In July, 2018 the UK’s Prison and Probation Service issued a report that detailed the findings from research that looked at the demand and use of illicit phones in prisons. The report explores the use of smuggled mobile phones in prison in considerable detail, contrasting the views of prison staff and prisoners themselves on why and how prisoners increasingly use mobiles inside prisons.

The aim of the research was to understand what drives the demand for illicit phones by prisoners, what type of prisoners are more likely to want an illicit phone, and to help identify methods that are potentially effective to reduce the supply and demand for illicit phones.

Unique in this report is the effort to identify and address not only the supply side of the contraband prison cell phone equation, but also the demand side drivers.

The varieties and types of  cell phone use by prisoners is captured in the figure below, followed by a description of the different user types identified. The report states, “The typology has been constructed on the basis of a synthesis of the qualitative material and it should be noted that the sample of prisoners interviewed was biased to higher risk prisoners. The synthesis has sought to capture the relative importance of different types of drivers of mobile phones as reported to the researchers, primarily by the prisoner sample. Figure 2 illustrates the typology, providing an indication of the relative importance of the various drivers of use as reported by prisoners, represented by the size of the circles. The overlaps between the circles of different types of users are intended as an indicator of crossover between groups in patterns of motivation and use. The size of the circles is not intended to denote the size of particular groups of mobile phone users; this cannot be deduced from a piece of qualitative research.”

Mobile phone user typology:

Family man
Profile: Partnered/with children. Includes very young fathers, but has older bias.
Motivation: Close to family, contribute as parent from inside, be part of family life.
Usage style: Text and voice. Discreet – aim to retain phone on sustainable basis.
Risk: Low, little cross-over with other aspects of prison economy.
Impact: Sustained relationships. Positive for resettlement/desistance.

Girlfriends/sex talk
Profile: Young men with and without partners.
Motivation: Relationships and intimacy, female company, control, sex, entertainment –presence in outside world.
Usage style: Primary focus text, voice, some picture sharing. Can be discreet – somesharing within close associate clique.
Risk: Medium, some crossover with drugs, some access to restricted numbers.
Impact: Positive for personal relationships and some diffusion of tension/aggression.Some potential for continuation of damaging controlling relationships, relationships with criminal associates.

Economically driven/opportunists
Profile: Multiple sentences, experienced or longer term prisoners.
Motivation: Cost savings and convenience. Some to sort affairs on entry to prison.
Usage style: Text and voice. Mix of phone owners/renters, some occasional use.
Risk: Medium to low. May be some crossover with running external criminal business.
Impact: Medium, some potential for debt, exposure to intimidation and stress.

Display/Rebel
Profile: Young males, testosterone/display-driven, multiple prison terms, often gang-related.
Motivation: Status and build reputation inside/outside prison, display physique, boast to external audience, maintain presence outside world, kick against system.
Usage style: Text and voice, images key, social media.
Risk: Medium to high: some crossover with drug/mobile trafficking, harassment of witnesses/victims, continuation of gang agenda.
Impact: Negative impact on victims/witnesses, impact on reputation of prison service, glamorising negative behaviours/gang cultures – but short-lived.

Dealers
Profile: Dealers in drugs/mobiles or both, both inside prison and, in some cases also running external drug business. Some local gang connected, some OCG links.
Motivation: Financial gain, status, continuation of criminal lifestyle – also used for personal and family communications but primary driver criminal business.
Usage style: Text and voice. May have dominant position in landing hierarchy. Phone typically held by associates or third party, typically weaker, potentially vulnerable prisoners.
Risk: High. Risks to security and good order, central to the illicit prison economy, continuation of external criminal business activities.
Impact: High. Disorder and volatility, debt, intimidation, violence, extortion, both internally and externally to families, potential risks for victims and witnesses and external associates.

Vulnerable holders
Profile: Weak individuals with little status intimidated into holding phones for more powerful and connected prisoners.
Motivation: Fear of more powerful individuals and potential consequences of not agreeing to look after phone. In some cases ‘quid pro quo’ of being able to use phone to contact own family.
Usage style: Often not used personally, in some cases limited text and voice.
Risk: Low risk, primarily to individual if phone detected and confiscated by authorities.
Impact: Secondary effect, primary impact associated with phone owners. Some risk to holders (of debt, retaliation, sanctions) if phone detected and confiscated.

Serious Organised Criminals (SOC)
Profile: Experienced lifestyle criminals, present as ‘model prisoner’.
Motivation: Continuation of criminal business activity, minimise personal exposure to risk and length of time in prison, minimise personal discomfort/restrictions within prison regime.
Usage style: Full functionality device, minimal personal use, maximum deniability, device carried/stored by associates, highly conscious of targeting and intelligence powers.
Risk: Very high – drug dealing and trafficking at scale, risks to witnesses and perversion of course of justice.
Impact: Very high – continuing of scale criminal business has ongoing negative impact on public.

Conclusions:

Regarding the types of contraband prison cell phone users, the report goes on to conclude , “There appeared to be a significant body of mobile phone users for whom the drivers of demand were essentially social and human rather than criminal and for whom the impact of mobile phone use was largely positive, not only in enabling individuals to maintain meaningful relationships with family and loved ones but also in increasing motivation for compliance and desistance. The primary social driver in these cases appears to be prisoners’ deep desire to maintain relationships with loved ones, with the legitimate phone system often being a poor fit with their communication needs and the realities of family lives, partners’ working hours and children’s activities. From the prisoners’ accounts, this appeared to be the most important driver of demand for mobile phones.

Clearly there is a degree of crossover between the criminal and social drivers. Nonetheless, for many prisoners using mobile phones primarily or solely for communications, the social use of mobile phones appeared to have a series of positives associated with it, in contrast to the undoubted risks and harm arising from criminally driven use of mobile phones in prisons. Access to mobile phones appeared to go some way to defusing the frustrations and tensions that are associated with the inadequacy of the legitimate PIN phone system, and thus may also be mitigating the potential for violent confrontations and intimidation which centres on access to these phones.

Against the background of capacity and resource pressure, it could also be argued that access to mobile phones may have also been working to dilute the impact of prisoners being locked up for extended periods and thus mitigating prisoner resentment of increasingly lengthy lock-ins, which might otherwise present a powerful driver for confrontation with prison authorities.

