Prisons want jamming technology to stop criminal activity, but critics warn there would be dire consequences if jamming was allowed to propagate.

In June the Department of Justice released a report that declared a solution to prevent criminal activity from happening within prisons: it successfully tested a jammer that would block mobile signals from smuggled cell phones inside a Maryland prison.

Throughout the corrections world the news spread fast. For South Carolina Corrections director Brian Stirling, the news affirmed his beliefs: to stop the flood of mobile phones streaming into prisons, jamming technology was the best, cheapest, and most efficient way to go.

A jammer can be a small, inexpensive box that transmits a continuous tone to antennas, effectively stopping any cell phone from making or receiving calls. Jamming equipment is generally cheap—a Google search turned up dozens of options ranging in price from $119 to $650—and easily available to order online.

But critics warn there would be dire consequences if jamming was allowed to propagate. They argue that there are numerous nefarious reasons—money, control of new systems, and criminal motivations—behind the push to legalize jamming through the corrections system.

“Allowing jamming technology is a very slippery slope, and once that door is opened we can never turn back,” Ben Levitan, a North Carolina-based wireless communication expert who has advised correction facilities, told me by telephone. “I’ve been in this business for 30 years. If someone is advocating for new technology they probably know someone who sells equipment or has a piece themselves.”

Levitan and other technology experts interviewed for this article say there are other effective solutions to control the flood of cell phones in prisons, such as detection systems, which track, locate and identify radio signals, and managed-access systems, in which phone companies filter calls using a predetermined whitelist.

The bigger problem is the high cost of calls from prison, jamming opponents say, and the need for inmates to be in touch with their loved ones.

Read the rest of this article here

The post This Is a War appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

According to the DOJ, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has posted a report detailing its findings from the Jan. 17, 2018 test of micro-jamming technology conducted at the Federal Correctional Institution at Cumberland, Maryland.

Data from the test show that the micro-jammer’s signal disrupted commercial wireless signals inside the prison cell, which meant that if cellphones were operating inside the cell, they would have been rendered inoperable. At 20 ft. and 100 ft. outside the cell, however, the micro-jammer signals did not disrupt the commercial wireless signals.

Under the Communications Act of 1934, it’s still illegal for states to jam public airwaves — only the federal government can authorize federal agencies to do it — but micro-jamming technology is starting to break down arguments against amending the law.

Telecommunication companies have long resisted any change in the law, saying jamming technology could block authorized calls outside the proscribed area.

Department officials present during the January 17, 2018, test reported that while their cellphone signals were blocked inside the cell, their cellphones were operable when standing several feet from the cell’s window. The data in the report will be used by BOP and the Department to understand the efficacy of micro-jamming, conduct further evaluation of jamming technology, and develop recommendations for strategic planning.

Here are the key findings from that report. We have highlighted some the key issues and concerns yet to be addressed as the technology is further evaluated.

Of note is finding Number 10 – With 50 to 100 micro-jamming units required per housing unit, electrical power requirements, capital costs and  detailed propagation modeling prior to installation may be significant issues in any real world deployment:

1) A contraband wireless device micro-jammer that was operated in four CMRS bands was temporarily installed and operated under an STA for a single day inside a Cumberland, Maryland FCI medium security housing unit. This micro-jammer, installed inside a utility closet, radiated its signal through a wall (concrete and steel, unspecified thickness) to a targeted prison cell on the other side. The cell was located on the ground floor. It had a single barred window to the outside. A commercially available light-reflective coating with unspecified electrical characteristics was temporarily installed on the outside of the window for the purpose of reducing the amount of jamming power that radiated outdoors.

2) The jammer consisted of a single unit containing four transmitters and associated antennas. The transmitters simultaneously produced sawtoothed FM (chirped) carrier waves that covered the CMRS bands 729–757 MHz, 869–894 MHz, 1930–1990 MHz, and 2110–2155 MHz. The jammer transmitters each produced 0.9 W per band, delivered into respective radiating antennas (combination of vertically and horizontally polarized) of +3 dBi gain. The unknown electrical characteristics of the wall through which the jammer radiated makes the unit’s ERP unknown, other than that it was less than the sum of the transmitter power and the antenna gain, that is, it was less than +32.5 dBm.

3) The unit was operated in on versus off states while emission measurements proceeded at four locations: two places inside the targeted cell and two places outdoors, adjacent to the targeted cell. The outdoor locations were 6.1 m (20 ft) and 30.5 m (100 ft) outside the building, with clear LOS to the window of the targeted prison cell.

4) NTIA performed in-band (CMRS band) and adjacent-band, OoB, spurious, and harmonic band measurements of the jammer emissions relative to the ambient CMRS signal levels at the four specified measurement locations. The results of those measurements are provided in this report.

5) Our data show that inside the targeted jamming zone (the prison cell interior), the jammer signal power levels substantially exceeded those of the CMRS signals, as summarized in Table 8 and Table 9 of this report. At the outdoor measurement locations, the jammer signals were substantially lower than indoors and the ambient CMRS signals were substantially higher in power than indoors. The range of signal power levels observed for the jammer versus the ambient CMRS signals at these locations are summarized in Table 8 and Table 9.

6) Lack of accepted quantitative engineering criteria for jammer effectiveness within a targeted jamming zone and for harmful interference outside a targeted jamming zone make it impossible for us to state, based solely on the measured jamming signal power levels and ambient CMRS signal levels, the effectiveness of the micro-jammer or its potential for causing harmful interference. The data in this report could be used for such analysis if (or when) such criteria are ever developed.

