UPDATE (10/22/15): The order passed at the FCC by a vote of 3 to 2. Securus and Global Tel*Link immediately issued statements indicating they would seek a stay of the order and appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, to get the entire decision overturned.

Original Post:

After a year of seeking comments on its Further Notice of Proposed Ruling Making focused on inmate phone call rates and fees, the FCC has released an Order stating it is proposing to cap rates for ALL ICS calls – local, long-distance, and international – while limiting or banning excessive fees on calls. The Order also continues the investigation into the prison inmate communications services industry by announcing a Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking focused on video visitation and other advanced inmate communications services.

The Commission will vote on the Order at the Commission’s October 22 Open Meeting.

Key Reforms:

Establishes caps on all inmate calling rates

• These new caps reduce the average rates for the vast majority of inmate calls substantially, from $2.96 to no more than $1.65 for a 15-minute intrastate call, and from $3.15 to no more than $1.65 for a 15-minute interstate call.

• Tiered rate structure accommodates the higher relative costs faced by jails (especially small jails) as opposed to state and federal prisons. The rate caps are as follows:

• 11 cents/minute for debit/prepaid calls, in state or federal prisons.
• 14 cents/minute for debit/prepaid calls in jails with 1,000 or more inmates.
• 16 cents /minute for debit/prepaid calls in jails with 350-999 inmates.
• 22 cents /minute for debit/prepaid calls in jails of up to 349 inmates.

• Rates for collect calls are slightly higher in the first year and will be phased down to these caps after a two-year transition period.

• Approximately 71% of inmates reside in state or federal prisons.

• Approximately 85% of inmates reside in institutions with populations exceeding 1,000.

• With the exception of the rate for small jails, these rates are substantially lower than the current 21 cents/minute interim cap on interstate rates.

• The rate caps permit recovery for robust security measures, as reflected in costs that ICS providers filed with the Commission.

Caps or bans burdensome and needless ancillary service charges, which can add nearly 40% to the cost of a single call

Limit and cap ancillary service charges to the following list of permitted charges:

• Automated payment by phone or website: $3.
• Payment through a live agent: $5.95.
• Paper bill fee: $2.
• Third-party financial transaction fees, such as fees charged by MoneyGram or Western  Union, may be passed through with no mark-up.
• All other ancillary service charges are prohibited.
• Mandatory taxes and regulatory fees may be passed through with no mark-up.

Discourages “site commission” payments by providers to institutions

• Defines the term “site commission” broadly as payments in money or services from inmate calling service providers to correctional institutions or government agencies.

• Excludes the cost of site commissions in establishing the rate caps and strongly discourages the use of site commissions.

• Continues to monitor the effect of site commissions on rates but does not restrict ICS providers’ sharing or profits if such payments fit within the rate caps.

Bans flat-rate calling

• Disallows providers from imposing so-called “flat-rate calling,” that is, a flat rate for a call up to 15 minutes regardless of actual call duration.

• Clarifies that this practice violates statutory mandates requiring that rates be just, reasonable, and fair, and penalizes callers who stay on the phone less than 15 minutes.

Ensures access for people with disabilities

• Requires providers to offer discounted rates for telephone relay service (TRS) calls for inmates with communications disabilities.

• Reminds correctional institutions of their obligation to make TRS available to people with communications disabilities.

• Encourages jails and prisons to allow commonly used forms of TRS and requires them to report service quality issues.

Transition Period

• Requires rate caps, site commission and ancillary service charge reforms to go into effect 90 days from the effective date of the Order.

Ongoing Review and Oversight

• Commits to reevaluate impact of reforms and rates in two years to determine if adjustments need to be made.

• Requires annual reporting and certification by ICS providers, to ensure compliance and enable monitoring of developments

Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

• Seeks further comment on promoting competition in inmate calling services without the need for additional regulation

• Video visitation and other advanced inmate communications services

• Recurring Mandatory Data Collection

The post FCC Proposing Capped Rates On All Prisoner Calls appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The first round of comments on the FCC’s Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding the reduction of the cost of all inmate calls are in. Here is one of the more interesting insights we have gleaned from those submissions:

The Prison Policy Initiative’s submission on advanced inmate communications services in prison discusses the very real need that these new services (such as the meshDETECT Secure Prison Cell Phone Solution) address:

These Services Address a Real Need

“These services are typically bundled with other communications services, and we rarely see them given much attention in industry bids for contracts. Surprisingly, we didn’t find many examples of the industry even bothering to explain the value that these services provide, so we will do so here:

Traditionally, there are only a few ways that incarcerated people and loved ones on the outside can communicate:

• By letter, sent by either party through the U.S. mail, with all of the delays that that entails.

• By visit in person, sometimes at great distance and sometimes arranged in advance, and always initiated by the non-incarcerated person.

• By telephone, always initiated by the incarcerated person.

These three avenues leave some serious gaps, namely that there is no way to send a timely message to an incarcerated person, such as:

• Your father just passed away.

• I was at home for your regular weekly call, but the doorbell rang right before you called and I missed your phone call. Can you call again tonight or tomorrow morning?

• I found a buyer for the car. Do you know where the deed is?

• I fell and broke my leg. I’m going to be ok, but I can’t make it to our regular visit tomorrow.

In these circumstances, there is no good way for family members to proceed. They can send a letter or wait for a phone call but all of these delays create unnecessary stress for everyone involved. In practice, there is one other possibility that often creates its own problems: the person on the outside calls the correctional facility, speaks to a counselor or the warden, and asks that a message be relayed for the incarcerated person to call. (And then, the person has to sit by the phone and hope that the message was relayed.)

Many of these services simply give both incarcerated and non-incarcerated people more methods of timely communication which can be initiated by either party. In fact, as we explain in our video visitation report, these services tend to be most popular where they give people not just a new technology with which to communicate, but also a more flexible approach to communication.”

With meshDETECT, families and loved ones can call into the detainee’s secure prison cell phone, if allowed by the facility. We agree that this is an important feature that will significantly improve the timeliness and quality of detainee/family communications.

The post FCC Filing Highlights The Value Of Inbound Calls To Prisoners appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The inmate communication services industry is being fundamentally reshaped by the FCC. Potentially more significant than its predecessor initiative, which significantly reduced prison payphone long-distance rates, the recently issued Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks comment on key drivers of revenue and profit for these prison payphone providers and the prisons themselves.