For those with access to them, mobile phones were clearly underpinning prisoners’ ability to maintain meaningful ongoing relationships with family and loved ones and to participate more fully in family life and relationships, with apparent benefits for children and partners as well as prisoners themselves. It could also be argued therefore that mobile phones – and the quality communication with family and loved ones that they facilitated – were acting to support pro-social behaviour and moderate the culture of violence and the inward-looking prison culture.”

The post The Demand For and Use of Illicit Phones in Prison appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

According to the DOJ, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has posted a report detailing its findings from the Jan. 17, 2018 test of micro-jamming technology conducted at the Federal Correctional Institution at Cumberland, Maryland.

Data from the test show that the micro-jammer’s signal disrupted commercial wireless signals inside the prison cell, which meant that if cellphones were operating inside the cell, they would have been rendered inoperable. At 20 ft. and 100 ft. outside the cell, however, the micro-jammer signals did not disrupt the commercial wireless signals.

Under the Communications Act of 1934, it’s still illegal for states to jam public airwaves — only the federal government can authorize federal agencies to do it — but micro-jamming technology is starting to break down arguments against amending the law.

Telecommunication companies have long resisted any change in the law, saying jamming technology could block authorized calls outside the proscribed area.

Department officials present during the January 17, 2018, test reported that while their cellphone signals were blocked inside the cell, their cellphones were operable when standing several feet from the cell’s window. The data in the report will be used by BOP and the Department to understand the efficacy of micro-jamming, conduct further evaluation of jamming technology, and develop recommendations for strategic planning.

Here are the key findings from that report. We have highlighted some the key issues and concerns yet to be addressed as the technology is further evaluated.

Of note is finding Number 10 – With 50 to 100 micro-jamming units required per housing unit, electrical power requirements, capital costs and  detailed propagation modeling prior to installation may be significant issues in any real world deployment:

1) A contraband wireless device micro-jammer that was operated in four CMRS bands was temporarily installed and operated under an STA for a single day inside a Cumberland, Maryland FCI medium security housing unit. This micro-jammer, installed inside a utility closet, radiated its signal through a wall (concrete and steel, unspecified thickness) to a targeted prison cell on the other side. The cell was located on the ground floor. It had a single barred window to the outside. A commercially available light-reflective coating with unspecified electrical characteristics was temporarily installed on the outside of the window for the purpose of reducing the amount of jamming power that radiated outdoors.

2) The jammer consisted of a single unit containing four transmitters and associated antennas. The transmitters simultaneously produced sawtoothed FM (chirped) carrier waves that covered the CMRS bands 729–757 MHz, 869–894 MHz, 1930–1990 MHz, and 2110–2155 MHz. The jammer transmitters each produced 0.9 W per band, delivered into respective radiating antennas (combination of vertically and horizontally polarized) of +3 dBi gain. The unknown electrical characteristics of the wall through which the jammer radiated makes the unit’s ERP unknown, other than that it was less than the sum of the transmitter power and the antenna gain, that is, it was less than +32.5 dBm.

3) The unit was operated in on versus off states while emission measurements proceeded at four locations: two places inside the targeted cell and two places outdoors, adjacent to the targeted cell. The outdoor locations were 6.1 m (20 ft) and 30.5 m (100 ft) outside the building, with clear LOS to the window of the targeted prison cell.

4) NTIA performed in-band (CMRS band) and adjacent-band, OoB, spurious, and harmonic band measurements of the jammer emissions relative to the ambient CMRS signal levels at the four specified measurement locations. The results of those measurements are provided in this report.

5) Our data show that inside the targeted jamming zone (the prison cell interior), the jammer signal power levels substantially exceeded those of the CMRS signals, as summarized in Table 8 and Table 9 of this report. At the outdoor measurement locations, the jammer signals were substantially lower than indoors and the ambient CMRS signals were substantially higher in power than indoors. The range of signal power levels observed for the jammer versus the ambient CMRS signals at these locations are summarized in Table 8 and Table 9.

6) Lack of accepted quantitative engineering criteria for jammer effectiveness within a targeted jamming zone and for harmful interference outside a targeted jamming zone make it impossible for us to state, based solely on the measured jamming signal power levels and ambient CMRS signal levels, the effectiveness of the micro-jammer or its potential for causing harmful interference. The data in this report could be used for such analysis if (or when) such criteria are ever developed.

7) Noting this gap in knowledge, we recommend that quantitative engineering criteria for jammer effectiveness against contraband wireless devices (e.g., S/J thresholds) and for harmful interference to non-targeted CMRS receivers (e.g., S/I thresholds) should be environments. Theoretical analytical and numerical models should be used in conjunction with selected laboratory measurements to determine these criteria.

8) Outside the targeted CMRS bands, the only spurious signals observed from the jammer were second harmonics of the 729–757 MHz band and the 2110–2155 MHz band. These harmonics, falling in aeronautical mobile telemetry and airborne radio altimeter bands, respectively, were about 24 dB lower than the intentional emission level for the associated 750 MHz band and 7 to 15 dB lower than the intentional emission for the 2.1 GHz band.

9) The results presented in this report are idiosyncratic to the technical particulars of this jammer transmitter and the housing unit building in which its signal was radiated. Different results would be expected for any given jammer installation at any given location.

10) Aggregate emissions from the numbers of micro-jammers that would be required to provide denial-of-service coverage to entire facilities such as Cumberland FCI will represent the sum total of emission power for those groups of jammers in such facilities. Seen at a distance from the facility, the total, aggregate power for such assemblages will tend to increase in direct proportion to the number of such transmitters deployed in each facility. It has been estimated that 50 to 100 jammer transmitters like the one observed in this report might be required to cover a single, large-size housing unit in a prison facility. There are eight such medium security housing units at Cumberland FCI, for example. Assessment of the aggregation effects of multiple jammer transmitters is beyond the scope of this report. Such assessment would require either a full micro-jammer deployment at a prison facility, or else a detailed theoretical-analytical study for a given facility, including detailed propagation modeling of all of the facility’s walls, ceilings, and floors.

11) Measured characteristics in the time domain are consistent with the chirped modulation of the micro-jammer transmitter.