7) Noting this gap in knowledge, we recommend that quantitative engineering criteria for jammer effectiveness against contraband wireless devices (e.g., S/J thresholds) and for harmful interference to non-targeted CMRS receivers (e.g., S/I thresholds) should be environments. Theoretical analytical and numerical models should be used in conjunction with selected laboratory measurements to determine these criteria.

8) Outside the targeted CMRS bands, the only spurious signals observed from the jammer were second harmonics of the 729–757 MHz band and the 2110–2155 MHz band. These harmonics, falling in aeronautical mobile telemetry and airborne radio altimeter bands, respectively, were about 24 dB lower than the intentional emission level for the associated 750 MHz band and 7 to 15 dB lower than the intentional emission for the 2.1 GHz band.

9) The results presented in this report are idiosyncratic to the technical particulars of this jammer transmitter and the housing unit building in which its signal was radiated. Different results would be expected for any given jammer installation at any given location.

10) Aggregate emissions from the numbers of micro-jammers that would be required to provide denial-of-service coverage to entire facilities such as Cumberland FCI will represent the sum total of emission power for those groups of jammers in such facilities. Seen at a distance from the facility, the total, aggregate power for such assemblages will tend to increase in direct proportion to the number of such transmitters deployed in each facility. It has been estimated that 50 to 100 jammer transmitters like the one observed in this report might be required to cover a single, large-size housing unit in a prison facility. There are eight such medium security housing units at Cumberland FCI, for example. Assessment of the aggregation effects of multiple jammer transmitters is beyond the scope of this report. Such assessment would require either a full micro-jammer deployment at a prison facility, or else a detailed theoretical-analytical study for a given facility, including detailed propagation modeling of all of the facility’s walls, ceilings, and floors.

11) Measured characteristics in the time domain are consistent with the chirped modulation of the micro-jammer transmitter.

12) Measured emission spectra have a lobed structure that is consistent with the chirped modulation of the micro-jammer transmitter.

13) Jammer transmitter detected peak power goes as 16.7?log(receiver IF bandwidth) for any given receiver. Detected average power will go as 10?log(receiver IF bandwidth) for any receiver. See Appendix B for experimental confirmation and further discussion of this topic.

14) The total-power emission bandwidth for the jammer transmitter goes, band-by-band, according to the values of Table 2. For peak detection the power-limiting bandwidths run between 1.4 and 2.5 MHz; for average detection the power limiting bandwidths are slightly wider than the chirp bandwidth, Bc. See Appendix B for further discussion.

15) The data in this report can be used with the unit conversion information provided in Section 5.3 and the supplemental material of [8] to compare with radhaz recommendations and limits.

The post Prison Test Of Micro-Jamming Contraband Cell Phones appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

T-Mobile recently submitted to the FCC a study comparing Managed Access Systems (“MAS”) and precision jamming systems (micro-jamming) as potential solutions to prevent contraband phone use in correctional facilities. This study was submitted to Docket 13-111, Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities.

The study provides an overview of MAS and micro-jamming solutions examining both technical and cost considerations. The paper finds that the cost to deploy and operate the two solutions is roughly equivalent, with the cost for a MAS being less than a jammer solution in larger prisons and the jammer solution being slightly less than an MAS solution for smaller prisons.

However, the study also details a number of detrimental impacts of a jammer solution compared to an MAS solution, such as blocking legitimate use of wireless devices, including use for E911 and FirstNet, jamming other important uses, including GPS, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, and creating a significant potential for interference with use of wireless devices by the general public in surrounding areas.

Based on the findings of the study, any cost/benefit analysis would necessarily have to conclude that a jamming solution is not an appropriate approach to combating contraband devices in prisons given the availability of comparably priced, effective solutions that do not include the negative societal impacts associated with jammers.

It also highlights that, although both solutions prevent the use of contraband devices within correctional facilities, MAS allows officials to permit the operation of authorized devices within correctional facilities, whereas jamming solutions prevent the operation of all devices for all purposes, regardless of legitimacy. Furthermore, the report identifies additional operational benefits available for MAS, e.g, data collection, that are not available with a jamming deployment.

Regarding cost, the study finds that in a large facility, precision jamming is expected to be costlier than  a  MAS  due  to  higher  system  management  and  monitoring  costs,  as  well  as  higher  R.F. jamming head-end costs.  In a medium facility, the precision jamming system’s higher management and head-end costs are expected to be partially offset by the MAS core network costs.  In a small facility, the additional cost of the MAS core network may make it slightly more costly. The following from the report summarizes these findings:

Of particular public interest is the potential impact of micro-jamming on the ongoing deployment of FirstNet nationwide. First Responder communications may be carried on commercial cellular bands. Since a jammer does not discriminate between cellular users, first responders attempting to communicate on the affected cellular frequency bands will be blocked. This would be a problem for first responder communications within the correctional facility, as well as outside of the facility if the jammer degrades local commercial wireless networks that also carry First Responder communications.

The post Prison Micro-Jamming Study Highlights Risks appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

Recently meshIP, LLC submitted  comments to the FCC’s Docket No. 13-111, Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities. We are re-posting  those comments here:

Introduction

meshIP, LLC (“meshIP” or “Company”) respectfully submits these comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC” or “Commission”) Report & Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM”) in the above- captioned proceeding.

meshIP is the provider of meshDETECT©  Secure Prison Cell Phone Solutions™. meshDETECT© is a unique solution to the problem of contraband cell phones in prison that also provides enhanced cellular wireless telephone access to detainees and their families. We offer a patented technology platform that can be offered in any prison interested in the smart deployment and management of secure prison cell phones – which reduces contraband wireless phone demand, promotes improved detainee behavior, reduces recidivism and increases officer safety.

