across Scotland after inmates worked out how to beat the system.

A heavily redacted report produced by the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) and obtained by The Ferret has revealed that a trial in two Scottish prisons involving high-tech mobile phone blockers, known as IMSI-catchers, was beset by multiple problems.

The project made use of technology, described by privacy campaigners as “disturbing”, that exploits a security weakness in the design of UK mobile phones.

All mobiles will automatically connect to the nearest mobile phone mast or base-station, but the phone doesn’t check whether the base-station is genuine.

By mimicking a base-station an IMSI catcher or “grabber” can persuade every nearby mobile phone to connect to it, and then it can obtain details about each handset.

The IMSI catcher can be set to block calls, or it can log details of calls whilst forwarding the call onto a genuine mobile phone mast.

Civil liberties groups say The Scottish Prison Service is the first UK public agency to admit using an IMSI catcher to collect details of mobile phones.

One group is so concerned over the privacy implications that they have pledged to refer the SPS to the Data Commissioner for investigation.

The SPS was using the devices to try prevent prisoners using mobile phones in two jails: HMP Shotts in North Lanarkshire and HMP Glenochil near Alloa.

Despite spending more than £1.2m on the phone blocking equipment, the report complains of “resilience issues,” during the pilot and a “lack of intelligence provided by the system.”

The project did not lead to a reduction in the numbers of mobile phones being used in the pilot prisons because prisoners developed what officials described as “innovative countermeasures” to circumvent the phone block.

Precise details of how they outwitted the high-tech system have been redacted from the report released under freedom of information law to The Ferret.

During the trial the number of smart phones in the pilot project jails actually increased, as prisoners learned that they could use the more sophisticated phones to get around the blocking technology.

In turn, officials suggested that this lead to “debt and bullying amongst prisoner groups” as “the business of renting out these handsets to a number of prisoners appears to be increasing.”

The report also explains that the technology could not be used in prisons in urban areas with better mobile phone networks and more members of the public living nearby.

Officials originally intended to trial the phone blocker technology at HMP Edinburgh, but the risk that people passing close to the prison would also have their phone signals blocked by the system was deemed a “high risk” early on in the project.

The system was also only commissioned to block 2G and 3G mobile signals, but a 4G signal was already available in Edinburgh at the start of the trial.

To mitigate this risk, the pilot was conducted in two more rural prisons, HMP Glenochil and HMP Shotts, instead. But despite the move, the report notes that 4G services increasingly became available throughout Scotland during the trial, including at the two final pilot prisons.

This gave prisoners another means of circumventing the phone blocking technology and communicating illegally with the outside world.

Although annual checks from Ofcom and mobile phone operators were conducted to make sure the IMSI catchers were not intercepting the calls of innocent neighbours, and no complaints were received from members of the public living near the prisons, SPS officials conclude the report by recommending that no further roll out of the controversial technology is undertaken until all the problems have been resolved.

The Ferret understands that there is only one device now in operation, and this is at HMP Shotts.

The SPS has spent £32,827 on maintaining this device in the last 24 months alone.

As a consequence of the trial an SPS spokesperson confirmed to The Ferret that the SPS is now considering moving to using mobile IMSI catcher devices, rather than ones that remain in a fixed location. It was not clear how the SPS would be able to ensure that mobile IMSI catchers would not have an impact outside the prison walls.

The service has no data retention policy that relates specifically to the IMSI catchers, and said that data obtained by the devices is held for a month before it is discarded.

Calls for Data Commissioner to investigate

Dr Richard Tynan, Technologist with Privacy International, a group that campaigns for greater transparency on the use of these devices, confirmed to The Ferret that the Scottish Prison Service was the first UK public agency to admit to using an IMSI catcher.

Other public agencies in the UK have long been suspected of using IMSI catchers but routinely operate a policy of neither confirming, nor denying, their use.