With the two largest providers of payphone services owned by private equity firms, not usually known for embracing a shrinking profit model, it will be interesting to see how they push their investments to respond – both at the FCC and in the market. One potential bright spot is the increase in call volume achieved post LD rate reduction mentioned below by Commissioner Clyburn. However, with a limited number of payphones per prison facility and call length typically limited to 15 minutes per day, there is a natural cap on the call volume increase that can be hoped for to offset reduced rates and fees. (We do know of one way to provide enhanced access to communications and unlimited calling…)

The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks comment on the following:

• Permanent rate caps on local, intrastate and interstate calling
• What level of cap would ensure coverage of the enhanced security requirements of inmate calling
• The elimination of per-call connection fees
• Prohibiting site commissions as a category for all interstate and intrastate services but permitting facilities to recover any legitimate costs of provisioning inmate calling services
• Capping and restricting ancillary fees, such as fees to open and maintain calling card accounts
• Phasing in these changes, with rate caps being effective in 90 days and a 2-year transition away from site commissions.
• Ensuring that inmate calling services are accessible for all Americans, including inmates and families with disabilities.
• Effective methods of enforcing inmate calling rate rules and reviewing their effect.

According to FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler this second rulemaking on prison payphone calls is being undertaken because, “Despite positive steps forward on interstate rates, it is clear that a more comprehensive approach to reform is necessary to address problems that continue to drive up rates. Namely, charges for “ancillary services” for an increasing array of services are on the rise; intrastate rates, which encompass the vast majority of calls from correctional facilities, remain very high in many states; and, most importantly, site commissions – payments required by correctional institutions from ICS providers for the privilege of serving those facilities – continue to be demanded and appear to be the driving force behind increased rates and ancillary fees. There are some positive signs that reform of interstate rates has resulted in reduced rates and increased calling, but absent a comprehensive solution to the problem we will continue to find ourselves in a never ending game of ICS rate whack-a-mole.”

Commissioner Mignon Clyburn stated, “The impact of the first phase of reform of our nation’s inmate calling regime has been tremendous. Our decision shows that doing the right thing can have reverberating benefits. Since February, when the interstate rate caps of $0.21 for debit/prepaid calls and $0.25 for collect calls went into effect, call volumes across state lines have increased nearly 70% in some facilities, and over 300% at one state department of corrections.

These are not just empty statistics. More affordable rates can help bring about increased and regular contact between inmates and their families. Studies show that having meaningful communication beyond prison walls can make a real difference when it comes to maintaining community ties, promoting rehabilitation, and reducing recidivism.”

The post FCC Seeks To Kill Prison Payphone Site Commissions appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

A disruptive innovation is an innovation that helps create a new market and value network, and eventually goes on to disrupt an existing market and value network (over a few years or decades), displacing an earlier technology. The term is used to describe innovations that improve a product or service in ways that the market does not expect, typically first by designing for a different set of consumers in a new market and later by lowering prices in the existing market.

Characteristics of a Disruptive Innovation:

• Its performance attributes meet the unfulfilled needs of an emerging market’s customers. These same attributes are not initially valued by the mainstream market, which instead value different performance attributes and initially see the innovation as substandard.
• Emerging market adoption enables the innovation to increase its performance and to begin overlapping with the performance expectations of the mainstream market.
• Awareness of the innovation increases as the innovation develops, influencing change in the mainstream market’s perception of what it values.
• The change in the mainstream market’s perception of what it values enables the innovation to disrupt and replace the existing offerings in the mainstream market.

In the prison payphone industry, it is clear that the high call prices and low availability of the traditional wall phones in prisons and jails are not meeting the communication desires of detainees and their families. As a result, the demand for contraband cell phones has soared. Prison administrators, and the prison payphone companies themselves, have focused on strategies to reduce the supply of smuggled mobile phones through the deployment of expensive managed access systems, cell phone detection technologies and specially trained K9s.

However, none of these strategies address the fundamental demand (and associated corruption of guards and staff supplying the phones) of detainees seeking lower cost and more frequent access to telephone services.

In mature industries, such as the prison payphone industry, the risk for incumbents is the danger of dematuring. Dematuring happens when a stable industry with known competitors begins to be dynamic and new again.  If an industry is dematuring, the chances of getting hit with a disruptive innovation are much greater and  established players lose their hegemony while value in the industry can move to entirely new players or parts of the value chain.

An industry is in danger of dematuring if two or more of the following four things happen simultaneously:

1. customer’s core requirements change;
2. the core technologies used to produce the product or service change;
3. the number of large competitors interested in the same market is on the rise;
4. significant regulation, deregulation, or re-regulation is coming down the pike.

In the prison payphone industry we see commissary companies such as Keefe entering the market as well as new initiatives by the FCC and state regulatory commissions to lower the high cost of prison phone calls.

We are also seeing the adoption of mobility technologies such as RFID, GPS and handheld devices. The very first payphone was installed in a bank in 1889 (and probably in a jail not too long after). Yet the inmate communications service providers such as Global Tel*Link and Securus Technologies are still using this basic device (admittedly with very sophisticated back-end controls) over 120 years later!

There is no denying the pervasive and rapid adoption of wireless technologies in the the consumer market has begun to seep into prisons and jails. Add to this the desire of prison administrators to deploy on-line forms, books, MP3 players and commissary access and one quickly comes to the realization that voice communications can be an important component of this move to individualized, utilitarian and portable access devices to educate, rehabilitate and manage detainees.

With meshDETECT, we are leading the charge to disrupt the prison payphone industry by providing a secure prison cell phone solution that provides the controls and security required by prison administrators while offering enhanced communications opportunities to detainees and their families thereby reducing recidivism and the demand for contraband cell phones.

The post Why The Prison Payphone Industry Is Ripe For Disruptive Innovation appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The FCC has released its order (FCC 13-113) detailing the rules associated with the regulating of prison payphone interstate calling rates. This is the culmination of FCC Proposed Rule Making 12-375 (The Wright Petition – follow the link for to see the new proposed rates) in which the Federal Communications Commission proposed to lower rates charged to prison inmates for long distance telephone calls by considering changes to its regulations governing rates for interstate inter-exchange inmate calling services (ICS), after studying the issue for nine years.

The ruling effectively guts the per minute LD rates and one-time per call fees companies such as Global Tel*Link and Securus Technologies can charge imates and their families as well as the commissions paid to Federal, State and County prisons.

The FCC claims that commissions are “not recoverable through interstate ICS rates because the record makes clear that they are not a direct cost of providing interstate ICS.”