12) Measured emission spectra have a lobed structure that is consistent with the chirped modulation of the micro-jammer transmitter.

13) Jammer transmitter detected peak power goes as 16.7?log(receiver IF bandwidth) for any given receiver. Detected average power will go as 10?log(receiver IF bandwidth) for any receiver. See Appendix B for experimental confirmation and further discussion of this topic.

14) The total-power emission bandwidth for the jammer transmitter goes, band-by-band, according to the values of Table 2. For peak detection the power-limiting bandwidths run between 1.4 and 2.5 MHz; for average detection the power limiting bandwidths are slightly wider than the chirp bandwidth, Bc. See Appendix B for further discussion.

15) The data in this report can be used with the unit conversion information provided in Section 5.3 and the supplemental material of [8] to compare with radhaz recommendations and limits.

The post Prison Test Of Micro-Jamming Contraband Cell Phones appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

Recently meshIP, LLC submitted  comments to the FCC’s Docket No. 13-111, Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities. We are re-posting  those comments here:

Introduction

meshIP, LLC (“meshIP” or “Company”) respectfully submits these comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC” or “Commission”) Report & Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM”) in the above- captioned proceeding.

meshIP is the provider of meshDETECT©  Secure Prison Cell Phone Solutions™. meshDETECT© is a unique solution to the problem of contraband cell phones in prison that also provides enhanced cellular wireless telephone access to detainees and their families. We offer a patented technology platform that can be offered in any prison interested in the smart deployment and management of secure prison cell phones – which reduces contraband wireless phone demand, promotes improved detainee behavior, reduces recidivism and increases officer safety.

We urge the FCC to consider the potential negative impact of blanket cellular jamming on the deployment and provision of alternate solutions to the demand for contraband cell phones as well as on those technologies that would introduce true choice and competition into the prison payphone industry, a stated goal of the FCC.

Demand and Supply are Two Sides of the Same Coin

We have long advocated for a balanced strategy that addresses both supply AND demand for contraband cell phones within prisons and jails. An effective contraband cell phone elimination strategy should focus on reducing demand, in addition to restricting supply.

Corrections officials have shared with us the fact that at least 40% of the calls intercepted by currently implemented managed access systems are to phone numbers already on inmates’ approved calling lists. We suspect that an even higher percentage are to other family and loved ones not on the limited list of allowed contacts and are also non-criminal wireless usage, i.e. conversations not related to criminal activity.

We believe that the problem of demand for smuggled mobile phones in jail goes beyond the very real problems of long-term offenders looking to continue their drug or crime operations, witness intimidation and the avoidance of high calling rates.

The demand is also driven by an inmate desire for more communication and more privacy (not secrecy). As such, any comprehensive solution should address both sides of the equation – supply and demand. However, like the problem of drug smuggling, without addressing the demand for contraband, the problem will never be solved.

A recent CDCR inmate, now released, shared with us the following insight, “California’s gangs have evolved over the past 5 decades to operate efficiently within the system of scarce resources. They can get gang orders out of a locked down county jail and into a locked down prison 70 miles away between midnight and 2 AM without reliance on any contraband inside either facility, telephones, nor help from staff using only technology from the 1970’s plus a large number of people inside and out working towards a common goal (FGA in custody terms – in furtherance of a gang activity). Sanctioned gang action does not travel over any phone for a reason. The reality is contraband phones are used for calls to friends and family, mostly female, because the current prison payphone system is inadequate to serve the number of people housed within CA’s system of incarceration. Managed Access has become an asset for the gang that controls and sells and profits from the technology to defeat it, since it now drives demand for the product they offer to sell inside while reducing supply of competing alternatives.”

An article[1] written by a current CDCR inmate also provides some interesting insights into this demand and how it is met, “The black market within the fences of the California prison in which I am incarcerated is as bad as any corrections department in this country. In my case, this prison is five hours from home, and the distance makes visitation a financial burden. Some prisoners have it even worse. The vast majority of the prison population lives on the support of loved ones alone. While the cost of a contraband cellphone is high, the corporation-run prepaid call system is downright robbery. Desperate to stay in touch with loved ones and faced with only unaffordable options, incarcerated people turn to the black market, where they are charged as much as $1,000 for a contraband smartphone. Incarcerated persons prefer to take the risk and spend the money on contraband phones than rely on the prison phone system because of the freedom they provide and their functionality beyond making simple calls. There are no time limits and fees to place calls…”

“The drug market is self-sustaining because drugs are consumed almost immediately. There will always be a demand for them, and the supply can flow as freely as they can be smuggled into the housing units. But a phone can possibly last years once you have one. So, there is a need for constant manipulation of the supply in order to ensure a steady stream of demand. The models of phone that I’ve come across are difficult to conceal and this could be deliberate. In the outside world, there are keychain-sized smartphones with 3G capabilities, but rarely have I seen one in here. I bought a basic talk and text-only phone the size of two fingers, and costed me the same amount as a 4G touchscreen model the size of my hand.”

An additional driver of contraband cell phones is the risk/reward ratio associated with the significant financial rewards for those smuggling these devices into prisons. Recent research[2] has linked contraband smuggling to low pay and high turnover for guards — and salaries for corrections officers in the states with the highest smuggling rates are indeed among the lowest in the nation.

However, by siphoning off and co-opting this non-criminal wireless usage, we can significantly reduce the overall demand for contraband cell phones and therefore the profitability for those smuggling these devices. Less financial reward for cell phone smugglers changes the risk/reward equation and makes it much less appealing given the high personal and professional risk for those caught smuggling.

In addition to reducing the demand for, and therefore the supply of, contraband cell phones, enhanced access to telecommunications services have the proven, significant, additional benefits of reducing recidivism, improving detainee behavior and increasing officer safety.

However blanket cellular jamming in prisons and jails will significantly reduce the technology options available to address the demand for contraband cell phones.

Introducing Choice and Competition into the Prison Payphone Industry

Not only will jamming significantly reduce the technology options available to address the demand for contraband cell phones, it will hamstring a viable, cost effective solution to introducing choice and competition into the prison payphone industry.  In fact, the FCC has frequently advocated for competition in the provision and availability of inmate communications services (ICS) in prisons and jails.