We urge the FCC to consider the potential negative impact of blanket cellular jamming on the deployment and provision of alternate solutions to the demand for contraband cell phones as well as on those technologies that would introduce true choice and competition into the prison payphone industry, a stated goal of the FCC.

Demand and Supply are Two Sides of the Same Coin

We have long advocated for a balanced strategy that addresses both supply AND demand for contraband cell phones within prisons and jails. An effective contraband cell phone elimination strategy should focus on reducing demand, in addition to restricting supply.

Corrections officials have shared with us the fact that at least 40% of the calls intercepted by currently implemented managed access systems are to phone numbers already on inmates’ approved calling lists. We suspect that an even higher percentage are to other family and loved ones not on the limited list of allowed contacts and are also non-criminal wireless usage, i.e. conversations not related to criminal activity.

We believe that the problem of demand for smuggled mobile phones in jail goes beyond the very real problems of long-term offenders looking to continue their drug or crime operations, witness intimidation and the avoidance of high calling rates.

The demand is also driven by an inmate desire for more communication and more privacy (not secrecy). As such, any comprehensive solution should address both sides of the equation – supply and demand. However, like the problem of drug smuggling, without addressing the demand for contraband, the problem will never be solved.

A recent CDCR inmate, now released, shared with us the following insight, “California’s gangs have evolved over the past 5 decades to operate efficiently within the system of scarce resources. They can get gang orders out of a locked down county jail and into a locked down prison 70 miles away between midnight and 2 AM without reliance on any contraband inside either facility, telephones, nor help from staff using only technology from the 1970’s plus a large number of people inside and out working towards a common goal (FGA in custody terms – in furtherance of a gang activity). Sanctioned gang action does not travel over any phone for a reason. The reality is contraband phones are used for calls to friends and family, mostly female, because the current prison payphone system is inadequate to serve the number of people housed within CA’s system of incarceration. Managed Access has become an asset for the gang that controls and sells and profits from the technology to defeat it, since it now drives demand for the product they offer to sell inside while reducing supply of competing alternatives.”

An article[1] written by a current CDCR inmate also provides some interesting insights into this demand and how it is met, “The black market within the fences of the California prison in which I am incarcerated is as bad as any corrections department in this country. In my case, this prison is five hours from home, and the distance makes visitation a financial burden. Some prisoners have it even worse. The vast majority of the prison population lives on the support of loved ones alone. While the cost of a contraband cellphone is high, the corporation-run prepaid call system is downright robbery. Desperate to stay in touch with loved ones and faced with only unaffordable options, incarcerated people turn to the black market, where they are charged as much as $1,000 for a contraband smartphone. Incarcerated persons prefer to take the risk and spend the money on contraband phones than rely on the prison phone system because of the freedom they provide and their functionality beyond making simple calls. There are no time limits and fees to place calls…”

“The drug market is self-sustaining because drugs are consumed almost immediately. There will always be a demand for them, and the supply can flow as freely as they can be smuggled into the housing units. But a phone can possibly last years once you have one. So, there is a need for constant manipulation of the supply in order to ensure a steady stream of demand. The models of phone that I’ve come across are difficult to conceal and this could be deliberate. In the outside world, there are keychain-sized smartphones with 3G capabilities, but rarely have I seen one in here. I bought a basic talk and text-only phone the size of two fingers, and costed me the same amount as a 4G touchscreen model the size of my hand.”

An additional driver of contraband cell phones is the risk/reward ratio associated with the significant financial rewards for those smuggling these devices into prisons. Recent research[2] has linked contraband smuggling to low pay and high turnover for guards — and salaries for corrections officers in the states with the highest smuggling rates are indeed among the lowest in the nation.

However, by siphoning off and co-opting this non-criminal wireless usage, we can significantly reduce the overall demand for contraband cell phones and therefore the profitability for those smuggling these devices. Less financial reward for cell phone smugglers changes the risk/reward equation and makes it much less appealing given the high personal and professional risk for those caught smuggling.

In addition to reducing the demand for, and therefore the supply of, contraband cell phones, enhanced access to telecommunications services have the proven, significant, additional benefits of reducing recidivism, improving detainee behavior and increasing officer safety.

However blanket cellular jamming in prisons and jails will significantly reduce the technology options available to address the demand for contraband cell phones.

Introducing Choice and Competition into the Prison Payphone Industry

Not only will jamming significantly reduce the technology options available to address the demand for contraband cell phones, it will hamstring a viable, cost effective solution to introducing choice and competition into the prison payphone industry.  In fact, the FCC has frequently advocated for competition in the provision and availability of inmate communications services (ICS) in prisons and jails.

In its Second Report And Order And Third Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking[3] (NPRM) adopted on 10/22/15, the Commission wrote, “While we adopt regulations in this Order to correct failures in the ICS market, the Commission generally prefers to rely on competition over regulation. We seek additional comment on whether there are ways to promote competition within the ICS market to enable the Commission to sunset or eliminate our regulations adopted herein in the future. In the 2012 NPRM, the Commission noted that the First Wright Petition asked the Commission to “mandate the opening of the ICS market to competition.”