It also sets the ground work for a similar action on intrastate rates. Relevant excerpts from the ruling relating to one time fees and to the payment of commissions to jails and prisons by the prison payphone providers are below. Securus has previously stated that it will go to court to stop the implementation of these rules.

As the prison payphone companies and prisons grapple with the challenge of recovering the revenues associated with this order, we suggest they consider meshDETECT Secure Prison Cell Phone Solutions™ as a potential new service offering that also reduces the demand for contraband cell phones while reducing recidivism.

Commissions

The Commission has previously held that site commissions are-for purposes of considering ICS rates under section 276—an apportionment of profit, not a cost of providing ICS.In the 2012 ICS NPRM, the Commission sought comment on its prior conclusion that site commission payments, or “location rents are not a cost of payphones, but should be treated as profit.” Site commission payments are not costs that are reasonably and directly related to the provision of ICS because they are payments made to correctional facilities or departments of corrections for a wide range of purposes, most or all of which have no reasonable and direct relation to the provision of ICS. After carefully considering the record, we reaffirm the Commission’s previous holding and conclude that site commission payments are not part of the cost of providing ICS and therefore not compensable in interstate ICS rates.

In this Order we find that site commissions are not recoverable through interstate ICS rates because the record makes clear that they are not a direct cost of providing interstate ICS. If commissions or other payments from ICS providers to correctional facilities reflect costs of providing ICS, providers have several avenues available to them.

Although it is clear that site commissions are a revenue stream to the correctional facility, we cannot foreclose the possibility that some portion of payments from ICS providers to some correctional facilities may, in certain circumstances, reimburse correctional facilities for their costs of providing ICS. As a result, we provide several avenues for exploring this issue further. First, we set the interim safe harbors and interim rate caps at conservative levels above costs in our record. Second, any ICS provider seeking a waiver of the rate cap or seeking to justify costs between the safe harbor and the interim rate cap may provide specific details about payments to correctional facilities that it contends are compensable for costs meeting our cost standards through interstate ICS rates as articulated in this Order. Third, as part of the mandatory data collection we initiate below, we will seek further information on payments to correctional facilities and whether they cover any costs of service. Finally, in our accompanying Further Notice, we seek comment on whether we should categorically find that payments to correctional facilities are not compensable costs, or whether there are certain compensable costs that those payments can legitimately address. In his Dissent, Commissioner Pai notes that this Order recognizes that excluding sitecommissions from cost data used to develop our safe harbor benchmark and rate cap may be an “underinclusive approach given that correctional institutions themselves often incur costs to provide ICS and those costs may need to be included in any costs-of-service estimates.” While it is correct that the rates and cost studies that the Commission used as a basis for the safe harbor benchmarks and the interim rate caps do not includesite commission payments, the Commission did not exclude them. Rather, the rates used to establish the safe-harbor benchmarks are rates for service in states that have prohibited site commission payments. Also, the ICS provider cost studies that we use as a basis for the interim rate caps adopted in the Order were prepared by the ICS providers to show costs of service excluding site commission payments. Furthermore, we do not remove costs or adjust inputs from the data used to establish the interim rate caps. For example, both cost studies used to establish the interim rate caps use an 11.25% rate of return to determine the cost of capital. We do not opine on whether this input is appropriate in this context. Instead, we accepted the figures in the cost study, as asserted, without considering whether they represent accurate levels of costs that are reasonably and directly related to provision of interstate ICS and, therefore, are appropriately recoverable thought interstate ICS rates. Consequently, it is likely that these cost figures are overstated, but we accept that possibility as part of our decision to set conservative interim rate cap levels.

We also disagree with ICS providers’ assertion that the Commission must defer to states on any decisions about site commission payments, their amount, and how such revenues are spent. We do not conclude that ICS providers and correctional facilities cannot have arrangements that include site commissions. We conclude only that, under the Act, such commission payments are not costs that can be recovered through interstate ICS rates. Our statutory obligations relate to the rates charged to end users— the inmates and the parties whom they call. We say nothing in this Order about how correctional facilities spend their funds or from where they derive. We state only that site commission payments as a category are not a compensable component of interstate ICS rates. We note that we would similarly treat “in-kind” payment requirements that replace site commission payments in ICS contracts.

Per Call Fees

We are concerned about the evidence regarding current per-call rates and associated practices. In particular, we are concerned that a rate structure with a per-call charge can impact the cost of calls of short duration, potentially rendering such charges unjust, unreasonable and unfair. We have particular concerns when calls are dropped without regard to whether there is a potential security or technical issue, and a per-call charge is imposed on the initial call and each successive call. As a result, we conclude that unreasonably high per-call charges and/or unnecessarily dropped calls that incur multiple per-call charges are not just and reasonable

Our interim rate structure will help address concerns raised about unreasonable per-call charges while we consider further reforms in the Further Notice. As described above, we adopt interim safe harbor rate levels and interim rate caps to ensure the overall cost of a 15-minute call is just, reasonable, and fair. ICS providers have the flexibility to satisfy the safe harbor either through a certification that the per-minute rate is at or below the safe harbor, or by demonstrating that the cost of a 15-minute call (including any per-connection charges) is at or below the safe harbor per-minute rate times 15.Thus, where an ICS provider elects to take advantage of the interim safe harbor rate levels described above, we allow the provider flexibility to determine whether its rate structure should include per-call charges. Specifically, we allow ICS providers to calculate whether their rates are at or below the interim safe harbor levels or the interim rate caps by calculating their compliance on the basis of a 15-minute call. Because our interim safe harbors constrain the cost of a 15-minute conversation to a level we find to be just, reasonable, and fair, we find it is appropriate to afford ICS providers such flexibility

Although we are unable to find ancillary charges per se unreasonable based on the record,
we have sufficient information and authority to reach several conclusions regarding ancillary charges. First, as stated earlier, interstate ICS rates must be cost-based, and to be compensable costs must be reasonably and directly related to provision of ICS. Ancillary service charges are no exception; they also fall within this standard and the Commission has the jurisdiction and authority to regulate them. Section 201(b) of the Act requires that “all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with” communications services be just and reasonable. Section 276 of the Act defines “payphone service” to encompass “the provision of inmate telephone service in correctional institutions, and any ancillary services,” and requires that providers be “fairly compensated.” The services associated with these ancillary charges are “in connection with” the inmate payphone services for purposes of section 201(b) and “ancillary” for purposes of section 276. As such, they fall within the standards we articulate above for determining which costs are compensable through interstate ICS rates. Therefore, even if a provider’s interstate ICS rates are otherwise in compliance with the requirements of this Order, the provider may still be found in violation of the Act and our rules if its ancillary service charges are not cost-based.