In its Second Report And Order And Third Further Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking[3] (NPRM) adopted on 10/22/15, the Commission wrote, “While we adopt regulations in this Order to correct failures in the ICS market, the Commission generally prefers to rely on competition over regulation. We seek additional comment on whether there are ways to promote competition within the ICS market to enable the Commission to sunset or eliminate our regulations adopted herein in the future. In the 2012 NPRM, the Commission noted that the First Wright Petition asked the Commission to “mandate the opening of the ICS market to competition.”

“In the First Wright Petition, the Petitioners further requested that the Commission address high ICS rates by prohibiting exclusive ICS contracts and collect-call-only restrictions at privately administered prisons, and requiring such facilities to permit multiple long-distance carriers to interconnect with prison telephone systems…The Commission sought comment on whether security issues were still a legitimate reason for limiting competition within correctional facilities, and whether any technological advances had changed the justification for such exclusive use.”

The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) commented, “The ICS commission issue also illustrates the fundamental problem with the existing status quo; specifically, the lack of competition in the ICS industry, in which, in exchange for commission payments, local jails and 42 state prison systems provide ICS providers with monopoly phone service contracts.[4]”

The American Bar Association commented, “The ABA recommends that the FCC use its statutory authority under section 253(d) of the Act to preempt states from entering into exclusive provider agreements, and open up the ICS market to fair and widespread competition.[5]”

And the Wright Petitioners wrote, “The FCC correctly notes that the Petitioners have been calling for the introduction of competition in the ICS market for more than 15 years, and in fact, this goal served as the basis for Martha Wright and the Petitioners to file the original lawsuit.[6]”

Some of the solutions put forth to achieve this goal include an equal access[7] approach similar to that which was put in place to open up local and long distance services to competition wherein consumers picked their local and long distance providers. Others have suggested a “wholesale/retail” bifurcation of the industry providers.

We believe, like the FCC, ABA, HRDC and the Wright Petitioners, that competition is an essential ingredient in breaking the ICS providers’ monopolies in prisons and jails in order to drive market-based pricing.

However, like the consumer market, unfettered and robust choice is what drives real competition. Completely bypassing the monopolists is the best way to ensure this choice. The consumer telecommunications market, while initially cracked open by regulatory schemes such as equal access, was fully emancipated by the introduction and widespread adoption of cellular phones.

An individual “wireless prison payphone” in the form of a secure cellular service offered to any detainee who wants it, without requiring interconnection to the monopolist’s infrastructure or the forced bifurcation of the industry into wholesale/retail providers, will offer true choice and therefore real competition in an industry that has for so long thrown up barriers to any meaningful competition.

By using commercial cellular networks to bypass the monopolists, no potentially insecure and costly infrastructure, such as WiFi[8], is required in a prison facility and therefore no capital costs to the prison facility as well as no risk of interconnection hurdles and artificial costs imposed by the incumbent ICS provider.

The current prison payphones already installed will remain in place, thereby giving inmates and their families a choice. If desired, the inmate can stand in line, waiting for his 15 minute call in a public area on the traditional prison payphone. Or he can make a controlled and sanctioned cellular call of unlimited length in the relative privacy of his cell.

In this way, real market forces will be introduced into the ICS arena thereby fulfilling the stated goals of the FCC, the ABA, the HDRC and the Wright Petitioners as well as providing choice and cost savings to the families of prisoners throughout the United States.

Conclusion

Accordingly, meshIP requests that the FCC considers the potential negative impact of cellular jamming on the competitive landscape and to alternative technology solutions available to address the problem of contraband cell phones in prisons. The approval of blanket cellular signal jamming runs the risk of hamstringing viable alternative solutions not only to this problem but also to the FCC’s long standing commitment to introducing choice and competition into the prison payphone industry.

————————————————————————————————————————————-

[1] https://shadowproof.com/2017/01/05/corrections-officers-control-supply-demand-contraband-phones-prisons/

[2] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/corrections/southern-prisons-have-smuggled-cellphone-problem-n790251

[3]https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-136A1_Rcd.pdf

[4] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001013059.pdf

[5] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001016566.pdf

[6] https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001408397.pdf

[7] https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/local-local-toll-and-long-distance-calling

[8] https://prisoncellphones.com/blog/2013/06/06/the-risks-of-wifi-and-internet-deployment-in-prisons/

The post Promoting Technological Solutions to Combat Contraband Wireless Device Use in Correctional Facilities appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

After last year’s announcement by the CDCR that they would halt the deployment of the managed access systems touted to stop the supply of contraband cell phones into California’s state prisons, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has now announced it is installing 272 more metal detectors, 68 X-ray machines to scan packages, 103 low-dose X-ray scanners, 170 hidden surveillance cameras, 34 devices to decrypt and analyze cellphones, and 272 scanners that detect magnetic signals in a new effort to address this supply problem.

According the the prison payphone provider in California, who also oversaw the now cancelled managed access system deployment, “The latest crackdown is unlikely to deter inmates who want to conduct illegal activities using an unmonitored cellphone,” said a Global Tel-Link product manager. “There is no magic bullet, You can’t try to address the demand because the demand is always going to be there. So it’s better to control the supply, not only by capturing illicit phones but analyzing their calls and contents. That analysis has at times led to investigators uncovering weapons or drugs within prisons.”

Demand and supply are two sides of the same coin

We have long advocated for a balanced strategy that addresses both supply AND demand, however. We believe that the problem of demand for smuggled mobile phones in jail goes beyond long-term offenders looking to continue their drug or crime operations, witness intimidation and the avoidance of high LD rates. The demand is also driven by a desire for more communication and more privacy (not secrecy). As such, any comprehensive solution should address both sides of the equation – supply and demand. However, like the problem of drug smuggling, without addressing the demand for contraband, the problem will never be solved.

A recent CDCR inmate, now released, shared with us the following insight, “California’s gangs have evolved over the past 5 decades to operate efficiently within the system of scarce resources. They can get gang orders out of a locked down county jail and into a locked down prison 70 miles away between midnight and 2 AM without reliance on any contraband inside either facility, telephones, nor help from staff using only technology from the 1970’s plus a large number of people inside and out working towards a common goal (FGA in custody terms – in furtherance of a gang activity). Sanctioned gang action does not travel over any phone for a reason. The reality is contraband phones are used for calls to friends and family, mostly female, because the GTL system is inadequate to serve the number of people housed within CA’s system of incarceration. Managed Access has become an asset for the gang that controls and sells and profits from the technology to defeat it, since it now drives demand for the product they offer to sell inside while reducing supply of competing alternatives.”