Dr Tynan said of the SPS admission: “While it is a positive beginning to transparency around these mass surveillance devices in the UK, much more information is required from the authorities and regulators about when they can be deployed and what safeguards are in place.

“This precedent must now be followed by other UK agencies and they must come clean about their use of these devices and how many innocent people have had their privacy invaded without any suspicion or hint of wrongdoing.”

The SPS can legally deploy the devices within prisons using powers in the Prisons (Interference with Wireless Telegraphy) Bill.

But Dr Tynan went on to suggest that the Scottish Prison Service had failed to fully consider the privacy implications of their IMSI catchers, for both prisoners and members of the public passing near the jails, and pledged that he would ask the Data Protection Commissioner to investigate.

Pointing out inconsistencies in the responses received by the Ferret he said: “Firstly, the SPS confirm the purchase and operation of an IMSI grabber device in “deny” mode only.”

“This would indicate that it was being used as a rudimentary jammer rather than a mass surveillance system.

“However, the subsequent admission that they collect both IMEI and IMSI numbers shows that the device is not just jamming but intentionally collecting and decoding information on any mobile phone subscriber within the area that connects to it. Most devices of this type entice as many phones as possible to connect to it and the user has no way to prevent this.

“Secondly, they claim to be able to limit the range of the devices impact to the specific perimeter of the prison but had to move the trial to a more rural area than the city of Edinburgh. This was due to the risk of leakage beyond the prison and therefore claims about their ability to not impact on innocent passers-by are dubious at best.

Tynan added: “Finally, they admit that there is no data retention policy in place at all. They hold on to the personal data obtained using this device for an entire month without any apparent regard to the necessity and proportionality of such data retention.”

“It would now seem appropriate for the Data Protection Commissioner to review the deployment and operation of this device, the long retention practices and the security measures in place for such sensitive data and how many innocent people have had their private data collected, decoded and stored unlawfully.”

Jim Killock, Executive Director of another civil liberties campaign, the Open Rights Group, also called for full transparency from the SPS about their use of IMSI catchers, and called for the rules around their use to be toughened up.

“IMSI catchers may not only affect the mobile phones of prisoners, staff and visitors but other people living nearby. If their use is rolled out to other prisons in urban areas, many more people could be affected,” he said.

“While the Scottish Prison Service is purportedly using the catchers to block mobile signals, we know that they can be used for other purposes, including installing malware.”

“As such, we need full transparency about how this technology is being used.”

Liam McArthur, a Scottish Liberal Democrat MSP, said that there should be no further deployment of the devices until the problems identified in the report had been addressed.

He said: “Reports that the SPS has spent more than £1m on a system that has been so easily circumvented and could impact on mobile phone users outside of prisons is a real concern. Part of the reason for pilot projects is to help identify problems and it seems clear that this effort to cut mobile phone use in prisons has failed.”

He concluded: “There should be no question of these technologies being rolled out into other prisons on the strength of this report.”

A spokesperson for the Scottish Prison Service said: “In Scotland section 41ZA of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989 provides that it is an offence to possess, or give to a prisoner in prison, or use, without authorisation or outside of the designated area of the prison, a personal communication device such as a mobile telephone or any other portable electronic device capable of transmitting or receiving a communication.

“The Scottish Prison Service gathers evidence to aid the detection of any crime that may have been committed. Going forward, we are taking forward regulations to allow the disconnection of mobile phones.”

Source

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On March 7, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) stayed two provisions of the FCC’s ICS rules: 47 CFR § 64.6010 (setting caps on ICS calling rates that vary based on the size and type of facility being served) and 47 CFR § 64.6020(b)(2) (setting caps for single-call services). The D.C. Circuit’s March 7 Order denied motions for stay of the FCC’s ICS rules “in all other respects.” On March 23, 2016, the D.C. Circuit modified the stay imposed in the March 7 Order to provide that “47 CFR § 64.6030 (imposing interim rate caps)” be stayed as applied to “intrastate calling services.”