The post FCC Releases Order (FCC 13-113) Regulating Prison Payphone Costs and Commissions appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

Update (8/9/13): Today the FCC, led by interim Chairwoman Mignon Clyburn, voted to limit how much companies can charge for phone calls from behind bars.

A decade after families of prison inmates asked for action, the Federal Communications Commission voted on a proposal to cap interstate phone rates at 21 cents a minute for debit or prepaid calls and 25 cents a minute for collect calls. Companies wanting to set higher rates would have to file a waiver and could not charge more until that waiver was granted.

Phone rates now fluctuate depending on the provider, the type of call and size of prison facility.

The proposal also calls for requiring the phone service providers to set rates based on their costs. Charges up to 12 cents a minute for debit or prepaid calls and up to 14 cents a minute for collect calls would be considered to be “just and reasonable” rates.

The mechanics of compliance and implementation as well as court challenges to the order will now become the focus of the ICS industry.

It also laid the groundwork for a similair action for intrastate rates…

Statement from the FCC on this vote:

The Federal Communications Commission today took long-overdue steps to ensure that the rates for interstate long-distance calls made by prison inmates are just, reasonable and fair.

Studies make clear that inmates who maintain contact with family and community while in prison have reduced rate of recidivism and are more likely to become productive citizens upon their release. Lower rates of recidivism also benefit society by reducing crime, the need for additional prisons, and other costs.

In addition, an estimated 2.7 million children would benefit from increased communication with an
incarcerated parent. Many of these children face challenges that are manifested in higher rates of truancy,homelessness, depression and other ills.

But the exorbitant price of interstate long-distance calls from correctional facilities today actually
discourages such communication because it is too expensive (over $17 for one 15-minute call),
particularly for families facing economic hardship. The Order takes immediate action to change this and provide an affordable means to encourage such communication.

The Commission’s reforms adopt a simple and balanced approach that protects security and public safety needs, ensures providers receive fair compensation while providing reasonable rates to consumers as follows:

Requires that all interstate inmate calling rates, including ancillary charges, be based on the cost
of providing the inmate calling service

Provides immediate relief to exorbitant rates:
o Adopts an interim rate cap of $0.21 per minute for debit and pre-paid calls and $0.25 per
minute for collect calls, dramatically decreasing rates of over $17 for a 15-minute call to no more than $3.75 or $3.15 a call

o Presumes that rates of $0.12 per minute for debit and prepaid calls ($1.80 for a 15-minute
call) and $0.14 cents per minute for collect calls ($2.10 for a 15-minute call) are just, reasonable and cost-based (safe-harbor rates)

o These rates include the costs of modern security features such as advanced mechanisms
that block calls to victims, witnesses, prosecutors and other prohibited parties; biometric caller verification; real-time recording systems; and monitoring to prevent evasion of restrictions on call-forwarding or three-way calling

Concludes that “site commissions” payments from providers to correctional facilities may not be
included in any interstate rate or charge

Clarifies that inmates or their loved ones who use Telecommunications Relay Services because of
hearing and speech disabilities may not be charged higher rates

Requires a mandatory data collection, annual certification requirement, and enforcement provision to ensure compliance with this Order

Seeks comment on reforming rates and practices affecting calls within a state

Seeks comment on fostering competition to reduce rates

Building on state reforms, the Commission’s action addresses a petition filed nearly a decade ago by Martha Wright, a Washington, D.C. grandmother who sought relief from exorbitant inmate calling rates. Since then, tens of thousands have urged the FCC to make it possible for them to stay in touch with loved ones in jail.

Action by the Commission August 9, 2013, by Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (FCC 13-113). Acting Chairwoman Clyburn and Commissioner Rosenworcel with
Commissioner Pai dissenting. Acting Chairwoman Clyburn, Commissioners Rosenworcel and Pai
issuing statements.

<end of update>

The Federal Communications Commission today said it will propose rules to lower rates charged to prison inmates for long distance telephone calls by considering changes to its regulations governing rates for interstate interexchange inmate calling services (ICS), after studying the issue for nine years. We have printed the key portions of the Proposed Rule Making below.

Given the scope of the request, the high profile parties on both sides of the issue, and the potential negative impact on the revenue of the prison payphone providers and the budgets of state departments of correction; this will be a highly contested rule making. It seems inevitable however that public pressure will force some sort of compromise on the prisons and their inmate communications service providers.

The question then becomes how do the prisons make up the revenue lost through the inevitable reduction in prison phone call commissions? We suggest that they consider deploying the meshDETECT Secure Prison Cell Phone Solutions™ to offset the lost revenue and reduce contraband cell phone smuggling.

There are multiple proposals to address ICS rates in the record. We seek to balance the goal of ensuring reasonable ICS rates for end users with the security concerns and expense inherent to ICS within the statutory guidelines of sections 201(b) and 276 of the Act. Ensuring just and reasonable ICS rates may be accomplished through incentives or regulations, or a combination of both; we seek comment on these proposals below.

A.     Rate Caps in the ICS Market

17.    In the Alternative Wright Petition, Petitioners requested that the Commission set rate caps for interstate long distance ICS. Specifically, Petitioners requested that the Commission “establish a benchmark rate for domestic interstate interexchange inmate debit calling service of $0.20 per minute and a benchmark rate for domestic interstate interexchange inmate collect calling service of $0.25 per minute, with no set-up or other per-call charge.” The Petitioners used 15 and 20 minute call durations to calculate the rate caps and based their proposed rate caps on then current Federal Bureau of Prison and several individual states’ ICS rates. We seek comment on the elements of the rate cap proposal and whether the criteria used to develop the proposed caps are appropriate.

18.      Per-Call Charge. Each time an inmate places a payphone call there are typically two elements that make up its cost – a per-call set up charge and a per-minute charge.  We first seek comment on the per-call charge.  Petitioners propose eliminating the call set up or per-call charge, which can be as much as $3.95, and allowing only per-minute charges.  We seek comment on this proposal.  What costs are associated with the per-call charge?  Would the elimination of the per-call charge help ensure just and reasonable ICS rates?  Would a prohibition on per-call charges result in below-cost service?