“In the First Wright Petition, the Petitioners further requested that the Commission address high ICS rates by prohibiting exclusive ICS contracts and collect-call-only restrictions at privately administered prisons, and requiring such facilities to permit multiple long-distance carriers to interconnect with prison telephone systems…The Commission sought comment on whether security issues were still a legitimate reason for limiting competition within correctional facilities, and whether any technological advances had changed the justification for such exclusive use.”

The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) commented, “The ICS commission issue also illustrates the fundamental problem with the existing status quo; specifically, the lack of competition in the ICS industry, in which, in exchange for commission payments, local jails and 42 state prison systems provide ICS providers with monopoly phone service contracts.[4]”

The American Bar Association commented, “The ABA recommends that the FCC use its statutory authority under section 253(d) of the Act to preempt states from entering into exclusive provider agreements, and open up the ICS market to fair and widespread competition.[5]”

And the Wright Petitioners wrote, “The FCC correctly notes that the Petitioners have been calling for the introduction of competition in the ICS market for more than 15 years, and in fact, this goal served as the basis for Martha Wright and the Petitioners to file the original lawsuit.[6]”

Some of the solutions put forth to achieve this goal include an equal access[7] approach similar to that which was put in place to open up local and long distance services to competition wherein consumers picked their local and long distance providers. Others have suggested a “wholesale/retail” bifurcation of the industry providers.

We believe, like the FCC, ABA, HRDC and the Wright Petitioners, that competition is an essential ingredient in breaking the ICS providers’ monopolies in prisons and jails in order to drive market-based pricing.

However, like the consumer market, unfettered and robust choice is what drives real competition. Completely bypassing the monopolists is the best way to ensure this choice. The consumer telecommunications market, while initially cracked open by regulatory schemes such as equal access, was fully emancipated by the introduction and widespread adoption of cellular phones.

An individual “wireless prison payphone” in the form of a secure cellular service offered to any detainee who wants it, without requiring interconnection to the monopolist’s infrastructure or the forced bifurcation of the industry into wholesale/retail providers, will offer true choice and therefore real competition in an industry that has for so long thrown up barriers to any meaningful competition.

By using commercial cellular networks to bypass the monopolists, no potentially insecure and costly infrastructure, such as WiFi[8], is required in a prison facility and therefore no capital costs to the prison facility as well as no risk of interconnection hurdles and artificial costs imposed by the incumbent ICS provider.

The current prison payphones already installed will remain in place, thereby giving inmates and their families a choice. If desired, the inmate can stand in line, waiting for his 15 minute call in a public area on the traditional prison payphone. Or he can make a controlled and sanctioned cellular call of unlimited length in the relative privacy of his cell.

In this way, real market forces will be introduced into the ICS arena thereby fulfilling the stated goals of the FCC, the ABA, the HDRC and the Wright Petitioners as well as providing choice and cost savings to the families of prisoners throughout the United States.

Conclusion

Accordingly, meshIP requests that the FCC considers the potential negative impact of cellular jamming on the competitive landscape and to alternative technology solutions available to address the problem of contraband cell phones in prisons. The approval of blanket cellular signal jamming runs the risk of hamstringing viable alternative solutions not only to this problem but also to the FCC’s long standing commitment to introducing choice and competition into the prison payphone industry.

————————————————————————————————————————————-

[1] https://shadowproof.com/2017/01/05/corrections-officers-control-supply-demand-contraband-phones-prisons/

[2] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/corrections/southern-prisons-have-smuggled-cellphone-problem-n790251

[3]https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-136A1_Rcd.pdf

[4] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001013059.pdf

[5] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001016566.pdf

[6] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001408397.pdf

[7] https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/local-local-toll-and-long-distance-calling

[8] https://prisoncellphones.com/blog/2013/06/06/the-risks-of-wifi-and-internet-deployment-in-prisons/

The post Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

After last year’s announcement by the CDCR that they would halt the deployment of the managed access systems touted to stop the supply of contraband cell phones into California’s state prisons, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has now announced it is installing 272 more metal detectors, 68 X-ray machines to scan packages, 103 low-dose X-ray scanners, 170 hidden surveillance cameras, 34 devices to decrypt and analyze cellphones, and 272 scanners that detect magnetic signals in a new effort to address this supply problem.

According the the prison payphone provider in California, who also oversaw the now cancelled managed access system deployment, “The latest crackdown is unlikely to deter inmates who want to conduct illegal activities using an unmonitored cellphone,” said a Global Tel-Link product manager. “There is no magic bullet, You can’t try to address the demand because the demand is always going to be there. So it’s better to control the supply, not only by capturing illicit phones but analyzing their calls and contents. That analysis has at times led to investigators uncovering weapons or drugs within prisons.”

Demand and supply are two sides of the same coin

We have long advocated for a balanced strategy that addresses both supply AND demand, however. We believe that the problem of demand for smuggled mobile phones in jail goes beyond long-term offenders looking to continue their drug or crime operations, witness intimidation and the avoidance of high LD rates. The demand is also driven by a desire for more communication and more privacy (not secrecy). As such, any comprehensive solution should address both sides of the equation – supply and demand. However, like the problem of drug smuggling, without addressing the demand for contraband, the problem will never be solved.

A recent CDCR inmate, now released, shared with us the following insight, “California’s gangs have evolved over the past 5 decades to operate efficiently within the system of scarce resources. They can get gang orders out of a locked down county jail and into a locked down prison 70 miles away between midnight and 2 AM without reliance on any contraband inside either facility, telephones, nor help from staff using only technology from the 1970’s plus a large number of people inside and out working towards a common goal (FGA in custody terms – in furtherance of a gang activity). Sanctioned gang action does not travel over any phone for a reason. The reality is contraband phones are used for calls to friends and family, mostly female, because the GTL system is inadequate to serve the number of people housed within CA’s system of incarceration. Managed Access has become an asset for the gang that controls and sells and profits from the technology to defeat it, since it now drives demand for the product they offer to sell inside while reducing supply of competing alternatives.”