In accordance with the 2015 ICS Order, the rules limiting charges for ancillary services—other than the rule related to single-call services, which the D.C. Circuit stayed—took effect on March 17, 2016 for all ICS calls from prisons, and will take effect on June 20, 2016 for all ICS calls from jails (see chart below). Those same effective dates also apply to the rates for ICS calls involving TTY devices, the rule governing the treatment of taxes and fees, the rule prohibiting per-call or per-connection charges, the rule prohibiting flat-rate calling, and the rules governing minimum and maximum calling account balances.

In addition, the interim rate caps – $0.21 per-minute for debit and prepaid ICS calls and $0.25 per-minute for collect ICS calls – set forth in the FCC’s rules are in effect for all interstate ICS calls.

Despite the legal fight over these rates between the FCC and ICS providers such as Securus Technologies and Global Tel*Link, the elephant in the room, commissions paid to correctional facilities by the ICS vendors, has not been fundamentally addressed in this rule-making process.

In a submission to the FCC responding to objections to his petition to reconsider the latest FCC rule-making on ICS rates, lawyer Michael S. Hamden distills the issues and risks succinctly. He states, “But, as set forth in the Petition, the Second ICS Order fell short of the comprehensive reform necessary because the Commission failed to address the primary cause of ICS marketplace dysfunction—site commission payments.”

“In granting a stay of the implementation of permanent ICS rates, the appellate court necessarily concluded that appellants are likely to succeed as to one or more of their challenges to the Second ICS Order. Should appellants ultimately prevail, the foundation upon which the Second ICS Order rests may well collapse. From a practical perspective, such an outcome would be destructive of the investment of time and resources of all parties over two decades, as well as the considerable time, energy, and political capital expended by the Commission in its effort to ensure just and reasonable charges and practices by ICS providers, while taking care to set rates that provide fair compensation for “each and every completed intrastate and interstate call . . ..”

His analysis of the situation continues, “The Commission declined to regulate site commissions or mandate any sort of facility cost recovery, at least in part because the record before it “contain[ed] a wide range of conflicting views regarding whether correctional facilities incur any costs that are directly reasonably related to making ICS available and that must be recovered through ICS rates.” The Commission did not require ICS providers or correctional facilities to report data regarding facility costs, and, consequently, it did not receive “sufficiently detail[ed]” data demonstrating facility costs from which to determine an appropriate level of facility compensation. The Wright Petitioners argue the Commission was correct to decline to establish rules that would have created a facility cost recovery fee additive because it did not have “concrete evidence in the record of the actual costs incurred by correctional facilities.” That lack of data, however, is exactly why the Commission cannot have fully analyzed and ruled on a facility cost recovery mechanism.”

He concludes with, “Comprehensive ICS reform has been a long time coming. This proceeding and its predecessor have been pending for twenty years. The threat is real that the persistent efforts of so many may end in a cataclysmic unraveling of reform measures painstakingly fashioned to provide certainty with regard to just and reasonable ICS charges and practices, as well as fair compensation for all ICS calls.

There is still time for the various parties to come together and work toward an ICS regulatory scheme in which rates and fees are capped at just levels, site commissions are prohibited, and facilities are modestly compensated for their ICS expenses through a fair cost recovery mechanism.”

Whether this happens or not, remains to be seen.

The post FCC Inmate Phone Rate Ruling At Risk appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

UPDATE (10/22/15): The order passed at the FCC by a vote of 3 to 2. Securus and Global Tel*Link immediately issued statements indicating they would seek a stay of the order and appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, to get the entire decision overturned.

Original Post:

After a year of seeking comments on its Further Notice of Proposed Ruling Making focused on inmate phone call rates and fees, the FCC has released an Order stating it is proposing to cap rates for ALL ICS calls – local, long-distance, and international – while limiting or banning excessive fees on calls. The Order also continues the investigation into the prison inmate communications services industry by announcing a Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking focused on video visitation and other advanced inmate communications services.