19.       Petitioners note that inmates often incur multiple per-call charges when calls are dropped after a pause in conversation.  We seek data on the average number of dropped calls that inmates experience.  We request that commenters suggest ways to prevent multiple per-call charges for a single conversation that is disconnected by security triggers and subsequently allowed to continue while maintaining appropriate security measures.  For example, if the per-call charge is maintained, Petitioners suggest that if a disconnected call is reinitiated within two minutes, it should not incur another per-call charge. Should the Commission require such a measure?  What other steps could be taken to prevent inmates from being charged multiple per-call charges for what amounts to one conversation?  What are the costs associated with call security and are they incurred on a fixed or per-call basis?

20.       Per-Minute Rate Caps.  Would the per-minute rate cap approach proposed by the Petitioners ensure just and reasonable rates?  Are the proposed rate caps just and reasonable consistent with sections 201 and 276 of the Act?  If not, would different rate caps be appropriate?  What factors should the Commission consider in determining an appropriate per-minute rate cap?  Commenters advocating an alternative per-minute rate cap should provide specific, detailed cost information and other relevant data to support their proposed per-minute rate caps. Should the domestic interstate interexchange ICS per-minute rate cap proposed above apply to both publicly- and privately-administered correctional facilities?

21.       Some commenters argue that the proposed per-minute rate caps are arbitrary and capricious because they would preclude providers from recovering their legitimate costs of providing service.  Others argue that the Alternative Wright Petition proposal is confiscatory or may otherwise put ICS providers out of business.  We seek evidence in support of or disproving such arguments.  Commenters also argue that the adoption of per-minute rate caps would chill innovation and ultimately result in reductions in service levels because the proposed caps will not adequately compensate the providers, thus making ICS a less attractive service to offer.  Others note that new providers are entering the ICS market.  Commenters supporting such assertions are asked to provide specific, detailed information about the ICS market to support their positions and describe how market trends influence ICS rates.

22.       In the Alternative Wright Petition, Petitioners argue that several benefits would accrue from setting per-minute rate caps, such as administrative ease and the absence of jurisdictional challenges. We seek comment on this argument.  Can commenters identify any other benefits to introducing per-minute rate caps?  What are the perceived problems or challenges associated with introducing per-minute rate caps?  For example, parties argue that differences between correctional facilities including size, location, security levels, facility age and staffing levels will not allow a one size fits all solution, such as per-minute rate caps.  Is this accurate?  How can the Commission establish a solution that addresses the many variations among confinement facilities?

23.       If the Commission decides to implement rate caps in the ICS market how should we?  What additional data, if any, does the Commission require to set rates?  Would a rate cap approach require the Commission to conduct rate cases, as some commenters suggest?  We seek comment on the best ways to determine just and reasonable caps for ICS rates.

24.       Marginal Location Methodology.  In 2008, ICS providers submitted the ICS Provider Proposal for ICS rates.  The ICS Provider Proposal uses the “marginal location” methodology, previously adopted by the Commission to calculate public payphone rates, to calculate proposed ICS rates.  The ICS providers believe the “marginal location” methodology provides a “basis for rates that represent ‘fair compensation’ as set forth in § 276(b)(1)(A).”  The ICS Provider Proposal advocates a two-part rate structure that includes both a fixed per-call charge and a per-minute rate, arguing that per-call charges must be maintained to cover such expenses as equipment costs and monthly line charges.

The ICS providers determined that the methodology and data yield a requisite fixed per-call charge of $1.56 with a per-minute rate of $0.06 for debit calls, and a fixed per-call charge of $2.49 with a per-minute rate of $0.07 for collect calls, applicable to all ICS providers.  In response, Petitioners point out that the ICS Provider Proposal “largely supports Petitioners’ requested benchmark rates.” Petitioners calculate that the ICS Provider Proposal two-part rate structure equals rate caps of $0.16 per minute for a 15-minute debit call and $0.24 per minute for a 15-minute collect call.

25.       We seek comment on whether the ICS Provider Proposal methodology would result in a just and reasonable rate.  We also encourage commenting parties that disagree with the ICS Provider Proposal or proposed methodology to provide alternative methodologies supported by sufficiently-detailed data. We seek comment on whether the ICS Provider Proposal has provided sufficient cost, demand, and revenue detail to allow the Commission to determine whether the proposed rates are just and reasonable.

26.       We also seek comment on whether the underlying cost and demand factors for public payphones and ICS are similar enough to justify using a cost methodology designed for public payphones to set ICS rates.  In particular, we seek comment on the extent to which ICS rates and call volumes vary among prisons across the country, and how the rates and call volumes compare with the variation that occurs with public payphones.  We seek comment on whether an additional justification exists for adopting this cost methodology.

27.       Impact of Rate Reductions on Call Volumes.  We seek comment on whether call volumes have increased where rates have been lowered, and the resulting impact on ICS providers’ revenues.  We note that the 2011 GAO Report found that only approximately 25 percent of inmates in the Federal Bureau of Prisons use their entire monthly allotted minutes for calls and that if rates were lowered it would encourage greater communications with families, which the Bureau of Prisons “has stated facilitates the reintegration of inmates into society upon release from prison.”  Do other correctional facilities find that incarcerated individuals are not using all their allotted time to make calls?  How much time is allotted, and what is the percentage of individuals who use all their time?

28.       Tiered Pricing.  A recent ex parte filing by Petitioners attached a transcript from a New Mexico Public Service Commission hearing that described the possible use of a tiered, by monthly volume of minutes, pricing structure in the state. Do commenters believe a per-minute rate set by usage volume is a viable option?   Would tiered pricing address concerns over a one size fits all reform approach such as rate caps? What factors should the Commission consider in establishing pricing tiers?  What are potential problems with tiered pricing?

29.       Market Forces.  Petitioners note that telecommunications costs in general, and long distance costs in particular, are decreasing and therefore, they believe, ICS rates should follow the market and decrease as well.  Some participants in this proceeding note that “rates in the largest majority of correctional facilities are moving in a downward trend.” Is this accurate?  Can commenters provide concrete examples of decreases in ICS rates?

30.       Collect Calling v. Debit Calling.  The Alternative Wright Petition suggests two different rate caps:  one for collect calling and one for debit calling.  A collect call is a call in which the called person pays for the call and a debit call deducts the cost of the call from a prepaid account.  Petitioners argue that collect calling is more expensive because its costs include billing costs and uncollectibles, while debit calling is less expensive because it reduces staff responsibilities and uncollectibles.  Do commenters agree that there should be different per-minute rate caps for collect and debit calling?  What are the benefits of debit calling?  For example, do commenters believe that debit calling will exert downward pressure on collect calling rates?