An article written by a current CDCR inmate also provides some interesting insights into this demand and how it is met, “The black market within the fences of the California prison in which I am incarcerated is as bad as any corrections department in this country. In my case, this prison is five hours from home, and the distance makes visitation a financial burden. Some prisoners have it even worse. The vast majority of the prison population lives on the support of loved ones alone. While the cost of a contraband cellphone is high, the corporation-run prepaid call system is downright robbery. Desperate to stay in touch with loved ones and faced with only unaffordable options, incarcerated people turn to the black market, where they are charged as much as $1,000 for a contraband smartphone. Incarcerated persons prefer to take the risk and spend the money on contraband phones than rely on the prison phone system because of the freedom they provide and their functionality beyond making simple calls. There are no time limits and fees to place calls…”

“The drug market is self-sustaining because drugs are consumed almost immediately. There will always be a demand for them, and the supply can flow as freely as they can be smuggled into the housing units. But a phone can possibly last years once you have one. So, there is a need for constant manipulation of the supply in order to ensure a steady stream of demand. The models of phone that I’ve come across are difficult to conceal and this could be deliberate. In the outside world, there are keychain-sized smartphones with 3G capabilities, but rarely have I seen one in here. I bought a basic talk and text-only phone the size of two fingers, and costed me the same amount as a 4G touchscreen model the size of my hand.”

meshDETECT is a secure prison cell phone solution that gives detainees highly customized cell phones with all the security and control features of prison payphones. This allows those detainees whose only desire is for legitimate, non-criminal contact with family to use wireless technology safely and securely.

By siphoning off and co-opting this non-criminal wireless usage, we significantly reduce the overall demand for contraband cell phones and therefore the profitability for those smuggling these devices. Less financial reward for cell phone smugglers changes the risk/reward equation and makes it much less appealing given the high personal and professional risk for those caught smuggling.

The post Controlling Supply And Demand For Contraband Phones In Prisons appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

An interesting article in light of the recent letter submitted to the FCC by ten Republican governors  who want the Federal Communications Commission to give states more autonomy to apply technology that can stop prison inmates from using smuggled cellphones.

Gov. Nikki Haley and her counterparts encouraged FCC Chairman Thomas Wheeler in a letter Monday to give them “flexibility and authority” to render such communication impossible.

While the letter doesn’t explicitly say so, what the governors want is permission to jam cellphone signals behind bars, primarily because the current efforts to deploy managed access systems, which selectively block calls from unapproved mobile phones, have proven ineffective and expensive.

A 1934 law says the FCC can grant permission to jam public airwaves only to federal agencies, not state or local ones. The cellphone industry has strongly opposed the use of localized jamming technology out of concern that it could set a precedent leading to much wider gaps in their networks.

The governors say the technology would be strictly limited to prisons, and that society outside would not suffer.

Back in 2013, the FCC first took up the issue of technology solutions to contraband cell phones in prisons in a “notice of proposed rule making” to “remove barriers to the deployment and viability of existing and future technologies used to combat contraband wireless devices.”  That rulemaking is still pending.

The FCC has been reluctant to approve jamming devices (and wireless companies have been opposed to them) because jamming devices could conceivably work beyond prison walls, jamming cell phones of civilians trying to call 911, for instance. There’s also a fear that once prisons get the ability to jam cell phone signals, there won’t be anything stopping other agencies from getting it, too.

£1.2m pilot project that tried to stop prisoners using mobile phones in jail is unlikely to be extended across Scotland after inmates worked out how to beat the system.

A heavily redacted report produced by the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) and obtained by The Ferret has revealed that a trial in two Scottish prisons involving high-tech mobile phone blockers, known as IMSI-catchers, was beset by multiple problems.

The project made use of technology, described by privacy campaigners as “disturbing”, that exploits a security weakness in the design of UK mobile phones.

All mobiles will automatically connect to the nearest mobile phone mast or base-station, but the phone doesn’t check whether the base-station is genuine.

By mimicking a base-station an IMSI catcher or “grabber” can persuade every nearby mobile phone to connect to it, and then it can obtain details about each handset.

The IMSI catcher can be set to block calls, or it can log details of calls whilst forwarding the call onto a genuine mobile phone mast.

Civil liberties groups say The Scottish Prison Service is the first UK public agency to admit using an IMSI catcher to collect details of mobile phones.

One group is so concerned over the privacy implications that they have pledged to refer the SPS to the Data Commissioner for investigation.

The SPS was using the devices to try prevent prisoners using mobile phones in two jails: HMP Shotts in North Lanarkshire and HMP Glenochil near Alloa.

Despite spending more than £1.2m on the phone blocking equipment, the report complains of “resilience issues,” during the pilot and a “lack of intelligence provided by the system.”

The project did not lead to a reduction in the numbers of mobile phones being used in the pilot prisons because prisoners developed what officials described as “innovative countermeasures” to circumvent the phone block.

Precise details of how they outwitted the high-tech system have been redacted from the report released under freedom of information law to The Ferret.

During the trial the number of smart phones in the pilot project jails actually increased, as prisoners learned that they could use the more sophisticated phones to get around the blocking technology.