The Commission will vote on the Order at the Commission’s October 22 Open Meeting.

Key Reforms:

Establishes caps on all inmate calling rates

• These new caps reduce the average rates for the vast majority of inmate calls substantially, from $2.96 to no more than $1.65 for a 15-minute intrastate call, and from $3.15 to no more than $1.65 for a 15-minute interstate call.

• Tiered rate structure accommodates the higher relative costs faced by jails (especially small jails) as opposed to state and federal prisons. The rate caps are as follows:

• 11 cents/minute for debit/prepaid calls, in state or federal prisons.
• 14 cents/minute for debit/prepaid calls in jails with 1,000 or more inmates.
• 16 cents /minute for debit/prepaid calls in jails with 350-999 inmates.
• 22 cents /minute for debit/prepaid calls in jails of up to 349 inmates.

• Rates for collect calls are slightly higher in the first year and will be phased down to these caps after a two-year transition period.

• Approximately 71% of inmates reside in state or federal prisons.

• Approximately 85% of inmates reside in institutions with populations exceeding 1,000.

• With the exception of the rate for small jails, these rates are substantially lower than the current 21 cents/minute interim cap on interstate rates.

• The rate caps permit recovery for robust security measures, as reflected in costs that ICS providers filed with the Commission.

Caps or bans burdensome and needless ancillary service charges, which can add nearly 40% to the cost of a single call

Limit and cap ancillary service charges to the following list of permitted charges:

• Automated payment by phone or website: $3.
• Payment through a live agent: $5.95.
• Paper bill fee: $2.
• Third-party financial transaction fees, such as fees charged by MoneyGram or Western  Union, may be passed through with no mark-up.
• All other ancillary service charges are prohibited.
• Mandatory taxes and regulatory fees may be passed through with no mark-up.

Discourages “site commission” payments by providers to institutions

• Defines the term “site commission” broadly as payments in money or services from inmate calling service providers to correctional institutions or government agencies.

• Excludes the cost of site commissions in establishing the rate caps and strongly discourages the use of site commissions.

• Continues to monitor the effect of site commissions on rates but does not restrict ICS providers’ sharing or profits if such payments fit within the rate caps.

Bans flat-rate calling

• Disallows providers from imposing so-called “flat-rate calling,” that is, a flat rate for a call up to 15 minutes regardless of actual call duration.

• Clarifies that this practice violates statutory mandates requiring that rates be just, reasonable, and fair, and penalizes callers who stay on the phone less than 15 minutes.

Ensures access for people with disabilities

• Requires providers to offer discounted rates for telephone relay service (TRS) calls for inmates with communications disabilities.

• Reminds correctional institutions of their obligation to make TRS available to people with communications disabilities.

• Encourages jails and prisons to allow commonly used forms of TRS and requires them to report service quality issues.

Transition Period

• Requires rate caps, site commission and ancillary service charge reforms to go into effect 90 days from the effective date of the Order.

Ongoing Review and Oversight

• Commits to reevaluate impact of reforms and rates in two years to determine if adjustments need to be made.

• Requires annual reporting and certification by ICS providers, to ensure compliance and enable monitoring of developments

Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

• Seeks further comment on promoting competition in inmate calling services without the need for additional regulation

• Video visitation and other advanced inmate communications services

• Recurring Mandatory Data Collection

The post FCC Proposing Capped Rates On All Prisoner Calls appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), in a recent FCC filing for Docket No. 12-375 (Inmate Calling Services), made the case that jails should be compensated for the costs they incur to allow inmate calling service (ICS). The FCC, in its Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SFNPRM), proposed the elimination of the payment of site commissions as a category to correctional facilities, including jails.

On January 12, 2015, NSA’s submitted a cost survey to the FCC which provided information on the cost to Sheriffs to provide security and administrative functions necessary to allow ICS in jails. Sheriffs operating jails in 23 states and the District of Columbia reported the number of hours per week officers, supervisors and other employees spent on monitoring/security duties and administrative duties in connection with ICS and the annual compensation for the officers and employees engaged in these duties.