31.       Some commenters have expressed concern about the expense and difficulty of implementing debit calling.  Specifically, they cite difficulty in blocking restricted telephone numbers, the expense of purchasing new equipment and the challenges of establishing new processes and procedures and verifying calling party identities. Parties have also expressed safety concerns related to debit calling.  Some prisons already allow for debit calling.  For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons allows debit calling in some of its facilities and the state of Iowa offers debit calling only.   What safety concerns are raised by debit calling service, and how have those concerns been addressed where debit calling already is permitted?  Commenters also note the increased administrative workload and cost associated with debit calling caused by such tasks as issuing PINs to each inmate in facilities with high turnover.  Have commenters experienced such challenges, and how have they been overcome?  What are the other pros or cons of debit calling?  We seek comment on ICS providers’ overall experiences with offering debit calling

32.       How many correctional facilities currently offer debit calling?  Has debit calling become more common?  What are the current ratios of debit to collect calling in correctional facilities?  Should the Commission mandate debit calling in privately and publicly-administered correctional facilities?   One commenter says it offers debit calling to all of the facilities it serves, but it is not practical to mandate debit calling because not all correctional facilities want the service.  What are other challenges to mandating debit calling?

33.       Prepaid Calling.  Commenters suggest prepaid calling as an alternative to collect and debit calling.  Prepaid calling allows inmates or their family members to prepay for minutes, usually at a discount.  This is different from debit calls, in which money is deducted from an account, but the minutes are not purchased in advance.  Commenters argue that the benefits of this approach may include administrative ease for the providers, increased safety, controlled costs for call recipients, and eliminating the need to block calls because of a call recipients’ credit standing. However, Petitioners note that there are outstanding questions with prepaid calling such as:  how to handle monthly fees; how to load an inmate’s account; and minimum required account balance. If these issues can be sufficiently addressed, is prepaid calling a viable ICS option?  Do any ICS providers currently offer prepaid calling?  What are some other concerns or considerations with prepaid calling?

34.       Intrastate-Interstate Parity.  Another alternative would be to adopt an intrastate-interstate parity principle that would require that rates for interstate, long-distance calls not exceed rates for intrastate, long-distance calls.  Rates for intrastate, long-distance calls are typically set by state public utility commissions, and those commissions may set rates that take into account the varying cost of providing inmate calling services within each state given the security and other features required by state law. To the extent that interstate rates for inmate calling services are significantly higher than intrastate rates, how would a requirement that ICS providers set interstate rates at a level no higher than intrastate, long-distance rates affect the justness and reasonableness of those rates?  How many states set rates specifically for ICS?  What is the rate structure for ICS calls in those states, and what are the rates for intrastate, long-distance calls?  How do states that set specific ICS rates ensure that ICS providers are “fairly compensated?”  How do intrastate, long-distance rates differ between states that establish general rate caps and those that set specific caps for ICS?  If the Commission adopts a parity principle, should there be any exceptions to that principle.

C.        Additional Proposals in the Record

35.       There are multiple other proposals in the record that do not directly address per-call and per-minute ICS rates.  We seek comment on any other proposals parties contend address the concerns raised in this proceeding, including any proposals in the record that are not addressed below.

36.       Competition in the ICS Market.  The First Wright Petition requested that the Commission mandate the opening of the ICS market to competition and prohibit collect call only restrictions in privately-administered correctional facilities.  ICS contracts are typically exclusive; competition appears to exist in winning an ICS contract but once an ICS provider wins a contract it becomes the sole provider. How do exclusive contracts influence ICS rates?  How would competitive ICS services be provided?  The First Wright Petition also argued that the collect calling-only limitations imposed by many confinement facilities increase costs to both ICS providers and inmates that are not outweighed by corresponding benefits and that such limitations should therefore be prohibited. To the extent ICS is still limited to collect calling in some correctional facilities, we seek comment on the rationale behind this restriction.

37.       Site Commissions.  ICS contracts frequently include a site commission or location rent which is paid to the facility and in some instances may go to fund inmate services at the facility. What types of inmate services or other services do site commissions fund?  How do site commissions in ICS contracts vary by facility?  Petitioners argue that ICS rates are inflated to cover commissions, which can be as much as 65 percent of gross revenues, causing the rates to be unreasonable in violation of section 201(b).   Is this accurate?  We seek updated data on how much these site commissions are and how much they add to per-call costs.  The FCC has previously found that “under most contracts, the commission is the single largest component affecting the rates for inmate calling service” and “because the bidder who charges the highest rates can afford to offer the confinement facilities the largest location commissions, the competitive bidding process may result in higher rates.”  Do commenters believe this is still accurate?  The Commission has also found that “location rents are not a cost of payphones, but should be treated as profit.” Do commenters agree with that conclusion?

38.       Some site commissions are mandated by state statute, while several states have reduced or eliminated commissions in ICS contracts.  If a state has reduced or eliminated site commissions, how has any resulting rate transition been handled?  How has the lowering or elimination of site commissions impacted rates?  Is this evidence that site commissions are not necessary, or is it evidence that the market is working and the Commission need not intervene?  Must the Commission address site commissions and the effect they have on ICS rates in order to ensure just and reasonable ICS rates?

39.      Offer No-Cost Calling.  In the Alternative Wright Petition, Petitioners include a suggestion they contend will advance the Commission’s universal service goals and provide all inmates valuable contact with the outside world.   Specifically, Petitioners suggest that ICS providers provide a certain amount of no-cost calling per inmate per month in each of the facilities they serve in exchange for the right to charge a higher per-minute rate. Petitioners suggest implementing rate caps of $0.22 per minute for debit calling and $0.275 per minute for collect calling if ICS providers offer 20 minutes of free calling per inmate per month. Can or should the Commission mandate a certain amount of free calling per inmate per month, or should this be offered at the providers’ discretion?  What legal questions are raised by this proposal?  What other considerations are raised by this proposal?

40.       Billing-Related Call Blocking.  Petitioners also express concern over billing-related call blocking in correctional facilities.   Specifically, Petitioners note that ICS providers are increasingly unable or unwilling to enter into agreements with LECs to provide for ICS providers’ billing the LECs’ customers receiving collect calls from inmates.  As a result, ICS providers cannot bill for an increasing percentage of inmate calls and thus “block inmate collect calls to numbers served by LECs with which the service providers have no billing arrangements.” Petitioners argue that in facilities where collect calling is the only option, this practice may ultimately prevent inmates from being able to make any telephone calls.  Commenters note that many ICS providers have solutions to “ensure that inmates can contact customers served by these CLECs that refuse to bill for collect calls.” Does this practice continue?  Petitioners argue that debit calling, which requires pre-payment, may prevent the need to block calls when the ICS provider does not have a billing arrangement with the terminating LEC. Is this accurate?  Do commenters have experience with billing-related call blocking?  Can commenters provide data on the average number of calls that are blocked per month and the reason for the blocking?  Are there ways, other than mandating debit calling, to deter or prevent billing-related call blocking?