In turn, officials suggested that this lead to “debt and bullying amongst prisoner groups” as “the business of renting out these handsets to a number of prisoners appears to be increasing.”

The report also explains that the technology could not be used in prisons in urban areas with better mobile phone networks and more members of the public living nearby.

Officials originally intended to trial the phone blocker technology at HMP Edinburgh, but the risk that people passing close to the prison would also have their phone signals blocked by the system was deemed a “high risk” early on in the project.

The system was also only commissioned to block 2G and 3G mobile signals, but a 4G signal was already available in Edinburgh at the start of the trial.

To mitigate this risk, the pilot was conducted in two more rural prisons, HMP Glenochil and HMP Shotts, instead. But despite the move, the report notes that 4G services increasingly became available throughout Scotland during the trial, including at the two final pilot prisons.

This gave prisoners another means of circumventing the phone blocking technology and communicating illegally with the outside world.

Although annual checks from Ofcom and mobile phone operators were conducted to make sure the IMSI catchers were not intercepting the calls of innocent neighbours, and no complaints were received from members of the public living near the prisons, SPS officials conclude the report by recommending that no further roll out of the controversial technology is undertaken until all the problems have been resolved.

The Ferret understands that there is only one device now in operation, and this is at HMP Shotts.

The SPS has spent £32,827 on maintaining this device in the last 24 months alone.

As a consequence of the trial an SPS spokesperson confirmed to The Ferret that the SPS is now considering moving to using mobile IMSI catcher devices, rather than ones that remain in a fixed location. It was not clear how the SPS would be able to ensure that mobile IMSI catchers would not have an impact outside the prison walls.

The service has no data retention policy that relates specifically to the IMSI catchers, and said that data obtained by the devices is held for a month before it is discarded.

Calls for Data Commissioner to investigate

Dr Richard Tynan, Technologist with Privacy International, a group that campaigns for greater transparency on the use of these devices, confirmed to The Ferret that the Scottish Prison Service was the first UK public agency to admit to using an IMSI catcher.

Other public agencies in the UK have long been suspected of using IMSI catchers but routinely operate a policy of neither confirming, nor denying, their use.

Dr Tynan said of the SPS admission: “While it is a positive beginning to transparency around these mass surveillance devices in the UK, much more information is required from the authorities and regulators about when they can be deployed and what safeguards are in place.

“This precedent must now be followed by other UK agencies and they must come clean about their use of these devices and how many innocent people have had their privacy invaded without any suspicion or hint of wrongdoing.”

The SPS can legally deploy the devices within prisons using powers in the Prisons (Interference with Wireless Telegraphy) Bill.

But Dr Tynan went on to suggest that the Scottish Prison Service had failed to fully consider the privacy implications of their IMSI catchers, for both prisoners and members of the public passing near the jails, and pledged that he would ask the Data Protection Commissioner to investigate.

Pointing out inconsistencies in the responses received by the Ferret he said: “Firstly, the SPS confirm the purchase and operation of an IMSI grabber device in “deny” mode only.”

“This would indicate that it was being used as a rudimentary jammer rather than a mass surveillance system.

“However, the subsequent admission that they collect both IMEI and IMSI numbers shows that the device is not just jamming but intentionally collecting and decoding information on any mobile phone subscriber within the area that connects to it. Most devices of this type entice as many phones as possible to connect to it and the user has no way to prevent this.

“Secondly, they claim to be able to limit the range of the devices impact to the specific perimeter of the prison but had to move the trial to a more rural area than the city of Edinburgh. This was due to the risk of leakage beyond the prison and therefore claims about their ability to not impact on innocent passers-by are dubious at best.

Tynan added: “Finally, they admit that there is no data retention policy in place at all. They hold on to the personal data obtained using this device for an entire month without any apparent regard to the necessity and proportionality of such data retention.”

“It would now seem appropriate for the Data Protection Commissioner to review the deployment and operation of this device, the long retention practices and the security measures in place for such sensitive data and how many innocent people have had their private data collected, decoded and stored unlawfully.”

Jim Killock, Executive Director of another civil liberties campaign, the Open Rights Group, also called for full transparency from the SPS about their use of IMSI catchers, and called for the rules around their use to be toughened up.

“IMSI catchers may not only affect the mobile phones of prisoners, staff and visitors but other people living nearby. If their use is rolled out to other prisons in urban areas, many more people could be affected,” he said.

“While the Scottish Prison Service is purportedly using the catchers to block mobile signals, we know that they can be used for other purposes, including installing malware.”

“As such, we need full transparency about how this technology is being used.”

Liam McArthur, a Scottish Liberal Democrat MSP, said that there should be no further deployment of the devices until the problems identified in the report had been addressed.

He said: “Reports that the SPS has spent more than £1m on a system that has been so easily circumvented and could impact on mobile phone users outside of prisons is a real concern. Part of the reason for pilot projects is to help identify problems and it seems clear that this effort to cut mobile phone use in prisons has failed.”

He concluded: “There should be no question of these technologies being rolled out into other prisons on the strength of this report.”

A spokesperson for the Scottish Prison Service said: “In Scotland section 41ZA of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989 provides that it is an offence to possess, or give to a prisoner in prison, or use, without authorisation or outside of the designated area of the prison, a personal communication device such as a mobile telephone or any other portable electronic device capable of transmitting or receiving a communication.

“The Scottish Prison Service gathers evidence to aid the detection of any crime that may have been committed. Going forward, we are taking forward regulations to allow the disconnection of mobile phones.”