An article written by a current CDCR inmate also provides some interesting insights into this demand and how it is met, “The black market within the fences of the California prison in which I am incarcerated is as bad as any corrections department in this country. In my case, this prison is five hours from home, and the distance makes visitation a financial burden. Some prisoners have it even worse. The vast majority of the prison population lives on the support of loved ones alone. While the cost of a contraband cellphone is high, the corporation-run prepaid call system is downright robbery. Desperate to stay in touch with loved ones and faced with only unaffordable options, incarcerated people turn to the black market, where they are charged as much as $1,000 for a contraband smartphone. Incarcerated persons prefer to take the risk and spend the money on contraband phones than rely on the prison phone system because of the freedom they provide and their functionality beyond making simple calls. There are no time limits and fees to place calls…”

“The drug market is self-sustaining because drugs are consumed almost immediately. There will always be a demand for them, and the supply can flow as freely as they can be smuggled into the housing units. But a phone can possibly last years once you have one. So, there is a need for constant manipulation of the supply in order to ensure a steady stream of demand. The models of phone that I’ve come across are difficult to conceal and this could be deliberate. In the outside world, there are keychain-sized smartphones with 3G capabilities, but rarely have I seen one in here. I bought a basic talk and text-only phone the size of two fingers, and costed me the same amount as a 4G touchscreen model the size of my hand.”

meshDETECT is a secure prison cell phone solution that gives detainees highly customized cell phones with all the security and control features of prison payphones. This allows those detainees whose only desire is for legitimate, non-criminal contact with family to use wireless technology safely and securely.

By siphoning off and co-opting this non-criminal wireless usage, we significantly reduce the overall demand for contraband cell phones and therefore the profitability for those smuggling these devices. Less financial reward for cell phone smugglers changes the risk/reward equation and makes it much less appealing given the high personal and professional risk for those caught smuggling.

The post Controlling Supply And Demand For Contraband Phones In Prisons appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

This news tracks with reports elsewhere that this technology to block cell phone usage in prisons is problematic. An effective contraband cell phone strategy should focus on reducing demand, in addition to restricting supply.

Corrections officials have shared with us the fact that at least 40% of the calls intercepted by these systems are to phone numbers on inmates’ approved calling lists. We suspect that an even higher percentage are to other family and loved ones not on the limited list of allowed contacts and are also non-criminal wireless usage.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) cannot say it was not warned that the high-tech system it was deploying to stop rampant, forbidden cellphone use by inmates in the state’s 34 prisons probably would not work.

The 2012 report by the California Council on Science and Technology said the system wouldn’t block 4G, Wi-Fi, MiFi, Skype, text messages or satellite transmissions. It can’t triangulate radio signals, limiting its effectiveness in identifying specific phones or users. And radio frequency leakage could interfere with regular cellphone usage, affecting the public’s access to 911 operators.

But the state forged ahead, installing the system at 18 prisons before deciding it wasn’t working.

The Associated Press reported on Wednesday that the department has halted expansion while options are pondered. “It’s been difficult to make sure the technology can handle those upgrades,” CDCR spokeswoman Dana Simas told AP. “Whether we’re going to scrap it or whether we can find solutions to these issues, that will be determined later.” “What remains to be determined is if the constant upgrades performed by the vendor will be sustainable in the future,” Simas said.

The report had called the state’s long-term investment in untested technology “unwise” and premature, especially in light of the fact that it really doesn’t even know how many illegal cellphones are floating around the prison system. The council recommended using airport-style screening systems for all personnel and having private carriers identify and disable illicitly obtained phones.

“In point of fact, there are no prisons anywhere in the United States using a functional managed access system to control cell phone use,” the report said.

Prison officials go to great lengths to prevent cellphones, often stolen, from being slipped into the prison by employees or visitors. It doesn’t work very well. Charles Manson, a high-profile 81-year-old killer, was recently caught twice with cellphones used to call around the country. A visitor was caught with a third phone meant for him, in a hallowed out boot heel.

Global Tel-Link’s blocking system made it into 18 of the state’s 34 prisons, and for now that seems as far as it’ll go, because cell phone companies of 2015 are using drastically different networks than the companies of 2011. Between 4G and Long Term Evolution services, phone companies are transmitting calls over a system that has more in common with a wifi network than old-school cell connections.

AP said the number of cellphones grabbed in California prisons declined markedly from 15,000 in 2011 to 8,000 in 2015. But the inmate who talked on his illicit phone to Vice reporter Seth Ferranti in February described a very active tech scene.

“All my homies that got phones, all of us are friends on Facebook. Niggas be making rap videos, they be filming riots and filming shit that’s going on and putting them on YouTube.”

The inmate, a lifer called “Big Smoke,” said, “The cellphones is rampant up and down the coast of California.” He claimed most of the phones were brought in by staff, but, “Some inmates is even smuggling them in now because it’s so profitable. They smuggling in memory cards, chargers, cords, anything that has to do with a cellphone. All that stuff goes for $50 a pop. Every part that has to do with a cellphone is profitable. The black market is big.”

(Source)

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Here is the latest summary of recent news articles regarding contraband cell phones in prisons around the world. I call these periodic round up of news items, “Wireless Prison Payphone™ Briefs” because this is essentially what smuggled mobile phones in jails have become – a substitute for the current wall mounted prison payphones.

Convicted Killer Among Group of Prisoners Given Permission to Buy Mobile Phone: A convicted killer is among a group of prisoners at an open jail given permission to buy a mobile phone.

Ten inmates at Loughan House jail in Blacklion, Co Cavan, were allowed to buy a handset late last week. And among the first to get their hands on the phones was convicted killer Nigel Kenny. He and the nine other inmates were told by Governor William Reilly that they could buy the Samsung handsets with a charger and €5 credit for €25 on Friday.