41.       Non-Geographic Numbers.  ICS providers have argued that lowering interstate calling rates may create an incentive for call recipients to obtain telephone numbers from other states, perhaps from wireless or VoIP providers, to take advantage of the lowered interstate rates.  Petitioners counter that the opposite is currently happening; call recipients are obtaining telephone numbers, from wireless or VoIP providers, that are local to the prison to take advantage of lower local calling rates.  Have commenters experienced either of these practices?  Do these practices raise any security concerns and if so what are those concerns?

42.       Disabilities Access.  There is evidence in the record to indicate that inmates with hearing disabilities may not have access to ICS at reasonable rates using TTYs. The record suggests that because the average length of a telephone conversation using a TTY is approximately four times longer than a voice telephone conversation, deaf and hard of hearing inmates who use TTYs have to pay more than their hearing counterparts.  The record also suggests that TTY users have had to pay additional fees for connecting to a TTY relay operator.  We seek comment on the types of ICS access that individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing experience during their incarceration.  Where such access to ICS is provided, are the rates the same as those available to those without a disability?  If the rates differ, what is that difference and what are the explanations for such difference?  We note that section 276(b)(1)(A) specifically exempts “telecommunications relay service calls for hearing disabled individuals” from the Commission-established “per call compensation plan” ensuring that ICS providers are “fairly compensated.”  How should the Commission take this exemption into account in examining rates?

43.      Updated Data.  We seek updated data from all interested parties and the public, but especially from ICS providers.  Commenters note that the record regarding nationwide interstate ICS rates is limited to an “analysis of prison phone contracts nationwide” that was conducted by Prison Legal News in April 2011. As such, we seek comment on the accuracy and reliability of the study.  In addition, from independent research we have found more-current state rates, which continue to demonstrate a range of prices for ICS calls among states.  For example, for a 15-minute interstate call, we found the following rates:  $6.65 in California; $2.04 in Montana; $6.45 in Texas; and $16.55 in Idaho. We encourage commenters to submit the most up-to-date information available regarding interstate ICS rates to aid us in developing a clearer understanding of the ICS market.  This includes per-call and per-minute rates, information on commissions and what percentage of a rate they comprise, the number of disconnected calls, the average length of calls, and how calls break out by type, i.e., collect, prepaid and debit.

44.       We also seek comment on whether the Alternative Wright Petition and ICS Provider Proposal are grounded in sufficiently-reliable data.  For example, the ICS Provider Proposal contains data for less than 30 correctional facilities, none of which impose site commissions.  Is this too small a sample, or a non-representative sample, on which to base a nationwide solution?  ICS providers argue that in calculating their proposed rate caps the Petitioners relied on data from facilities with low cost calling.  We therefore invite parties to comment on whether the data supporting the First Wright Petition, the Alternative Wright Petition and the ICS Provider Proposal is representative of correctional facilities across the country.

45.      Existing Contracts.  Petitioners suggest that if the Commission implements a rate cap it should also mandate a one-year fresh look, transition period for existing ICS contracts Petitioners envision that this transition period would allow for any necessary review and termination or renegotiation of existing ICS contracts in order to introduce rate caps which would be effective by the end of the transition period  Commenters argue that the Commission cannot insert itself into the procurement decisions of correctional agencies and that any new ICS-related rules should not be applied to existing contracts but only to contracts entered into after the adoption of new rules

46.     Would it be appropriate to mandate a fresh look period or should any new ICS rules apply only to contracts entered into after the adoption of new rules?  With renegotiated contracts, how long should the transition period last?  What are typical ICS contract terms?  Do such contracts usually have change of law provisions that would be triggered by a Commission order?  How does the length of existing contracts affect the implementation of any of the proposals discussed above?  If commenters provide alternative proposals not discussed above, they should include information on how the contractual process will function with each specific proposal.  After implementing a new ICS regime, should the Commission require a periodic rate review to ensure that the rates remain just and reasonable?

47.     We encourage comment on any new issues that have arisen in the ICS market or issues that have not been addressed above.  We request that commenters provide evidentiary support for their comments and suggestions in this proceeding.

D.                    Cost/Benefit Analysis of Proposals 

48.       Acknowledging the potential difficulty of quantifying costs and benefits, we seek to determine whether the proposals above will provide public benefits that outweigh their costs, and we seek to maximize the net benefits to the public from any proposals we adopt.  For example, commenters have argued that inmate recidivism is decreased with regular family contact.  Accordingly, we seek specific comment on the costs and benefits of the proposals above and any additional proposals received in response to this Notice.  We also seek any information or analysis that would help us to quantify these costs or benefits.  Further, we seek comment on any considerations regarding the manner in which the proposals could be implemented that would increase the number of people who benefit from them, or otherwise increase their net public benefit.  We request that interested parties discuss whether, how and by how much they will be impacted in terms of costs and benefits of the proposals included herein.  We recognize that the costs and benefits may vary based on such things as the correctional facility served and ICS provider.  We request that parties file specific analysis and facts to support any claims of significant costs or benefits associated with the proposals herein.

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This article from the LA Times summarizes the contraband cell phone challenges the California prison system is experiencing, with no solution seemingly in sight. However, the one positive and logical approach to this issue is suggested by Najee Ali – co-opt the problem by provisioning secure prison cell phone service, much like secure payphone service is currently offered.

When the nation’s most notorious mass murderer has a phone under the mattress in his cell, it’s hard to ignore the fact that security has broken down in California’s prison system.

And it’s logical to finger prison guards, especially after a state investigation discovered that a guard made $150,000 in one year smuggling phones to prison inmates, and another had 50 phones in his car in a prison parking lot, labeled with the names of convicts.

But cracking down on the most likely culprits isn’t as easy as it sounds. If we try to halt the flow of phones by making guards go through tedious and time-consuming security checks, like airport passengers, we have to pay them for the hours that will take, under an arcane labor deal called “walk time.”