With respect to monitoring/security duties, the Sheriffs reported time spent on call monitoring, responding to ICS system alerts, responding to law enforcement requests for records/recordings, call recording analysis, enrolling inmates for voice biometrics, and other duties.

With respect to administrative duties, the Sheriffs reported time spent on system administration, answering questions from the public, answering questions from inmates, blocking/unblocking numbers, providing escorts for phone repairs, educating inmates on the use of ICS and other duties.

Sheriffs also were asked to provide the most recent three months of data from ICS providers concerning the total minutes of use for the facility for each month. From this data, the per minute cost for each facility was calculated.

The NSA cost survey provides the inputs for a sampling of jails of all sizes for the hours spent on ICS related duties, the salaries and benefits for the officers and employees performing the ICS-related duties and the number of ICS minutes for the jails.

This input data was then used to calculate a per minute cost to perform the duties associated with ICS for each jail. Excluding the highest cost jails (any result over $1.00), which might reasonably be considered outliers, the average per minute cost for jails by average daily population (ADP):

• $0.409 for jails with 1-99 ADP
• $0.209 for jails with 100-349 ADP
• $0.088 for jails with 350-999 ADP
• $0.059 for jails with 1000-2499 ADP

(NSA’s survey includes only one facility with ADP of 2500 or more, with a per minute compensation amount of approximately $0.007.)

However, after taking into account similar analysis conducted by Pay-Tel, CenturyLink, Praeses, Global Tel*Link, it proposes the following commission rates:

ADP                                     Per Minute Compensation

1-349                                         $0.09-$0.11

350-2,499                                  $0.05-$0.08

?2,500                                       $0.01-$0.02

The NSA concludes its analysis by stating that facility costs should be recovered via a per minute amount added to the per minute ICS rate and that if Sheriffs do not receive compensation, they would have the incentive to reduce the amount of unrecoverable cost by reducing access to ICS.

The NSA further states, “Unlike food, shelter and healthcare, there is no obligation on the public at large to pay for inmate calling services. Some argue, and the Commission has found, that the public benefits from ICS because it keeps children in touch with incarcerated parents and reduces recidivism, which reduces the costs to our justice and prison systems. Even if this is true, it does not change the fact that the Communications Act and Commission precedent establish that costs incurred in connection with a service should be recovered from the cost causer. Nor does it change the fact that the Commission has no authority under the Communications Act to mandate the recovery of cost from general taxpayers. It also does not change the fact that in most cases ICS is a discretionary service and that Sheriffs have wide latitude in determining the extent of ICS calling that will be allowed.”

The post Sheriffs’ Association Makes Case For Jail Call Commissions appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The first round of comments on the FCC’s Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding the reduction of the cost of all inmate calls are in. Here is one of the more interesting insights we have gleaned from those submissions:

The Prison Policy Initiative’s submission on advanced inmate communications services in prison discusses the very real need that these new services (such as the meshDETECT Secure Prison Cell Phone Solution) address:

These Services Address a Real Need

“These services are typically bundled with other communications services, and we rarely see them given much attention in industry bids for contracts. Surprisingly, we didn’t find many examples of the industry even bothering to explain the value that these services provide, so we will do so here:

Traditionally, there are only a few ways that incarcerated people and loved ones on the outside can communicate:

• By letter, sent by either party through the U.S. mail, with all of the delays that that entails.

• By visit in person, sometimes at great distance and sometimes arranged in advance, and always initiated by the non-incarcerated person.

• By telephone, always initiated by the incarcerated person.

These three avenues leave some serious gaps, namely that there is no way to send a timely message to an incarcerated person, such as:

• Your father just passed away.

• I was at home for your regular weekly call, but the doorbell rang right before you called and I missed your phone call. Can you call again tonight or tomorrow morning?

• I found a buyer for the car. Do you know where the deed is?