The programme is expected to be rolled out to all prisoners at the open jail over the coming weeks. Mobile phones have already been given to inmates at Shelton Abbey open prison in Co Wicklow… (source)

Romania to Implement Mobile Signal Jammers in Prisons to Curb Phone Fraud by Inmates: Romania plans to implement a system that will jam mobile phone reception in prisons starting 2015, which should limit the number and use of mobile phones in prisons, but also corruption among prison employees.

The unauthorized use of mobile phones by inmates was central to many fraud cases where prisoners called gullible individuals and asked for money by giving them fake information. One of the most common schemed used was for inmates to call people and pretend they were lawyers, working with a family member who was taken by the Police and who needed money to be released, convincing families to send them over the money… (source)

Smuggled Cellphones Creating Havoc in Prisons: They’re hidden in babies’ diapers, ramen noodle soup packages, footballs, soda cans and even body cavities.

Not drugs or weapons, but cellphones. They’re becoming a growing problem in prisons across America as they are used to make threats, plan escapes and for inmates to continue to make money from illegal activity even while behind bars.

“You can pick states all across the country and you’ll see everything from hits being ordered on individuals to criminal enterprises being run from inside institutions with cellphones,” said Michael Crews, head of Florida’s Department of Corrections.

When two murderers serving life sentences escaped from Florida Panhandle prison last fall, a search of their cells turned up a cellphone used to help plan the getaway, drawing attention to the burgeoning problem. It was just one of 4,200 cellphones confiscated by prison officials last year, or 11 per day…(source)

Blocking Cell Phone Calls from Prisons: Good Idea, Dumb Policy: Honduras has embarked on a very stupid program of forcing its cell phone providers to block calls from within the 23 prisons in Honduras. It’s not that the idea is necessarily bad. But the implementation they chose is exceptionally stupid. The Honduran Congress under Porfirio Lobo passed a bill that requires cell phone providers to block any calls from prisons. This is not something that is done easily in a standard cell phone base station and requires special programming (and probably required the purchase of that capability from the base station provider).

The idiocy comes from the fact that the law specifies that for each prison location, no cell phone be able to complete a call, text message, or Internet connection within a one kilometer circle around the prison. The Honduran Congress definitely shouldn’t have specified a technical solution to what recognizably is a problem for their desired management of the prison population. But they did, and they chose the worst possible solution for the Honduran populace that lives near the prisons.

It probably bears emphasis that in Honduras, prisons are often located in densely populated areas surrounded by housing. The residents of these cities and towns living within one kilometer of the prisons targeted are suffering because their cell phones don’t work, either. That means no emergency service calls for medical help, no fire protection, no calling the police to report a crime in progress… (source)

‘Dead’ Mobiles Spark Stir: Residents in Kalapet, Chinna Kalapet and Kanagachettikulam resorted to road blockades in four places on the East Coast Road on Monday, to protest the disconnection of cell phone towers in the vicinity of Puducherry Central prison at Kalapet. The traffic on the route was crippled for more than two hours.

The district magistrate had disconnected the towers, to stave off the use of cell phones by prison inmates, to perpetrate crimes, posing a great deal of inconvenience to the residents. However, the intervention by Revenue and Police led to the withdrawal of the road blockade.

The District Magistrate had initiated the action after the Governor himself visited the jail and raised safety issues. Taking advantage of the proximity of mobile towers, the jammers inside the central jail were rendered ineffective and the inmates of the jail made calls at ease… (source)

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The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice has determined that managed access jamming of contraband cell phones is too expensive and has commissioned “research to explore the use and demand for illicit mobile phones amongst the prison population” in order to facilitate the “development of a new mobile phone strategy to:

(i) manage prisoner communications,

(ii) reduce and control criminal activities and

(iii) reduce expenditure on equipment and the need for time-consuming searches.”

The aim of the study is:

1. To further the understanding of what drives the demand for illicit mobile phones by prisoners; and

2. To help identify potential effective ways of preventing their usage (excluding prohibitively expensive solutions such as mobile phone blockers).

To guide the analysis, the key research questions to be explored are:

• What drives the demand for mobile phones within prisons? How much is for maintaining family conduct and how much is for other more criminal purposes (including criminal networks, gangs, terrorism)?

• Are certain types of prisoners more likely to want a mobile phone and so drive demand in particular establishments?

• Which non-technical factors could be most effective (and cost effective) in reducing both the supply and demand for mobile phones in prison (including ways of counteracting the prison economy that surrounds the use of mobile phones)?

Maryland as an example

Let’s look at Maryland as an example of the managed access cost concerns prisons around the world must wrestle with when considering jamming technology. Last year, the Maryland State legislature formed a Special Joint Commission on Public Safety and Security in State and Local Correctional Facilities. Formed in response to the scandal at the Baltimore City Detention Center, where a joint federal-state investigation revealed a virtual takeover of the facility by violent inmate gang members and corrupt correctional officers, the commission recently released its recommendations.

Included in this report is the recommendation is to expand the funding for managed access jammers at six additional prison facilities beyond the two sites (MTC and BCDC) where it has already been installed. Per the report, the jamming costs for these two existing sites are $2 million annually at MTC and $3.9 million annually at BCDC.

According to the report, “The system appears to be very effective, as evidenced by the sight of inmates continuously lined up at payphones.” That’s some fact-based decision making right there!

If the cell phones in the prison were predominately used to plan crimes by avoiding the monitoring/recording of calls at the prison payphones (the reasons given to justify the multi-million dollar annual expenditures), why would prison payphone demand increase once the contraband mobile phones were being jammed? Perhaps because the predominant use of the now blocked mobile phones is not to run gangs, but rather to speak to loved ones?

We have long advocated the strategy of looking at the problem of contraband cell phones as a problem of supply AND demand. We believe however that the problem of demand for smuggled mobile phones in jail goes beyond long-term offenders looking to continue their drug or crime operations, witness intimidation and the avoidance of high call prices.

Contraband cell phone demand is also driven by a desire for more frequent family communication and more privacy (not secrecy) and as such, any comprehensive solution should address both sides of the equation – supply and demand.