Source

The post Prisoners Outwit Mobile Phone Blocking Technology appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

This news tracks with reports elsewhere that this technology to block cell phone usage in prisons is problematic. An effective contraband cell phone strategy should focus on reducing demand, in addition to restricting supply.

Corrections officials have shared with us the fact that at least 40% of the calls intercepted by these systems are to phone numbers on inmates’ approved calling lists. We suspect that an even higher percentage are to other family and loved ones not on the limited list of allowed contacts and are also non-criminal wireless usage.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) cannot say it was not warned that the high-tech system it was deploying to stop rampant, forbidden cellphone use by inmates in the state’s 34 prisons probably would not work.

The 2012 report by the California Council on Science and Technology said the system wouldn’t block 4G, Wi-Fi, MiFi, Skype, text messages or satellite transmissions. It can’t triangulate radio signals, limiting its effectiveness in identifying specific phones or users. And radio frequency leakage could interfere with regular cellphone usage, affecting the public’s access to 911 operators.

But the state forged ahead, installing the system at 18 prisons before deciding it wasn’t working.

The Associated Press reported on Wednesday that the department has halted expansion while options are pondered. “It’s been difficult to make sure the technology can handle those upgrades,” CDCR spokeswoman Dana Simas told AP. “Whether we’re going to scrap it or whether we can find solutions to these issues, that will be determined later.” “What remains to be determined is if the constant upgrades performed by the vendor will be sustainable in the future,” Simas said.

The report had called the state’s long-term investment in untested technology “unwise” and premature, especially in light of the fact that it really doesn’t even know how many illegal cellphones are floating around the prison system. The council recommended using airport-style screening systems for all personnel and having private carriers identify and disable illicitly obtained phones.

“In point of fact, there are no prisons anywhere in the United States using a functional managed access system to control cell phone use,” the report said.

Prison officials go to great lengths to prevent cellphones, often stolen, from being slipped into the prison by employees or visitors. It doesn’t work very well. Charles Manson, a high-profile 81-year-old killer, was recently caught twice with cellphones used to call around the country. A visitor was caught with a third phone meant for him, in a hallowed out boot heel.

Global Tel-Link’s blocking system made it into 18 of the state’s 34 prisons, and for now that seems as far as it’ll go, because cell phone companies of 2015 are using drastically different networks than the companies of 2011. Between 4G and Long Term Evolution services, phone companies are transmitting calls over a system that has more in common with a wifi network than old-school cell connections.

AP said the number of cellphones grabbed in California prisons declined markedly from 15,000 in 2011 to 8,000 in 2015. But the inmate who talked on his illicit phone to Vice reporter Seth Ferranti in February described a very active tech scene.

“All my homies that got phones, all of us are friends on Facebook. Niggas be making rap videos, they be filming riots and filming shit that’s going on and putting them on YouTube.”

The inmate, a lifer called “Big Smoke,” said, “The cellphones is rampant up and down the coast of California.” He claimed most of the phones were brought in by staff, but, “Some inmates is even smuggling them in now because it’s so profitable. They smuggling in memory cards, chargers, cords, anything that has to do with a cellphone. All that stuff goes for $50 a pop. Every part that has to do with a cellphone is profitable. The black market is big.”

(Source)

The post CDCR Halts Roll Out Of Managed Access Cell Phone Jamming appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

A cautionary tale for prisons contemplating shelling out millions of dollars for managed access systems to jam contraband cell phones. A prison in New Zealand has spent over $11M (US) in installation and upgrades on a cellular signal jamming system that has not prevented the ongoing use of wireless devices.

Taxpayers have forked out $17 million on cellphone jamming technology for prisons – but inmates continue to be caught with increasing numbers of contraband mobile phones.

Despite a network blocking system designed to stop Mt Eden prisoners using cellphones, footage of a “fight club” found its way out of the Auckland jail and on to social media.

Serco confirmed a cellphone was found during a full search of Mt Eden prison on Monday.

Corrections found 284 of the banned devices in the country’s prisons in the 2013-14 financial year.

The previous financial year the department found 274 cellphones unlawfully held by prisoners or brought in by visitors. It also confiscated 119 phone batteries, 128 chargers and 151 SIM cards.

Corrections’ cellphone jamming system cost a budget-blowing $10.9m to install between 2007 and 2009.  It budgeted $5.7m and nearly $6.7m has been spent since, including almost $2.3m in the first five months of last year on a systems upgrade. That followed a $1.3m spruce-up in 2011, according to records released under the Official Information Act.

Yet it does not seemed to have curbed prisoners’ efforts to smuggle them in – and they would not bother if the phones didn’t work, prison drug and alcohol counsellor Roger Brooking said.

A prison intelligence report this year showed Killer Beez founder Josh Masters was continuing to lead the street gang and arrange drug supply from his prison cell using a smuggled cellphone.

Last year convicted murderer Buddy Campbell used a cellphone to post selfies to his Facebook page while an inmate in Rimutaka prison.

Inmates had previously told Brooking they exploited loopholes, finding they could connect to 2 Degrees when it was first launched, he said.

Brooking said keeping cellphones out of prisoners’ hands to protect the public was a “valid concern”, but $17m could have been better spent on healthcare and counselling.

“I think it’s a complete and utter waste of money.”

The jammers were designed to block cellular access to the internet, Corrections said.

But it would not comment on whether mobile network bands 3G and 4G were covered, saying revealing the information would provide insight to prisoners and their associates.

Corrections national commissioner Jeremy Lightfoot said cellphones were banned to prevent prisoners organising crime, harassing victims and perverting the course of justice.