• I fell and broke my leg. I’m going to be ok, but I can’t make it to our regular visit tomorrow.

In these circumstances, there is no good way for family members to proceed. They can send a letter or wait for a phone call but all of these delays create unnecessary stress for everyone involved. In practice, there is one other possibility that often creates its own problems: the person on the outside calls the correctional facility, speaks to a counselor or the warden, and asks that a message be relayed for the incarcerated person to call. (And then, the person has to sit by the phone and hope that the message was relayed.)

Many of these services simply give both incarcerated and non-incarcerated people more methods of timely communication which can be initiated by either party. In fact, as we explain in our video visitation report, these services tend to be most popular where they give people not just a new technology with which to communicate, but also a more flexible approach to communication.”

With meshDETECT, families and loved ones can call into the detainee’s secure prison cell phone, if allowed by the facility. We agree that this is an important feature that will significantly improve the timeliness and quality of detainee/family communications.

The post FCC Filing Highlights The Value Of Inbound Calls To Prisoners appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The inmate communication services industry is being fundamentally reshaped by the FCC. Potentially more significant than its predecessor initiative, which significantly reduced prison payphone long-distance rates, the recently issued Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks comment on key drivers of revenue and profit for these prison payphone providers and the prisons themselves.

With the two largest providers of payphone services owned by private equity firms, not usually known for embracing a shrinking profit model, it will be interesting to see how they push their investments to respond – both at the FCC and in the market. One potential bright spot is the increase in call volume achieved post LD rate reduction mentioned below by Commissioner Clyburn. However, with a limited number of payphones per prison facility and call length typically limited to 15 minutes per day, there is a natural cap on the call volume increase that can be hoped for to offset reduced rates and fees. (We do know of one way to provide enhanced access to communications and unlimited calling…)

The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks comment on the following:

• Permanent rate caps on local, intrastate and interstate calling
• What level of cap would ensure coverage of the enhanced security requirements of inmate calling
• The elimination of per-call connection fees
• Prohibiting site commissions as a category for all interstate and intrastate services but permitting facilities to recover any legitimate costs of provisioning inmate calling services
• Capping and restricting ancillary fees, such as fees to open and maintain calling card accounts
• Phasing in these changes, with rate caps being effective in 90 days and a 2-year transition away from site commissions.
• Ensuring that inmate calling services are accessible for all Americans, including inmates and families with disabilities.
• Effective methods of enforcing inmate calling rate rules and reviewing their effect.

According to FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler this second rulemaking on prison payphone calls is being undertaken because, “Despite positive steps forward on interstate rates, it is clear that a more comprehensive approach to reform is necessary to address problems that continue to drive up rates. Namely, charges for “ancillary services” for an increasing array of services are on the rise; intrastate rates, which encompass the vast majority of calls from correctional facilities, remain very high in many states; and, most importantly, site commissions – payments required by correctional institutions from ICS providers for the privilege of serving those facilities – continue to be demanded and appear to be the driving force behind increased rates and ancillary fees. There are some positive signs that reform of interstate rates has resulted in reduced rates and increased calling, but absent a comprehensive solution to the problem we will continue to find ourselves in a never ending game of ICS rate whack-a-mole.”

Commissioner Mignon Clyburn stated, “The impact of the first phase of reform of our nation’s inmate calling regime has been tremendous. Our decision shows that doing the right thing can have reverberating benefits. Since February, when the interstate rate caps of $0.21 for debit/prepaid calls and $0.25 for collect calls went into effect, call volumes across state lines have increased nearly 70% in some facilities, and over 300% at one state department of corrections.

These are not just empty statistics. More affordable rates can help bring about increased and regular contact between inmates and their families. Studies show that having meaningful communication beyond prison walls can make a real difference when it comes to maintaining community ties, promoting rehabilitation, and reducing recidivism.”

The post FCC Seeks To Kill Prison Payphone Site Commissions appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.