Providing prisoners with a controlled and secure prison cell phone, such as the meshDETECT solution, will siphon off the predominant use of the contraband phones – communication with loved ones. Combined with a measured and cost effective supply-side strategy, this demand-side approach will lower the value of the contraband wireless phones and therefore the money that can be made smuggling them into prison, eliminate wireless airtime as prison currency and reduce recidivism by enhancing family connections.

The challenges prison budgets face in today’s economic environment necessitate such a comprehensive approach. We are pleased to see that, in Britain at least, this strategy is being seriously considered.

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A disruptive innovation is an innovation that helps create a new market and value network, and eventually goes on to disrupt an existing market and value network (over a few years or decades), displacing an earlier technology. The term is used to describe innovations that improve a product or service in ways that the market does not expect, typically first by designing for a different set of consumers in a new market and later by lowering prices in the existing market.

Characteristics of a Disruptive Innovation:

• Its performance attributes meet the unfulfilled needs of an emerging market’s customers. These same attributes are not initially valued by the mainstream market, which instead value different performance attributes and initially see the innovation as substandard.
• Emerging market adoption enables the innovation to increase its performance and to begin overlapping with the performance expectations of the mainstream market.
• Awareness of the innovation increases as the innovation develops, influencing change in the mainstream market’s perception of what it values.
• The change in the mainstream market’s perception of what it values enables the innovation to disrupt and replace the existing offerings in the mainstream market.

In the prison payphone industry, it is clear that the high call prices and low availability of the traditional wall phones in prisons and jails are not meeting the communication desires of detainees and their families. As a result, the demand for contraband cell phones has soared. Prison administrators, and the prison payphone companies themselves, have focused on strategies to reduce the supply of smuggled mobile phones through the deployment of expensive managed access systems, cell phone detection technologies and specially trained K9s.

However, none of these strategies address the fundamental demand (and associated corruption of guards and staff supplying the phones) of detainees seeking lower cost and more frequent access to telephone services.

In mature industries, such as the prison payphone industry, the risk for incumbents is the danger of dematuring. Dematuring happens when a stable industry with known competitors begins to be dynamic and new again.  If an industry is dematuring, the chances of getting hit with a disruptive innovation are much greater and  established players lose their hegemony while value in the industry can move to entirely new players or parts of the value chain.

An industry is in danger of dematuring if two or more of the following four things happen simultaneously:

1. customer’s core requirements change;
2. the core technologies used to produce the product or service change;
3. the number of large competitors interested in the same market is on the rise;
4. significant regulation, deregulation, or re-regulation is coming down the pike.

In the prison payphone industry we see commissary companies such as Keefe entering the market as well as new initiatives by the FCC and state regulatory commissions to lower the high cost of prison phone calls.

We are also seeing the adoption of mobility technologies such as RFID, GPS and handheld devices. The very first payphone was installed in a bank in 1889 (and probably in a jail not too long after). Yet the inmate communications service providers such as Global Tel*Link and Securus Technologies are still using this basic device (admittedly with very sophisticated back-end controls) over 120 years later!

There is no denying the pervasive and rapid adoption of wireless technologies in the the consumer market has begun to seep into prisons and jails. Add to this the desire of prison administrators to deploy on-line forms, books, MP3 players and commissary access and one quickly comes to the realization that voice communications can be an important component of this move to individualized, utilitarian and portable access devices to educate, rehabilitate and manage detainees.

With meshDETECT, we are leading the charge to disrupt the prison payphone industry by providing a secure prison cell phone solution that provides the controls and security required by prison administrators while offering enhanced communications opportunities to detainees and their families thereby reducing recidivism and the demand for contraband cell phones.

The post Why The Prison Payphone Industry Is Ripe For Disruptive Innovation appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

Update: We have submitted our thoughts on this complex issue to the FCC. You can read them here and download the actual filing here.

The FCC today issued FCC 13-58, Contraband Wireless Device Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), to “remove barriers to the deployment and viability of existing and future technologies used to combat contraband wireless devices.” The NPRM discusses current technologies such as managed access, detection, jamming and wireless carrier service termination of identified contraband cell phones.

Below are excerpts from the rulemaking document:

Inmate use of contraband wireless devices has grown within the federal and state prison systems parallel to the growth of wireless device use by the general public. In federal institutions and prison camps, GAO reports that the number of cell phones confiscated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) grew from 1,774 in 2008 to 3,684 in 2010. While not all states track or report data on the use of contraband wireless devices, the data that has been reported demonstrates significant growth. For example, California correctional officers seized approximately 261 cell phones in 2006; by 2011, correctional officers discovered more than 15,000 contraband wireless devices. Further, a test of an interdiction technology in two California State prisons detected more than 25,000 unauthorized communication attempts over an 11 day period in 2011. A similar interdiction system permanently installed in a Mississippi correctional facility reportedly blocked 325,000 communications attempts in the first month of operation, and as of February 2012, had blocked more than 2 million communications attempts.

In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice), we take steps to facilitate the development of multiple technological solutions to combat the use of contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities nationwide. Prisoners’ use of contraband wireless devices to engage in criminal activity is a serious threat to the safety of prison employees, other prisoners, and the general public. Through this Notice, we seek to remove barriers to the deployment and viability of existing and future technologies used to combat contraband wireless devices. In this Notice, “contraband wireless device” refers to any wireless device, including the physical hardware or part of a device – such as a subscriber identification module (SIM) – that is used within a correctional facility without authorization by the correctional authority. We use the phrase “correctional facility” to refer to any facility operated or overseen by federal, state, or local authorities that houses or holds prisoners for any period of time.

We propose a series of modifications to the Commission’s rules to facilitate spectrum lease agreements between wireless providers and providers or operators of managed access systems used to combat contraband wireless devices. Those proposed modifications are:

• Revising the Commission’s rules to immediately process de facto lease agreements or spectrum manager lease agreements for spectrum used exclusively in managed access systems in correctional facilities, and streamlining other aspects of the lease application or notification review process for those managed access systems in correctional facilities.

• Forbearing, to the extent necessary, from the individualized application review and public notice requirements of Sections 308, 309, and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act), for qualifying managed access leases.

• Establishing a presumption that managed access operators provide a private mobile radio service (PMRS), streamlining the process for seeking Special Temporary Authority (STA) to operate a managed access system, and seeking comment on whether to establish a requirement that managed access providers provide notice to nearby households and businesses prior to activation of a managed access system.