That would cost the state millions of dollars, according to a story by Times reporter Jack Dolan on legislative efforts to approve criminal sanctions.

But abolishing “walk time” isn’t the solution. The provision is a staple of contracts in law enforcement — called “pre- and post-shift activities” in some, and “donning and doffing” in others.

It’s rooted in federal labor laws that compensate employees for work-related tasks they must do before or after their shifts — like travel through locked doors and across prison yards to posts in isolated gun towers.

For California prison guards, that translates to an extra hour of pay each week. Thirty years ago, “we cut a deal with the union,” said Craig Brown, who was part of the state’s negotiating team back then. “We said, ‘We’ll pay you for 12 minutes every day, whether you walk a minute or a half hour.'” It wasn’t considered a perk back then, he said, but a way to keep California on a budget.

Now Brown is on the other side, as chief lobbyist for the union of prison guards. And he bristles at the notion that guards are the bad guys in the cellphone scandal.

“They don’t just come in with employees, they come in by mail, they come in by visitors, they come in over the fence,” he said. “When an inmate wants a phone, somebody is going to supply him.”

Sure. But according to lawmakers, that “somebody” is most likely a prison employee.

Brown, and others before him, said phones in the hands of inmates jeopardize the safety of guards. Inmates have tried to organize institutional riots, escapes and prison crimes.

“The 90-plus percent of our good officers who want these things to run safely want to kick the ass of the guy that brings the cellphones in, because it endangers them,” Brown said. But they’re not willing to spend unpaid time lining up to be herded through metal detectors checking them for contraband phones.

Nor, it seems, are they willing to snitch on colleagues selling phones to convicts. “It’s a difficult individual decision,” he said. “Some officers would probably turn their head and pretend they didn’t see it. And some officers would try to solve the problem.

“Most of them just want to go to work, do their jobs and go home safe.”

Which is probably true for most of the inmates.

::

If I take Craig Brown’s word that the typical cellphone smuggler isn’t a corrections officer, then I might as well take Najee Ali’s word that the typical inmate with a contraband cellphone isn’t Charles Manson texting his followers.

Ali, a high-profile activist in Los Angeles’ black community, came home from prison last week. He spent two years behind bars for trying to bribe a witness in a criminal case involving a family member. He served his time at two prisons, Tehachapi and Avenal, in a medium-security dormitory “with three guards watching 1,000 inmates.”

And he kept in touch with folks back home on a BlackBerry he acquired behind bars, purchased for $500 from an inmate “who had a relationship with a guard.”

Inmate cellphones, in Ali’s view, are an “open secret” and a prison-tolerated management technique, he said. They help tamp down tensions among antsy convicts in overcrowded prisons. “If you have half the guys in a dorm with cellphones, that’s 500 guys who are pacified and not a threat to anyone’s safety.”

The idea of Manson with a flip phone fuels our outrage. “But for every person doing something illegal, there are hundreds of guys who just want to talk to their families and keep in touch with what’s going on back home,” he said. “…They’re talking to their mamas, their wives, looking at photos, checking on their Facebook pages.”

Guards look the other way at the black-market deals, he said. A state study showed that a prison employee can make $1,000 on a smuggled phone. “With pay cuts, furloughs, it’s tough for them,” Ali said. “The same guards who are bringing in the cellphones are the ones now acting all up in arms.

“At the end of the day, if the guards did not want us to have those phones, we would not have them,” Ali said. “They know it makes us less of a threat, to them and to each other.”

The worst-case scenarios are pretty bad: inmates on clandestine phones planning escapes, arranging drug deals, ordering hits on enemies.

::

But what Ali wanted to talk about was far less troubling: “You share your cellphone with other inmates, that eases a lot of tension throughout the building.

“It brought a sense of normalcy to my life. If we’re being real about this, it’s too far gone to stop it.”

Instead of metal detectors or high-tech scrambling systems, we ought to think about regulating prisoners’ access to cellphones, he said. Why not let some convicts have access — maybe minimum-security inmates or those with good prison behavior records?

“You could restrict the hours, like maybe they could only use them from 7 to 9. Or create a process for handing them out, like you check out a library book,” he said.

Ali’s idea could be a tool to promote order in our overcrowded prison system. And it might make honest men out of those prison guards who are drawn, like criminals, to a black market system.

The post Allowing Phones in The Cells Might Be a Sound Call appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

This news item is interesting in that it highlights not only the potential risk of unfettered technology access for high-security prisoners, but also the impact of the high cost of prison telecommunications services.

Evidently, other prisons within the UK do allow the use of Skype by prisoners, however. Increasingly, prisoners are getting access to various consumer technologies, such as email, MP3 players, etc., albeit in a customized and controlled versions. We believe that a secure prison cell phone solution will be part of that offering over time as prisons and jails seek to reduce the demand for contraband cell phones.

London: In what could be regarded as the height of whining, a Bangladeshi terrorist, who plotted to blow up a passenger jet, has complained that that he is not allowed to use Skype to make low-cost phone calls from a high-security UK jail.

Rajib Karim, 32, wants to use the system, which offers cheap international calls from phones as well as free video link-ups, to contact friends and family in Bangladesh. But officials at maximum security HMP Frankland in Durham barred the move saying it would pose a serious security risk.

“This guy planned on killing hundreds of people. He is a former British Airways software engineer who knows a lot about computers and telecommunications.

“The last thing he should be given access to is a computer or method of free communication,” The Daily Mail quoted an unnamed source as saying.

Karim was jailed for 30 years last year after being found guilty of planning a 9/11-style terror attack with former al- Qaeda warlord Anwar al-Awlaki.

The father-of-two claims using a prison payphone costs him too much money.

In a letter written to Inside Time, a newspaper for prisoners, he said: “The international call rates cost a lot using the prison PIN system and the Skype option looked like a perfect solution.

“The best part was that it was legal and no breach of prison rules as the call was made to a direct number and was not being redirected.

“But when I recently tried making my first call I was told by staff here at HMP Frankland that I am not allowed to make any calls through Skype”.

The report said he “tried to explain” how other prisons in the UK reportedly allow inmates to use the service, but said, “The response was a firm ‘no’ as HMP Frankland is part of the high security estate”.

Karim’s complaint has been passed on to the National Offender Management Service (NOMS).

He was imprisoned for 30 years last year after Woolwich Crown Court heard he wanted to use his position at British Airways to plant a bomb on a plane as part of a “chilling” conspiracy with al-Awlaki, a notorious radical preacher associated with al-Qaeda.

Source

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