The department was constantly responding to telecommunications industry evolution in its efforts to keep the public safe.

Current prisoner Arthur Taylor contacted Fairfax to say he was concerned about the cellphone jammers’ radiation, claiming he could see 10 of the devices stationed on his block.

Asked if he thought the jammers worked, Taylor replied: “Cellphone finds were well down before the jammers arrived – due to other security measures.”

Source

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A Texas Tribune investigation has found that few inmates or correctional officers face legal consequences for smuggling cellphones even as prison officials have intensified efforts to keep the devices out of prisons. Just 5 percent of cellphone smuggling cases investigated by the Criminal Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General from 2009 to 2013 resulted in a criminal sentence, according to documents obtained from the office through a public information request.

Some notable excerpts from the article:

In 2003, legislators made smuggling the devices into prisons a felony. Since 2009, the state has allocated $10 million every two years for “security enhancements for contraband interdiction,” said Robert Hurst, a Criminal Justice Department spokesman.

The enhancements include a special K-9 unit responsible for sniffing out cellphones, increased video surveillance of guards and the addition of “managed access systems” at two prisons that intercept all but a few specified outgoing cellular signals.

The costs of the offender telephone service are “so high, that’s one of the reasons why inmates turn to cellphones,” said Michele Deitch, a prisons expert at the University of Texas at Austin. “They really need the phone access, which promotes healthier families, but at those rates it becomes an incredible burden on the families.” A phone call with the service costs up to 26 cents per minute.

For guards, who risk their jobs and felony charges by dealing in contraband, the financial reward can be much larger than their salaries.

“The temptation is there, if there’s not a strong deterrent to misbehavior,” said Pelz, the former warden, adding that a smuggled cellphone can fetch up to $3,000. “Your weakest link is the employees bringing the contraband in.”

Lance Lowry, president of the Texas correctional employees local of the American Federation of State County and Municipal Emlpoyees union, said many who resort to smuggling were trying to supplement low wages. Entry-level correctional officers make about $29,000 a year. At that rate, one cellphone could amount to 10 percent of an officer’s annual salary.

The post Few Consequences For Texas Prison Cell Phone Smuggling appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice has determined that managed access jamming of contraband cell phones is too expensive and has commissioned “research to explore the use and demand for illicit mobile phones amongst the prison population” in order to facilitate the “development of a new mobile phone strategy to:

(i) manage prisoner communications,

(ii) reduce and control criminal activities and

(iii) reduce expenditure on equipment and the need for time-consuming searches.”

The aim of the study is:

1. To further the understanding of what drives the demand for illicit mobile phones by prisoners; and

2. To help identify potential effective ways of preventing their usage (excluding prohibitively expensive solutions such as mobile phone blockers).

To guide the analysis, the key research questions to be explored are:

• What drives the demand for mobile phones within prisons? How much is for maintaining family conduct and how much is for other more criminal purposes (including criminal networks, gangs, terrorism)?

• Are certain types of prisoners more likely to want a mobile phone and so drive demand in particular establishments?

• Which non-technical factors could be most effective (and cost effective) in reducing both the supply and demand for mobile phones in prison (including ways of counteracting the prison economy that surrounds the use of mobile phones)?

Maryland as an example

Let’s look at Maryland as an example of the managed access cost concerns prisons around the world must wrestle with when considering jamming technology. Last year, the Maryland State legislature formed a Special Joint Commission on Public Safety and Security in State and Local Correctional Facilities. Formed in response to the scandal at the Baltimore City Detention Center, where a joint federal-state investigation revealed a virtual takeover of the facility by violent inmate gang members and corrupt correctional officers, the commission recently released its recommendations.

Included in this report is the recommendation is to expand the funding for managed access jammers at six additional prison facilities beyond the two sites (MTC and BCDC) where it has already been installed. Per the report, the jamming costs for these two existing sites are $2 million annually at MTC and $3.9 million annually at BCDC.

According to the report, “The system appears to be very effective, as evidenced by the sight of inmates continuously lined up at payphones.” That’s some fact-based decision making right there!

If the cell phones in the prison were predominately used to plan crimes by avoiding the monitoring/recording of calls at the prison payphones (the reasons given to justify the multi-million dollar annual expenditures), why would prison payphone demand increase once the contraband mobile phones were being jammed? Perhaps because the predominant use of the now blocked mobile phones is not to run gangs, but rather to speak to loved ones?

We have long advocated the strategy of looking at the problem of contraband cell phones as a problem of supply AND demand. We believe however that the problem of demand for smuggled mobile phones in jail goes beyond long-term offenders looking to continue their drug or crime operations, witness intimidation and the avoidance of high call prices.

Contraband cell phone demand is also driven by a desire for more frequent family communication and more privacy (not secrecy) and as such, any comprehensive solution should address both sides of the equation – supply and demand.

Providing prisoners with a controlled and secure prison cell phone, such as the meshDETECT solution, will siphon off the predominant use of the contraband phones – communication with loved ones. Combined with a measured and cost effective supply-side strategy, this demand-side approach will lower the value of the contraband wireless phones and therefore the money that can be made smuggling them into prison, eliminate wireless airtime as prison currency and reduce recidivism by enhancing family connections.

The challenges prison budgets face in today’s economic environment necessitate such a comprehensive approach. We are pleased to see that, in Britain at least, this strategy is being seriously considered.

The post Managed Access Jamming Too Expensive Says MoJ, Investigates Demand For Contraband Cell Phones appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.