We also propose to require wireless providers to terminate service, if technically feasible, to a contraband wireless device if an authorized correctional facility official notifies the wireless provider of the presence of the contraband wireless device within the correctional facility. We seek comment on the elements of the proposed notification and termination process, including who should be authorized to transmit a termination notification to the wireless provider, the form of such termination notice, and any safeguards necessary to ensure that service to legitimate wireless devices is not inadvertently terminated. We seek comment on the implication of our proposals on detection and managed access system operators’ compliance with or liability under Section 705 of the Act and federal law governing the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices. Finally, while we are limiting our proposals to managed access and detection solutions, we nevertheless invite comment on other technological approaches for addressing the problem of contraband wireless device usage in correctional facilities.

Further on in the document, it discusses managed access systems and some of the current deployments in state prison systems:

Managed access systems are micro-cellular, private networks that analyze transmissions to and from wireless devices to determine whether the device is authorized or unauthorized for purposes of accessing public carrier networks. Managed access systems utilize base stations that are optimized to capture all voice, text, and data communications within the system coverage area, which would be a correctional facility in the instant case. When a wireless device attempts to connect to the network from within the coverage area of the managed access system, the system cross-checks the identifying information of the device against a database that lists wireless devices authorized to operate in the coverage area. Authorized devices are allowed to communicate normally (i.e., transmit and receive voice, text, and data) with the commercial wireless network, while transmissions to or from unauthorized devices are terminated. The managed access system may also provide an alert to the user notifying the user that the device is unauthorized. The systems provide operational flexibility to the correctional facility administrators by allowing them to disable devices without having to physically remove them.

A correctional facility or third party at a correctional facility may operate a managed access system if authorized by the Commission. This authorization has to date involved agreements with the wireless providers serving the geographic area including the correctional facility and lease applications approved by the Commission. A number of deployments and trials have been conducted or are ongoing, as listed below.

• California The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has conducted trials of managed access systems at two state prisons. Based on the results of the trials, the California Technology Agency issued an Invitation for Bids for a prime contractor to provide a pay telephone system for inmates and wards and a managed access systems in correctional facilities across the state. The CDCR awarded the contract in April 2012 to Global Tel*Link (GTL), and its managed access operator has received experimental authorization to test a managed access system in nine facilities.

• Maryland The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) conducted an in-depth analysis of contraband cell phone interdiction technologies in 2009. Maryland DPSCS conducted trials of various non-jamming technologies at a decommissioned correctional facility in Jessup, Maryland, and a real-world study of non-jamming technologies in three commissioned correctional facilities. Maryland DPSCS subsequently issued a Request for Proposals for the installation of managed access and detection systems in all of its prisons, and granted a contract to Tecore Networks (Tecore) to install a managed access system in the Metropolitan Transition Center in Baltimore City, Maryland.

• Mississippi In 2010, the Mississippi Department of Corrections deployed a managed access system at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, a maximum security prison in Parchman, Mississippi. In its first month of operation, the system blocked a total of 325,000 call and message attempts, and has prevented more than 2 million calls and text messages through February 2012.

• South Carolina South Carolina has conducted trials of a managed access system at its Lieber Correctional Institution in Ridgeville, South Carolina. The Commission has approved several spectrum leases sought by ShawnTech Communications (ShawnTech) for a permanent installation at the Lieber Correctional Institution, and the system is operational.

• Texas The Texas Department of Criminal Justice announced in late 2012 that it would install managed access systems in two state correctional facilities. The Commission has approved a number of spectrum leases for ShawnTech for the managed access installations.

The post FCC Takes Up Technology Solutions To Contraband Cell Phones appeared first on meshDETECT® Blog.

Here is an interesting article endorsing the deployment and use of phones in prison cells to increase prisoner family contact and reduce recidivism. The issue of public perception of such a strategy is acknowledged, but enhancing access to telecommunication services will reduce the value of contraband cell phones and improve officer safety in prisons and jails. The strategy can easily be accomplished with no upfront cost through the deployment of the meshDETECT secure prison cell phone solution.

Telephones and not just televisions should be allowed in prisoners’ cells, the chief executive of the Scottish Prison Service has suggested.

Colin McConnell said helping people keep in touch with their families could help prevent reoffending.

He raised the idea with MSPs on Holyrood’s Justice Committee.

“I know that might stick in the craw of certain members of the public and maybe some members sitting round the table here,” Mr McConnell admitted.

“It seems to me you get people to behave normally if you treat them normally; you try and recreate normality.

“One of the things that’s generally accepted helps towards reducing reoffending is relationships and family contact.

Television curfew

“Anything reasonably and safely we can do to help sustain and develop family contact, we should give it a go.”

Mr McConnell admitted, in mentioning phones in cells, he was being “a wee bit reformist”.

The SPS chief executive said he is a “fan of TVs in cells” for prisoners, with “loads of positives that come from that”.

Labour MSP Graeme Pearson, a former director general of the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency, asked Mr McConnell if a 01:00 television curfew in operation at Low Moss Prison in Bishopbriggs should be extended to all prisoners.

The SPS chief executive replied that television could be a “window on the world”.

“It’s about keeping informed about what’s going on and actually it’s a displacement activity as well,” he said.

Encouraged to sleep

“If it stops somebody thinking horrible thoughts about themselves or others and encourages discourse about Coronation Street, the news or whatever it might be, I think there’s loads of positives that come from that.

“I know it’s one of those issues that polarises people, but I think there’s a place for it. Whether it should have a curfew, I think there are pros and cons.

“I’d much rather treat people with the respect and decency in the sense of ‘please use it sensibly’ and those that don’t, we might have to curtail it.”

Mr Pearson, the South of Scotland MSP, had suggested that, having visited the Bishopbriggs facility, the curfew appeared to have a “very positive effect on the prison” because it encourages prisoners to go to sleep, “which means, in the morning, they are more engaged and ready to go out and do something”.

Committee convener Christine Grahame said both televisions and phones in cells should come “with the caveat that presumably it’s monitored what they are watching and obviously phone calls, so people don’t think they are in some kind of Marriot Hotel instead of in prison”.

Source

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